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Catastrophe testimony is the testimony of survivors of traumatic experiences involving 
deliberately inflicted physical and psychological violence.   In this dissertation I examine the 
testimonies of survivors of rape, torture and imprisonment in Auschwitz and other 
concentration camps.  My objective is to explore how such testimonies bear witness to the 
epistemological, existential and moral chasm between the survivors and the world -  those 
who have no lived experience of being the victim of such catastrophic experiences.  In Part 
One of the dissertation, I describe the origins and theme of the dissertation, and my overall 
aims.  In Part Two I explore the epistemological chasm, reviewing the ‘classical’ reductionist 
and anti-reductionist accounts of belief justification and knowledge creation, and more recent 
epistemic agent-centred accounts, notably Inference to the Best Explanation and Virtue 
Epistemology.  I find that none of these ’informational’ accounts  can be adapted to permit 
the evaluation of non-propositional testimonial content.  The epistemological chasm thus 
equates to that part of what is revealed by testifiers in their testimony which cannot be 
justifiably believed or become known through the application of accepted epistemic rules and 
practices.  In Part Three of the dissertation, I begin my exploration of the existential and moral 
chasm between survivors and the world with a discussion of memory and especially episodic 
memory. I then consider specifically the evaluation of catastrophe testimony primarily by 
psychologists and psychotherapists, and also by historians and socio-political theorists. 
Finally, in Part Four, which is the core of the dissertation, I examine how selected survivors 
see themselves and judge the world through their testimonies, and also how societies, and 
specifically perpetrator societies, respond to their findings.  Parts Three and Four of the 
dissertation enable me to delineate the nature and extent of the existential and moral chasms 
between survivors and the world.  I conclude that the epistemological, existential and moral 
chasm between survivors and the world is a matter which should continue to concern us, but 
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                                                         PART ONE 
                                                      INTRODUCTION 
   
     CHAPTER 1.  BACKGROUND AND GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
    1.1   Origins of this Dissertation 
       My interest in the issues examined in this dissertation was first aroused by five essays 
written by the Austrian essayist Jean Améry (born Hans Maier, in Vienna, in 1912)1, and 
published in his book Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne (Beyond Guilt and Atonement), originally 
written in 1966 and first translated into English under the title At the Mind’s Limits in 1980.  
Améry had been a victim of the Third Reich in three capacities.  First as a three-quarters Jew, 
he had been forced to flee his native Austria, with his Jewish wife, at the end of 1938, and 
take refuge in Belgium.  Secondly, he had been arrested by the Gestapo in July 1943 whilst 
working as a  member of a small German-speaking resistance group operating in Brussels, and 
handed over to the SS, who had tortured him as a potential informant,  unaware of his Jewish 
identity, and then imprisoned him for several months in solitary confinement at Fort 
Breendonk, a concentration camp situated on the Belgian coast.  Finally, after his Jewish 
identity had been revealed he had been transported to Auschwitz in January 1944, where he 
remained until January 1945. After Auschwitz was evacuated, Améry  was first forced to 
march on foot and then transported by open rail truck to Dora-Mittelbau, and finally sent to 
Bergen-Belsen, from which he was liberated in April 1945 (Heidelberger-Leonard, 2010: 61-
63). 
                                                            
1 Jean Améry was the name he assumed in 1955, having settled permanently in Brussels, both in his everyday 
life, and as a writer.  It was an acknowledgement of his choice to live the rest of his life in francophone Belgium, 
but  his adopted surname, also represented an anagram of ‘Mayer’, his preferred spelling of his Austrian 
surname.  The poet and novelist Anne Michaels suggests that in distorting his given name Améry, was 
‘simultaneously creating a hiding place and exposing a violated self’ (Michaels, 2020: 36).   
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   Reading the essays in Améry’s book was the start of a journey of discovery for me. They 
addressed some major existential themes arising out of his experiences as a victim and 
survivor of the Third Reich in an essayistic rather than a straightforwardly anecdotal manner. 
They were  originally written as texts for a series of broadcasts by Améry to listeners of the 
German regional radio station Süddeutscher Rundfunk, beginning in early 1964, shortly after 
the commencement of the major trial in Frankfurt of a number of former members of the SS 
who  had served in Auschwitz.  Améry’s Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne essays are the work for 
which he is most widely known as a writer, although he wrote and broadcast a number of 
other important essays on political and cultural themes, particularly between 1966 and his 
death in 1978, as well as autobiographically inspired books and works of fiction. Though never 
as widely acclaimed as other writers of survivor testimonies such as Primo Levi, interest in 
Améry’s writings has been growing in recent years, particularly in anglophone circles.2   
Nevertheless, the ranks of those who have held his work in high esteem have included  W. G 
Sebald, Imre Kertesz, Alfred Andersch, Elias Canetti, Ingeborg Bachmann, and Primo Levi . 
Describing, in the Preface to the first edition of Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne, his approach 
to writing his essays, Améry said he had not wanted to write a ‘documentary report’ of his 
experiences, but rather ‘a phenomenological description of the existence of the victim’ 
(Améry, 1999, Preface to the First Edition: xiii).  His  own existential condition as a victim and 
survivor of the Nazi regime, which he regarded as irreversible, and unchangeable, was marked  
by  the renunciation of his former ‘German’ identity, which he condemned retrospectively as 
inauthentic. His childhood, and adolescence, as a provincial,  self-consciously Austrian, youth, 
he declared, though admittedly happy, had been in retrospect a ‘masquerade’, and his love 
for his native land, and its people based on ‘an existential misunderstanding’.  ‘What we 
thought had constituted our nature’ he asked, ‘was it ever anything else but mimicry?’ 
(Améry, 1999: 50).  On the other hand, his cultural identity as a left-wing German intellectual 
and writer had been both real and central to his existence, and his intellectual life as a survivor 
became focused on regaining it, and also on the restoration more generally of his dignity as a 
human being- the right to be someone thought ‘worthy of life’ which he declared had been 
                                                            
2 See, for example, Sebald (2003), Brudholm (2008), Heidelberger-Leonard 2010), Kertesz (2011), Zolkos (2010, 
2011), Cheyette (2013).  
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stripped from  him, and all Jews by the Third Reich.  However, rather than return to live in 
Austria, Améry chose to live out his life in Brussels, as a permanent exile.   
  His existence as a survivor, and especially one whose German cultural and educational roots 
still defined his intellectual and cultural life was, said Améry, fundamentally one of extreme 
loneliness. He wanted to end it, but on his own terms, and by 1964 he had come to realise 
that this was practically impossible.  The German people had moved on beyond the era of 
guilt and atonement, which they had in any event never sincerely embraced, to one of 
political rehabilitation and  economic restoration, and self-reinvention as a tolerant and 
democratic society.  It was moreover a society in which ‘resentful’ former victims of the Third 
Reich such as himself, far from being honoured, were themselves resented as visible 
reminders of the country’s shameful past and continually subjected to social pressure to 
forgive, and be reconciled, or at least to remain silent.  Of course such a reaction might be 
expected in cases where the majority of a population are implicated, if not  as perpetrators 
or accomplices then at least as indifferent bystanders, in the crimes of nations.  However, one 
of the discoveries I was to make in the course of exploring the relationship between survivors 
of catastrophic experiences and the world was the extent to which the mere fact of being a 
former victim, however innocent, of a catastrophic experience can render a survivor, if not a 
social pariah, then at least a social outsider.  
    As a testifier, Améry’s sense of isolation was compounded by another phenomenon which 
was to prove general among testifiers- the impossibility of finding a common language in 
which to communicate  what he had experienced to others.    In the essay  in which he 
recounted his experience of being tortured at Fort Breendonk, for example he  dismissed any 
attempt to describe the pain he experienced as involving a totally senseless ‘merry-go-round 
of figurative speech’(ibid. :33) Qualities of feeling such as the pain of torture, he declared, 
were as incomparable as they were indescribable: ‘They mark the limit of the capacity of 
language to communicate’ (ibid.).  Améry had in effect been caught on the horns of a dilemma 
which other testifiers would also face between the desire to invoke in his audience some kind 
of sympathetic response to his suffering  on the one hand, and the desire to avoid banalizing 
it by giving it a name, such as ‘hunger’,  ‘pain’ or ‘fear’,  to which they could attach an everyday 
meaning on the other.  Catastrophe testimony, I was to discover, however emotionally 
revelatory it might be, is never truly intimate.   
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   I surmised that these testifier-side issues  probably arose in some form or another  in the 
testimony of other survivors of the Holocaust, or of other genocidal actions, or torture, and 
perhaps beyond these also that of survivors of other violent, deliberately inflicted, personal 
assaults, such as rape. It also seemed plausible that the problems Améry had encountered as 
a survivor in attempting to re-engage personally and through  testimony with the world might 
reflect a more generally experienced  societal dilemma for survivors of catastrophic 
experiences, though obviously his case was a very particular one.  At the same time, it seemed 
necessary  to explore not only what can be told, but also what can be heard, through what I 
decided to call  catastrophe testimony.  How far could recipients of such testimony  
comprehend what they were being told, beyond the ‘what, where and when’ of survivor 
experiences, and indeed how far would they feel the need to do so?  How far would those 
who had not shared the experience of testifiers seek, or be equipped, to engage competently 
with the complex and distressing story they had been told without surrendering to 
incomprehension, or the temptation to cognitively repackage it in line with more familiar, or 
less discomforting, social, political, psychological, or cultural, narratives?   That is how what 
became my attempt to explore the epistemological, existential and moral chasm between 
survivors of catastrophic experiences, on the one hand, and the world as represented by their 
listeners and readers, on the other, began. 
  1.2  What Is Catastrophe Testimony? 
   The broadest definition of testimony is the act of one person telling another person 
something. However, the study of testimony has been traditionally seen an object of 
epistemological enquiry, and in that context its definition has become narrowed in two 
important respects.  First, the notion of testifying has come to be associated with the notion 
of conveying information, and thus testimonial ‘telling’ has come to mean propositional 
telling – that which occurs when a testifier tells someone that p.  Secondly the context in 
which the  telling occurs has come to be assumed as that of a speech act, in which  a statement 
that p is uttered by a speaker to a present hearer, or a  group of hearers, such as when  giving 
someone the time of day, or directions to the railway station, or giving evidence in a criminal 
trial.  However, whilst catastrophe testimony certainly typically conveys propositional 
information – about when and where a catastrophic experience occurred, the identity of the 
perpetrator(s) and the nature of the atrocities they committed, for example – this is neither 
11 
the full extent of the content of such testimony, nor necessarily its most important or valuable 
element.  And whilst catastrophe testimony is sometimes presented in the form of a speech 
act, it may also be presented in a variety of other forms, such as  an audio or video recording, 
a radio or televisual broadcast, or a published autobiographical work in a documentary, 
essayistic, fictionalised, or poetic form, the recipients of which may be unidentified, or even 
unknown.    
    However, it is the subject matter of catastrophe testimony rather than the epistemological 
nature of its content, or its presentation or transmission,  which is its defining characteristic- 
the catastrophic experience suffered by the testifier. A catastrophic experience as defined 
herein is one involving the intentional and violent infliction of pain and suffering, often 
including a threat to life or limb, resulting in serious and lasting physical and psychological 
trauma.  Being a victim of rape, for instance, is a catastrophic experience, whereas being a 
victim of a serious car accident is not, although both may result in severe physical and 
psychological trauma.  A catastrophic experience may be the result of a personally targeted 
action, such as torture, or individual cases of rape, or collectively targeted actions, such as 
those connected with forced mass deportations, various kinds of group enslavement, 
imprisonment in concentration camps, or other persecutions of particular groups, races, or 
people, including acts of genocide. The term ‘catastrophe testimony’ also embraces 
testimony relating to the existential, psychological and moral experience of being a survivor 
of the catastrophic experience in question. 
     The content of catastrophe testimony invariably includes non-propositional or 
introspective elements reflecting its essential nature as a phenomenal account of the 
subjectively felt experience of victimhood or survival. In addition, it may also contain 
declarations of a political, social, cultural and moral nature, such as expressions of 
condemnation or resentment concerning the failure of society, or sections of society, to 
sufficiently acknowledge or accept responsibility or atone for the ordeals suffered by  the 
testifier and other victims or survivors similar catastrophic experiences.   Thus, I am inclined 
to think of catastrophe testimony as essentially  sui generis; testimony in a variety of  forms 
in which propositional and non-propositional elements are interwoven and narrativized in the 
context of the testifier’s objectives in bearing witness to the particular catastrophic 
experience in question, or its existential legacy.  
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   The proportion of catastrophe testimony which epistemologists might accept as 
constituting epistemically evaluable propositional telling relative to the testimony as a whole 
is thus something which can be determined only on a case- by- case basis.  In fact, it cannot 
be assumed  that the testifier’s primary objective in testifying is necessarily the provision of 
propositional information to recipients. Améry for example intentionally avoided the 
inclusion of what he called ‘documentary’ information – roughly propositional data -  in his 
essays, save where required in the context of the subject under discussion, preferring to 
concentrate on conveying  his own phenomenal experience of victimhood and survival and 
essayistic meditations invoked by them.  By the same token, the importance or value of such 
propositional information to the recipient cannot be assumed, and will largely depend on his 
or her interest in evaluating the testimony. It might, for example, be of vital importance to a 
lawyer seeking evidence in relation to the prosecution of a perpetrator, or a historian seeking 
to write a definitive account of the catastrophic event in question, but of lesser importance 
to a psychotherapist who regards her patient’s ‘trauma story’ primarily as a psychological tool 
to be employed in helping his or her recovery rather than a record of their experiences. In 
fact, the most widely read testimonies are probably those autobiographical works published 
for general public consumption to those whose interest in hearing or reading them may have 
no particular epistemic or other orientation. 
    So there can be no hard and fast rules about the form or content of catastrophe testimony. 
The most important factors in determining its form, content or aims in my experience are 
contextual.  One important factor I have found for instance is the time of its writing relative 
to the occurrence of the catastrophic event. Whilst testimonies written shortly after the 
occurrence of the catastrophic experiences they describe, such as Primo Levi’s If This is a Man, 
or Charlotte Delbo’s None of Us will Return, seem to me to be driven primarily by cathartic, 
and revelatory impulses, and tend to be anecdotal, (and thus sometimes more propositional) 
in nature,  those written several years after the event often appear more preoccupied with 
the existential, societal or moral discontents of survival, such as the sense of being estranged 
from, or abandoned by contemporary society.  This underlines the fact that testimony relating 
to past events, is always written from the perspective of the time of writing, and the greater 
the time which has elapsed between the two, the more the testifier’s account of her 
experiences  can be influenced by the testifier’s experience of survival, as well as what she 
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may have learned about the past in the intervening period.  It is for this reason that some 
commentators regard contemporary diaries as more reliable accounts of what happened in 
the past than autobiographical accounts of events written years later. Certainly, some such 
‘long distance’ autobiographical testimonies can sometimes appear to be a somewhat 
negatively influenced by the discontents of survival. This, though, is not always the case- 
Kathryn Freedman’s account   of surviving rape in her book One Hour in Paris, written 24 years 
after the event, for example is a positive story of recovery, and social reconnection, however 
incomplete or contingent. 
   Another crucial characteristic of catastrophe testimony is its source, which lies not only in 
episodic memory -memory of things which happened in the past – but in the episodic memory 
of traumatic experiences.  I examine the debate around the role of memory generally in 
Chapter 5 below, and in relation to  traumatic experiences specifically in Chapter 7 below. 
     1.3 Overall  Aim and Structure  of This Dissertation 
The primary aim of this dissertation is to explore how catastrophe testimony reveals the 
epistemological, existential and moral chasm between testifiers and the world – those 
individuals and societies to which they return or with which they seek to engage as survivors.  
It focuses on those issues primarily from the perspective of survivors themselves. At the same 
time, researching and writing this dissertation has also proved to be something of a journey.  
At the beginning it seemed to me that the issues to be addressed were largely epistemological 
– questions such as whether and how one can to form justified true beliefs, or acquire 
knowledge through catastrophe testimony, given that the experiences described in such 
testimony were so extreme, and lay so far outside the lived experience of those who had not 
themselves undergone comparable experiences.  Gradually, though, it became clear that to 
address the issue only from an epistemological perspective was to confine its scope to that 
part of the testimonial content which could be properly regarded as conveying propositional 
information, which neither reflected the true scope, value and importance of such testimony 
in a philosophical context nor the apparent aims of testifiers in testifying to their experiences.  
The key  to how to expand the scope of my enquiry beyond the epistemological seemed to 
me to lie in Améry’s insistence, in his Preface to the Reissue of  Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne 
that to be a survivor of a catastrophic experience such as his own was an existential condition 
‘which is unchangeable’ (Améry, 1999, Preface to the Reissue; ix).  What, therefore, I would 
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need to address beyond purely epistemological issues were those relating to the nature of 
that existential condition: broadly speaking the introspective element of surviving one’s 
survival, and the social element of re-engaging (or not) with post-traumatic society. The 
remainder of this dissertation is in effect a record of my attempt to carry out that task.  
   The structure of this dissertation essentially follows the philosophical journey described 
above. It begins, in Part Two of the dissertation, with a review of a number of epistemological 
accounts of how testimonial beliefs can become justified true beliefs and yield knowledge, 
and  discusses their applicability to and their limitations as accounts of catastrophe testimony.  
I then explore various accounts of the workings of memory as a testimonial source.  In Part 
Three of the dissertation I move on to examine the existential condition of being a victim and 
survivor of a catastrophic experience, and the existential and moral chasm between testifiers 
and the world, from an outsider perspective.  Finally, in Part Four of the dissertation I examine 
those issues from the perspectives of survivors themselves, through a selection of survivor 
testimonies: those of Karyn L. Freedman, a victim of rape, Jean Améry, a victim of torture and 
of imprisonment in Auschwitz, Charlotte Delbo, a non- Jewish political prisoner in Auschwitz 
and other concentration camps, Primo Levi a Jewish prisoner in Auschwitz, and Ruth Kluger, 
a Jewish prisoner in a number of Nazi camps, including Auschwitz.  These encompass not only 
three different kinds of catastrophic experience, but also catastrophic experiences which 
were both individually and collectively experienced.  Finally, in the Epilogue, I consider what  
has been learned concerning the role of testimony in bearing witness to the epistemological, 












                                                             PART  TWO 
 
     CATASTROPHE TESTIMONY AS AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL PHENOMENON 
 
     CHAPTER 2.   INTRODUCTION  
     2.1  Testimony From an Epistemological Perspective 
    Testimony, as a subject of philosophical inquiry, has  been treated historically as primarily 
the province of epistemologists, though epistemological discourse relating to memory  has in 
recent years also been influenced by developments in the fields of psychology and cognitive 
science as discussed  in Chapter 5 below.  However, as Jennifer Lackey notes, ‘the central 
focus in the epistemology of testimony is not on the nature of testimony itself, but instead on 
how justified belief, or knowledge, is acquired on the basis of what other people tell us’ 
(Lackey,2011: 71).  Moreover, epistemologists have typically addressed this question as one 
of prescribing evaluatory rules or criteria of evaluation, notwithstanding the many different 
kinds of interactions which may be described as testimony, and have also generally continued 
to treat testimony  as a speech act addressed by a speaker to a hearer, notwithstanding the 
increasing variety of forms in which testimony, including catastrophe testimony, may actually 
be transmitted.  
   Given the range and diversity of different kinds of testimony, from giving directions to a 
nearby location, or telling someone the time of day, to giving formal evidence in judicial 
proceedings, it is not surprising that there appears to be no general agreement among 
epistemologists regarding a standard definition of testimony. Some epistemologists  choose 
to define testimony in the widest terms, such as ‘tellings in general (i.e. with no restrictions 
either on subject matter, or on the speaker’s epistemic relation to it)’ (Fricker, 1995: 396-7), 
or ‘the intentional transmission of information in general’ (Pritchard, 2014: 80).  Robert Audi 
suggests that  testimony is ‘virtually any instance of someone’s telling somebody something 
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where this is telling that---propositional telling--- as opposed to telling to---imperatival 
telling’, adding that ‘telling that’ is  ‘roughly a matter of saying the kind of thing from which 
we learn facts from other people’ (Audi 2006: 25).  C.A.J Coady, on the other hand, opts for a 
relatively narrow  definition of testimony.  He first distinguishes ‘formal’ testimony - that 
offered  as evidence in a court of law  or similar forum, in which rules regulating the content 
or presentation of testimony are generally applied - and ‘natural’ testimony - any other 
testimonial encounter in which ‘we have a speaker engaged in the speech act of testifying to 
the truth of some proposition which is either in dispute or in some way in need of 
determination and his attestation is evidence towards the settling of the matter’ (Coady 1992: 
38).   In Coady’s view,  all testimony, including natural testimony, must both be offered as 
evidence for a proposition p, and provide actual evidence for the truth of the stated 
proposition p, by a testifier having the ‘the relevant competence, authority, or credentials to 
state truly that p’, and be directed to those in need of such evidence. (ibid: 42). As Peter 
Graham (1997) points out,  these conditions  appear somewhat onerous when applied, for 
instance, to someone giving  directions to the post office, whilst Elizabeth Fricker suggests 
that Coady’s assumption that testimony is always delivered ‘by-someone-in-a-position-to-
know-about-the-matter-in-question’ is ‘tendentious’ (Fricker, 1995: 39).  
    It must, however, be evident to most observers that giving a stranger directions, or telling 
her the time of day, teaching or instructing a child, offering an expert view on a scientific, or 
historical question, giving evidence in a murder trial, or rendering an account of an act of 
genocide one may have witnessed, not only constitute fundamentally different categories of 
testimony, but also involve acts of testifying which make materially different demands on the 
testifier, and the recipient(s) of her testimony.   Indeed, it should be evident that even two 
testimonial encounters of the same general nature may  be materially different in reality; for 
example, a request for directions to the nearest post office, and a request, made in bad 
weather, for directions to the safest route off a mountain. Consequently, however one 
defines testimony, what is at stake for the testifier in testifying, or for the recipient of her 
testimony in accepting her utterance as true, depends largely on the context and situation of 
the testimonial encounter, the nature of the testimony, and the individual characters and 
motivations of the parties.  And that is particularly true of  catastrophe testimony. 
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   2.2  The Epistemic Status Of Testimony 
      As Lackey observed, epistemological interest in testimony is focused on its how it can yield 
justified true beliefs, or disseminate knowledge.  The underlying question in this context is 
whether testimony is or can be an independent source of justified true belief like perception, 
inferential reasoning, or memory, or whether its function in the epistemic chain is purely that 
of transmitting propositional information originating from one or more of these other 
sources.  It is a separate issue whether testimony is merely a means of transmitting knowledge  
acquired from other sources or a locus of knowledge in itself, and this is by no means a settled 
issue among epistemologists.  In the specific case of catastrophe testimony, however, we 
have already established that its primary source is episodic memory, or more precisely 
recollection, and this is true whether one takes the preservationist view that memory is a 
faculty for recording and reproducing an original image of a past event or experience, or the 
generativist view that  memory is part of a wider cognitive process of continuously adapting, 
constructing or reconstructing  memory beliefs, including at the time of their retrieval for 
transmission as testimony (see, further, Chapter 5).  However, if one takes the preservationist 
view, it seems to follow that one  believes that the role of testimony is purely transmissive, 
whereas if one takes the generativist view, it seems to follow that one believes that 
recollection  rather than memory is the locus of any knowledge acquired as a result of the 
utterance ( as is more fully  explained in Chapter 5).  Jean Améry, on the other hand, further 
complicates this issue when he claims that only in the process of writing about his experience 
as a prisoner in Auschwitz was he able to fully recall, and thus retrieve, the memories of what 
he had experienced  as a victim of the Third Reich (Améry, 1999, Preface: xiii).  This implies 
that the causal link between memory and testimony is not necessarily as fixed as one might 
suppose- that the act of testifying can invoke memory, in which case it is if not the source of 
memory then at least the possible trigger for remembering.   None of this of course affects 
the issue of whether, and to what extent, beliefs produced by a particular act of testifying 
might or might not constitute justified true beliefs or generate knowledge in the case in 
question, which is a separate issue. 
  2.3  Justifying Testimonially Transmitted Beliefs   
      When somebody tells me that p, and I accept the propositional content of what she tells 
me as true, I acquire a testimonially transmitted belief that p.  However, my belief is not 
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necessarily justified; the information transmitted to me may have been false, misleading, or 
unreliable.  And unlike in the case of other sources of belief, such as perception or reasoning, 
in order to acquire a justified testimonial belief, my evaluation of the attested proposition  
involves me interrogating not merely my own senses, or rationality, but also the credibility of 
a third-party - the testifier. Thus the question of how I may become epistemically entitled to 
make this assessment lies at the heart  of the debate on testimonial justification.  
  The contemporary epistemological debate surrounding this question of how  we can form, 
and justify, true beliefs through  testimony is rooted in two, historically polarised, accounts 
whose origins can be traced back to the eighteenth century.  The first of these, known as the 
non-reductionist, anti-reductionist, or (sometimes pejoratively) credulist account is 
historically associated with the Scottish philosopher, Thomas Reid (1710-96).  The second, 
known as the reductionist account, is historically associated with another eighteenth century 
Scottish philosopher, David Hume, (1711-76).   Broadly speaking, the non-reductionist (I will 
generally prefer that term) position maintains that we do not need additional positive reasons 
to accept the word of a testifier beyond the attestation itself, unless we have a specific reason 
to doubt her word. Thus, the non-reductionist account of justifying testimonial belief is non-
inferential.  Reductionism, on the other hand, comes in two forms.  One is the traditional 
Humean reductionist position, known as global reductionism,  which denies that testimony is 
a fundamental source of epistemic warrant.  Consequently, it requires testimonially-based 
beliefs to be inferentially justified, a posteriori, by other sources, such as perception, memory, 
or inference. The principal problem identified in relation to global reductionism is that if 
everything we are told requires a posteriori  corroboration, this clearly will materially  restrict 
the number of things we can come to know.  Obtaining the necessary corroboration may also 
be impracticable, or even impossible. Consequently, as Christopher Green notes, ‘Few 
contemporary philosophers will endorse Hume’s reductionist or inferentialist approach to 
testimonially-based belief in anything close to its full form’ (Green, 2008:6).  The more popular 
modern iteration of reductionism therefore is what is known as local reductionism, according 
to which the warrant or justification for any given testimonial utterance is arrived  at primarily 
by monitoring the testifier in question for evidence of her sincerity and competence, or lack 
of it, with the help of such background evidence as may be available ( Fricker, 1994: 398).  
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    These are not the only accounts of belief justification espoused by contemporary 
epistemologists, however, and in Chapter 4 below I consider the arguments of proponents 
and critics of alternative accounts of belief justification. I also consider the view that all rule 
or criteria-based accounts of testimonial justification represent little more in practice than  
conceptual rules of thumb for a process of evaluation which is in reality largely determined 
by the social and individual context, or circumstances of each particular testimonial 
encounter. 
  2.4  The Epistemological Chasm 
   The epistemological divide between testifiers and recipients of catastrophe testimony 
though is not fundamentally methodological. It concerns the reality that catastrophe 
testimony is not only  sourced  in the memory of profoundly traumatic experiences, but that 
it is also exceptional in  other ways, such as its descriptions of sensations and feelings which 
have no corresponding meaning to those who have not experienced them.  When a testifier 
speaks of her fear, her hunger, her thirst or her pain in a place such as Auschwitz, she speaks 
of an experience which can neither be intellectually ‘known’, nor imagined. What Améry 
called ‘a phenomenological study of the existence of the victim’  was in reality no essayistic  
study of some esoteric  philosophical concept but his deeply introspective examination and 
articulation of his own existence as a victim, and so it is for all survivor testimony. Henry 
Greenspan thus suggests, from a psychologist’s perspective, that a common attribute of all 
forms of catastrophe testimony should  be that it is ‘authentic’, in the sense of being believed 
to be true by the testifier, as opposed to being necessarily factually accurate (Greenspan and 
others, 2014). Kenneth Waltzer similarly notes that the term ‘testimony’ in such a context 
implies a general affirmation of truth, such as in the case of an affirmation made by those 
bearing witness in a judicial or religious context.  Testimony, such as Holocaust testimony, he 
suggests, connotes  ‘truth value or sincerity of belief about truth, even if the testimonies in 
reality may be only rough approximations of truth’ - selective, imprecise, chronologically dis-
ordered, or reflecting  limited comprehension of the wider context in which they took place, 
for example. Such testimonies, he adds should be seen as premised on the testifier’s ‘personal 
compact about truth’- her commitment to provide as accurate account as she can manage 
(ibid. :200).  This implies in turn that the recipient of such testimony must choose whether to 
believe as true what she cannot know through a process of epistemological evaluation to be 
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true.  The notion of an epistemological chasm between testifiers and recipients in relation to 
catastrophe testimony thus connotes both the methodological distance between  
epistemological accounts of belief justification and the acceptance of catastrophe testimony, 
and the more fundamental distance between the notion of truth as correspondence with 
factual accuracy and a more subjective and ethically driven notion of truth.  This is a theme 
which I develop in later chapters of this dissertation, and particularly Chapters 5 to 7 
(inclusive). 
  Testimony such as Holocaust testimony thus fundamentally disrupts the concept of 
testimony as wholly propositional and epistemically evaluable, and even challenges the 
assumption that the testifier’s experiences may be  communicable at all to the extent that 
they can describe the testifier’s impressions, sensations or feelings.3 Moreover, we cannot 
assume that the epistemically evaluable and non-epistemically evaluable elements of such 
testimony are necessarily discrete, or that the boundary between then is readily discernible.   
Consequently, it might be better to define at least some of the content of catastrophe 
testimony as revelation rather than information. 
    Finally, catastrophe testimony may be distinguished from other kinds of testimony by its 
narrativity, especially when it comes in the form of a survivor’s autobiographical account of 
their life as a victim and survivor of the catastrophic experience in question. One can find 
numerous well-known examples of such narrativized ‘life story’ accounts in the testimony of 
survivors of the Third Reich. These come inter alia, in anecdotal, and sometimes novelesque, 
autobiographical forms such as Primo Levi’s If This Is A Man, or  Elie Wiesel’s Night, in the 
form of fictionalised autobiographical accounts, such as Imre Kertesz’s  Fatelessness or 
Kaddish For an Unborn Child, or Jorge Semprun’s The Long Voyage, or even in poetic form, as 
in the case of  the testimony of Charlotte Delbo examined  in Chapter 9 below, or the poems 
of Paul Celan.   Narrativization does not necessarily  reduce the value or reliability of such 
                                                            
3 I present this as a separate argument from, and without prejudice to, the more general ‘private language 
argument’, after Wittgenstein, concerning the conceivability of a language known only to a speaker, ‘ in which a 
person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences—his feelings, moods, and so on---for his own 
use’ (Wittgenstein,2009; para 243).  My argument concerns specifically the less radical testimonial issue of 
communicability, and thus the possibility, or otherwise, of the transmission of information in terms 
understandable to a hearer. 
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accounts as conveyors of propositional information, but it can certainly make the task of 
evaluating them in that context harder. 
   2.5  Holocaust Testimony 
   Three of the four survivor experiences examined in Chapter 9 as case studies of the 
experience of being the victim and survivor of a collective atrocity are those of former Jewish 
prisoners of Auschwitz and other Nazi concentration camps.  These were not victims of what 
many consider to be the greatest crime which occurred in Auschwitz, as well as the ‘Reinhard’ 
death camps – the mass murder on arrival by gassing of the vast majority of the Jewish 
prisoners who were not, as the survivors were, selected for slave labour.  It was this crime 
which probably represents the apogee of the Holocaust in my view, both in terms of the 
numbers murdered and the industrial, dehumanized nature of their killing. Nevertheless, the 
treatment of Jewish prisoners though not of a different kind than that of other prisoners,  
certainly seems on the evidence of contemporary documents and the accounts of both 
former Jewish and non-Jewish prisoners, to have been considerably more brutal, and more 
likely to result in death, than that of other prisoners, and also distinctive in that the atrocities 
against Jewish prisoners were often committed by non-Jewish ‘privileged’ prisoners, as well 
as the SS guards.  Thus it can be said to represent the apogee of the Jewish experience of 
persecution under the Third Reich.  However both the mass murder of Jewish and other 
deportees, and the atrocities committed against Jewish and other prisoners constituted  
crimes which it later became socially impossible for the German people either to deny 
(because survivor testimony prevented denial, save in the case of a tiny minority of Holocaust 
deniers) or admit (because they were simply so great and so radically evil as to repudiate the 
humanity not only of those who committed them but also of those who allowed them to be 
committed).   The task of testifying to their experience of Auschwitz for Jewish  survivors, and 
also some non-Jewish survivors,  thus represented testifying to experiences which were both 
at the limits of  believability, and in many cases could not be believed.  How, for example, 
does one explain, even to those who are willing to believe, the Monowitz-Buna satellite camp 
of Auschwitz - a rubber factory which never produced any rubber, and existed solely as a 
means of killing its own labour force in the most degrading and dehumanising manner that 
could be conceived, notwithstanding the real and desperately needed military and economic 
benefits of putting them to productive use?  
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     The person sometimes cited as symbolising the ultimate Auschwitz victim is the 
musselmann (‘moslem’) -  the prisoner whose humanity and will to live had been extinguished 
to the point where his fellow prisoners abandoned him to his fate.  To me, however, it is the   
members of the Sonderkommando (‘special labour detail’); Jewish prisoners, in the ‘Reinhard’ 
death camps and Auschwitz, living, like other prisoners, under a suspended but virtually 
inevitable death sentence, whose task it was to facilitate the  processing of fellow Jews to the 
gas chambers, including deceiving them as to the real purpose of the ‘showers’  they were 
about to take, and to cremate their corpses.  Conceiving and organising Sonderkommando 
squads, wrote Primo Levi, ‘was National Socialism’s most demonic crime’ because it 
represented an attempt to shift the burden of guilt onto the victims, and thus deprive them  
‘of even the solace of innocence’ (Levi, 1989; 52).  Testifying to the experience of Auschwitz 
therefore represents a supreme challenge to bridging all three of the chasms which face 
catastrophe testimony: the epistemological chasm, the existential chasm and the moral 
chasm.  
    2.6  The Psychological Element  
       In the case of many kinds of testimony, the question of the testifier’s state of mind is of 
little epistemic relevance. As Thomas Reid argued, we are inclined as human beings to believe 
what we are told, but that belief is also pragmatic - for instance in the case  of mundane 
information, such as the time of day, or directions to a nearby location, or in a case where we 
know the testifier to be an expert in a field in which we have no or little knowledge or 
expertise.  Questions of testifier motivation thus often arise only if recipients have reason to 
feel they are being deceived or misinformed by testifiers.  Catastrophe testimony, on the 
other hand is frequently sourced in episodic memories of traumatic experiences which may 
have occurred many years, or even decades, earlier. Moreover, much may have happened in 
the intervening period which might have a direct bearing on what is recollected for the 
purpose of testifying. The testifier’s memory may, for example, have become influenced by 
the psychotherapeutic treatment she has received related to her experiences, or by her 
exposure to intervening scientific insights into conditions such as post- traumatic stress 
disorder, or by  historical or political accounts of the past she has seen or read. It may also be 
affected by her state of mind regarding the past at the time of testifying – whether, for 
example, she has been consoled or angered by some contemporary political or social initiative 
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relevant to the past.  Consequently, understanding as much one can of the nature of the 
testifier’s motivation,  objectives, and state of mind, in testifying may well be an integral part 
of competently evaluating the accuracy, or reliability of her testimony.  
   By the same token, the recipient’s evaluation of catastrophe testimony might similarly be 
affected by her own prior knowledge, or views, concerning the matters in question in the 
testimony and her own state of mind at the time of receiving it.  Leaving aside  recipients with 
an evident  professional  interest in its reception, the evaluation by recipients of the testimony 
may be affected  by some general identity prejudice against or in favour of the testifier as a 
knower, for example on racial, gender, or other identity-based grounds, or some more 
personal bias, such as being a descendent of a victim, or of a perpetrator.  Some recipients, 
like testifiers , may be very conflicted in this  regard;  those, for instance, who identify socially 
and culturally with perpetrators, yet are moved by the fate of their victims, and thus have a 
sense of duty to others to acknowledge and even memorialise what testifiers tell them, yet 
at the same time wish to put it behind them. Others may be primarily concerned with 
instrumentalising catastrophe testimony in the service of social or political theorising, and 
thus inclined to disregard or even deny the testifier’s individuality. The importance of such  
motivational factors in the presentation and evaluation of catastrophe testimony can thus be 
crucial to its content and reception, and to the nature and extent of the resulting  
epistemological chasm, or at least what might appear to be an epistemological chasm, 
between testifier and recipient.   
   2.7  Summary 
      I have endeavoured in the preceding sections of this chapter to indicate some of the more 
important respects in which catastrophe testimony is or might be distinguishable from other 
kinds of testimony.  Nevertheless, catastrophe testimony is certainly not thereby deprived of 
its importance or value as a source of propositional information, although the extent of it will 
depend on the form and content of the particular testimony.  In the final analysis, the limit of 
epistemological enquiry has been set by epistemologists by reference to what can be 
justifiably believed, or come to be known by a recipient through testimony, and accordingly 
the existence and extent of the epistemological chasm is determined by the knowable content 
of any given testimonial utterance relative to its total content.  With this in mind, I seek in the 
following two chapters to examine various classical and more recent  methodologies for the 
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     CHAPTER 3.  HOW TESTIMONY CAN PRODUCE JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEFS AND KNOWLEDGE 
  3.1  Introduction  
The objective of this and the next chapter is not to offer a comprehensive review, or 
comparative critical analysis, of the many contemporary epistemological accounts of 
whether, and how, testimony yields, or produces, justified beliefs, or knowledge, but rather 
to offer a  general overview, against a historical background, of the contemporary epistemic 
discourse regarding testimony, in the context of this dissertation.  I begin by examining, in the 
following two sections, the two classic epistemological accounts of how we can justify our 
beliefs in testimonial utterances:  non-reductionism, and reductionism, both in the form of 
global reductionism, and local reductionism. 
  
3.2  The Non-Reductionist Account  
3.2.1 The Historical Roots of Non-Reductionism 
The historical roots of the contemporary non-reductionist account of testimonial justification 
(my preferred term for it) are to be found in a paper entitled On Seeing, one of a number of 
papers published by Thomas Reid in 1764 under the title An Inquiry into the Human Mind on 
the Principles of Common Sense.  In Chapter 6, Section XXIV of Inquiry, headed Of The Analogy 
Between Perception And The Credit We Give To Human Testimony (Reid 1983: pp.89-103), 
Reid expressed that analogy in the following terms: 
In the testimony of Nature given by the senses, as well as in the human testimony 
given by language, things are signified to us by signs: and in one as well as the other, 
the mind, either by original principles or by custom, passes from the sign to the 
conception and belief of the things signified (ibid.: 90). 
   The language of  human testimony, Reid added comprises both ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ 
language.  The former embraces ‘features of the face, gestures of the body, and modulations 
of the voice’, which Nature gives us innate and universal skills as humans to interpret, 
analogous to the skills we have to interpret sense experience (ibid.). The latter consists in 
words uttered by the testifier, whose significance we must learn through experience, in 
tandem with learning our mother tongue, but also with the help of natural language (ibid.:91).  
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 Reid then asked how we can rely on the conceptions and beliefs formed from our experiences 
of past testimonial utterences to ground our beliefs in future testimonial utterances.  How, 
for example, can we assume that what was previously said with honest intention is not now 
being said with an intention to deceive, or mislead, or that words  used in the past to express 
a certain thought are not now being used  with a different meaning, or to express different 
thoughts?  His answer was that: 
 The wise and beneficent Author of Nature, who intended that we should be social       
creatures, and that we should receive the greatest and most important part of our 
knowledge by the information of others, hath, for these purposes, implanted in our 
natures two principles that tally with each other (ibid.: 93). 
The first of these innate principles, said Reid, was the principle of veracity;  ‘a propensity to 
speak truth, and to use the signs of language so as to convey our real sentiments’ (ibid.: 94).  
Even the greatest liars, he argued, speak the truth most of the time, because that is our 
dominant natural instinct, and we therefore do not lie unless the temptation to do so is strong 
enough to overcome that instinct.  The second principle Reid identified was the principle of 
credulity; the disposition to believe what others tell us, which he claimed was unlimited in 
children (thus proving it was innate, rather than the product of reason or experience) but 
remained strong throughout adult life, even after encountering instances of deceit and 
falsehood.  If these two principles had not been implanted in us, Reid argued, distrust and 
incredulity ‘would deprive us of the greatest benefits of society, and place us in a worse 
condition than that of savages’ (Reid 1983:95).   Nevertheless, he added, our beliefs, once 
formed, were not immutable; they might be confirmed, or refuted, through reason or 
experience, including other testimony (ibid.:96-97).   
3.2.2. Contemporary Non-Reductionist Accounts  
All of the contemporary non-reductionist accounts of belief justification reviewed below owe 
much to Reid’s earlier account. I begin with an important, and sustained, articulation and 
defence of non-reductionist principles found in C.A.J.Coady’s book Testimony: a Philosophical 
Study (1992).  
Coady essentially endorses  Reid’s principle of credulity, but reformulates it as a general 
presumptive epistemic right  to believe, as a default position, the testimony of others.     Coady 
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does not, though, go so far as to argue that this right should be unquestioning: ‘This attitude 
of trust’, he says ‘is fundamental but it is not blind’, citing Reid’s observation that a child 
begins with an attitude of complete trust in what it is told, and develops more critical attitudes 
as it matures. ‘None the less’, he concludes, ‘even for adults, the critical attitude is itself 
founded upon a general stance of trust, just as the adult awareness of the way memory plays 
us false rests upon a broader confidence in recollective powers.’ (ibid.:46)4   Moreover, says 
Coady, a presumption of trust should be unreflective rather than uncritical; one made as a 
default position, in the absence of ‘signs of deceit, confusion or mistake’ (ibid.:47). Thus 
qualified, the presumptive right to trust the word of others, says Coady, is fundamental to our 
acquisition of knowledge, as well as our learning language, since ‘an extensive commitment 
to trusting the reports of others [is] a precondition of understanding their speech at all’ 
(ibid.:176). 
    Coady’s definition of ‘natural testimony’ (all testimony other than that given in judicial 
proceedings, where specific rules of evidence, such as the rule against hearsay, may apply), is 
not dissimilar to his definition of formal testimony.  A speaker, S, he declares, testifies by 
making  some statement that p only if: (1) that statement is both evidence that p and offered 
as evidence that p, (2) S has the ‘relevant competence, authority, or credentials to state truly 
that p’, and (3) S’s statement is offered as evidence relevant to some ’disputed or unresolved 
question’ and directed to those in need of such evidence.  This insistence on the need for 
testimony to have what Coady calls ‘evidential promise’, has been challenged by Peter 
Graham (1997), who suggests firstly that this epistemic bar is simply too high for such 
mundane testimonial encounters as, for example, asking directions to the nearest post office, 
and secondly that by no means all testimony offered as evidence is evidence, notwithstanding 
the testifier’s intention that it should be so. Accordingly, Graham argues, Coady’s first 
condition should be modified by requiring a testimonial statement only  to be offered as 
evidence (Graham, 1997: 227).  I would add to this suggestion, my own doubt as to whether 
meeting Coady’s second condition is practicable in many cases, such as in mundane 
testimony. In fact, I tend to agree with Elizabeth Fricker’s (1995) critique that  assuming the 
                                                            
4 Coady offers no supporting evidence for the validity of the analogy between testimony and memory in this 
context, which seems to me questionable.  I would say that the development of more critical attitudes to 
testimony is one which is empirically driven, and not necessarily uniform across all categories of testimony 
whereas the case of memory seems to me a more psychological process of coming to know , and trust, or 
distrust, one’s own powers of memory.  
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testifier is ‘someone-in-a-position-to-know-about-the-matter-in-question’ implies a  
tendentious narrowing of the definition of what testimony is (Fricker, 1995: 396-7).  Finally , 
I have some doubt as to whether Coady’s third condition is a necessary or desirable 
supplement to his first condition in cases of non-formal testimony.  
Tyler Burge makes another significant intervention on the non-reductionist side of the debate, 
in his essay ‘Content Preservation’ (1993).  Burge endorses the views of Reid, regarding the 
grounds for our entitlement to believe testimony, but restates it in terms of what he calls the 
Acceptance Principle:  
   A person is entitled to accept as true something that is presented as true and that is    
intelligible to him, unless there are stronger reasons not to do so (Burge 1993: 467). 
   Whilst acknowledging that such acceptance can be instinctive, Burge argues that an 
entitlement to accept  what is prima facie intelligible to the testimonial recipient, as an 
epistemic default position,  ‘comes with being a rational agent’ (ibid.467-8)5.  Echoing Coady’s 
stance that testimony is a direct epistemic source of knowledge, Burge maintains that the  
entitlement to accept is an epistemic right or warrant, equivalent to the entitlement to rely 
on other seemingly rational epistemic ‘guides to truth’, such as perception, memory, or 
deductive or inductive reasoning (ibid. :458 and 470-71). It is, he declares, ‘cognitively 
fundamental’ to our existence as rational beings, in order that we may learn language, and 
acquire beliefs from others, without the ability to do which ‘our cognitive lives would be little 
different from the animals’ (ibid.466). The same rationality underpins our entitlement to rely 
unquestioningly on certain kinds of testimony, such as mundane testimony, signs we read, 
newspaper reports, or statements made by strangers on ‘unloaded topics’.  The basic rule is 
that: ‘We are a priori prima facie entitled to accept something that is prima facie intelligible 
and presented as true’ (472).6   
                                                            
5 Matthew Weiner defines such default justification as ‘a justification for a belief that does not depend on other 
beliefs based ultimately on the believer’s past or current experiences’.  The point he makes is that such other 
beliefs provide justification over and above default justification in the form of positive evidence for the 
proposition in question (Weiner 2003:257). 
6 According to Burge, the difference between entitlement and justification is that the former is an epistemic 
right or warrant ’that need not be understood by or even accessible to the subject’, whereas the latter ‘must be 
available to the cognitive repertoire of the subject’, though he admits that the border between the two ‘may be 
fuzzy’ (458-9). 
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  This entitlement, Burge accepts, is no guarantee of the actual truth of the testimonial 
proposition in question. The Acceptance Principle, like Coady’s presumptive right, simply 
establishes a rational, but defeasible, epistemic default position, which Burge justifies on the 
grounds that to presume,  in the absence of contrary evidence,  that a testifier who presents 
as true a proposition which is prima facie intelligible  is, or may be, actually lying, is a 
‘rationally unnatural attitude’ (476). 
   Burge’s Acceptance Principle, then, represents an attractively permissive restatement of 
Reid’s account, but I am somewhat troubled by the condition of intelligibility in the context 
of catastrophe testimony. What does intelligibility mean for example when applied to 
testimony in which the testifier reveals his subjective experience of being tortured to 
someone who has never herself been tortured?  How does the hearer being ‘rational’ help 
him to understand such an experience?   Perhaps Burge had this problem in mind when he 
elaborated in his essay ‘Interlocution, Perception, and Memory’ (1997) on his notion of 
entitlement ,by separating it into two ‘rational default positions’: 
1. We have a general a priori prima facie (pro tanto) entitlement to rely on seeming 
understanding as general understanding; and 
2. We have a general a priori prima facie (pro tanto) entitlement to believe putative 
assertions that we seem to understand (Burge 1997:21) 
This reformulation, however, seems not to settle the issued I have raised. In fact it 
probably makes it more difficult to surmount, since it now appears to involve a hearer 
subjectively speculating about a testifier’s subjective description of an experience which 
lies beyond the hearer’s lived experience.    
    Arguments For Non-Reductionism 
  The most commonly cited arguments in support of the non-reductionist account of belief 
justification and knowledge acquisition are, in summary: 
1. Many, if not most, of the beliefs, and knowledge, that we acquire are in 
fact acquired testimonially, through applying (whether consciously or not) 
the principle of credulity,  This includes specifically those beliefs and 
knowledge we acquire throughout childhood and adolescence, from our 
teachers, and our parents,  concerning the world, such as  our knowledge 
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of  language, history, geography, or science.  Equally, in our  adult lives, 
even though we might adopt, through experience, and the development 
of our rational faculties, a less  unconditionally accepting attitude to  
testimonial assertions, we continue to learn many things by accepting the 
word of those whose knowledge of specific subjects exceeds our own.  
Thus, if we have no right to take others at their word, as Reid’s principle 
of veracity encourages to do, then the vast majority of the things we 
believe cannot be regarded as things we know, and this seems deeply 
implausible. This seems to me to be the most powerful argument. 
2. We can only learn to speak the language of social discourse if we  take others 
at their word; that is assume that what they say, or convey to us by signs or 
gestures is what they intend to say, or convey. I find this less convincing.  If 
someone tells me that the object in front of me is a lemon, and the next person 
that it is a lime, then I cannot know what it is by trusting both of them.  If one 
person tells me it is a lemon, but three people tell me it is a lime, I can decide 
that the word of three is more trustworthy than the word of one, but then my 
decision is a reductive one. 
3.  It is  more rational to believe that those who tell us things are telling the 
truth, than that they are lying.  Reid said any form of lying is ‘doing violence 
to our nature’, and thus not employed unless the temptation to do so is 
stronger than the natural instinct not to do so (Reid 1983: 94). Burge (1993) 
argues that lying is a form of madness, since the purpose of reason is to 
promote truth.  This may be generally true, but lying can also be rational, for 
example as a pretext for persuading someone  to take beneficial medicine 
they are irrationally opposed to taking.  
                       Arguments Against  Non-Reductionism 




 1. That, as Elizabeth Fricker puts it, to assert, as a normative epistemic principle, 
‘that a hearer has the epistemic right to believe what she observes an arbitrary 
speaker to assert, just on the ground that it has been asserted’ is to write an 
‘epistemic charter for the gullible and undiscriminating’ ( Fricker, 1994: 126-7).  
This must be at least partly true, for there are times when we should be sceptical, 
or discriminating, about what we are told -  about a salesman’s assertion 
concerning the merits of his products, or the demerits of those of his competitors, 
for example - but it is incorrect to suggest that non-reductionism, of itself, 
promotes, or produces, gullibility.  On the contrary, non-reductionism specifically 
provides that belief in the word of others is a default position which one is only 
entitled to maintain in the absence of contrary evidence. Gullibility, on the other 
hand, is a propensity that some humans have to be easily persuaded to believe 
what others tell them, when others would not do so.  Gullible people therefore 
believe the word of others more readily because it is their nature to do so, not 
because they are licensed to do so by epistemic rules. Moreover, for Fricker to 
warn against hearers who are gullible and undiscriminating seems somewhat at 
odds with her own local reductionist reliance on their monitoring abilities  (see 
below).       
2.  James Van Cleve (2006) argues that when Reid enunciated his principles of 
veracity he intended to say no more than that ‘(It tends to be the case that) if A 
says that p, A believes that p’, since he contrasted the propensity to speak the 
truth with lying, which is asserting as true what you what you believe to be false 
(Van Cleve 2006: 51).   Consequently, when A testifies that p to B, and B, following 
the principle of credulity, accepts that p, the result is no more than that both A 
and B come to believe that p.  Reid, says Van Cleve, never intended to suggest that 
a belief acquired on this basis must be justified, or knowledge creating per se 
(ibid.:59).  Reid, he says, considered (contra Hume) that the epistemic question 
was settled differently, by accepting that testimony was an epistemically basic 
source of evident belief, or knowledge, like perception. Thus  Reid’s principles of 
veracity and credulity can be accepted by reductionists as an account of the 
psychology of testimony, whilst at the same time rejecting them as support for the 
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non-reductive epistemic account of testimony as an epistemically basic source of 
justified belief, or knowledge, like perception.   
3.  Jennifer Lackey argues that, in the absence of any specific evidence available to 
her against accepting the speaker’s report, non-reductionism leaves the hearer 
with ‘no positive epistemic work to do in order to justifiedly (sic). accept the 
testimony in question’ (Lackey, 2006: 166).  It does not require the hearer, in the 
absence of clear evidence of the speaker’s insincerity or unreliability, to make any 
positive effort to ensure that his acceptance of the speaker’s testimony as true is 
rationally founded ( ibid. :170).  Thus, she claims, non-reductionism is false.  As in 
the case of Fricker’s claim of gullibility, however, this seems to take the argument 
too far; non-reductionism doesn’t entail indifference to the task of scrutinising 
testifiers, though it might, as she suggests be claimed by the indifferent to licence 
it. 
    Peter Lipton (1998) notes, in similar vein, that Coady rarely addresses the 
question of how we actually discriminate in practice between the testimony we 
accept and the testimony we reject, suggesting that he might have ‘downplayed 
these issues for fear of giving false comfort to the reductionists’ (Lipton, 1998:23). 
 
         3.3   The Reductionist Account 
     3.3.1 The Historical Roots of Reductionism 
    The historical roots of contemporary reductionist accounts of testimonial justification are 
to be found in an essay written by David Hume entitled ‘Of Miracles’, which  comprises Section 
X of  An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, originally published in 1748.  Though the 
essay, as its title implies, is mainly concerned with the warrant for accepting testimonial 
accounts of miracles, it is generally taken by commentators as having far wider significance in 
the context of  the Humean evaluation of testimony more generally.  
Having acknowledged that ‘there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and 
even necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the testimony of men, and the 
reports of eye-witnesses and spectators’, Hume suggests that our acceptance of the veracity 
of  testimonial assertions is derived empirically, from ‘our observation of the veracity of 
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human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses’ (Hume 
2007: 80-81).  Humean testimony must therefore conform to the general maxim that ‘no 
objects have any discoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences  which we can 
draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of their constant and 
regular conjunction’(ibid. :82). Thus, contra Reid’s principle of credulity, Hume believed that 
any general propensity individuals might have to believe what others tell us them could only 
be properly acquired, epistemically speaking, inductively (ibid.). Consequently, the 
justification of our beliefs in testimony in general ‘reduces’ to an a posteriori acceptance of 
the veracity of those epistemic sources on which the testimony in question rests, such as 
perception, or memory.  This thesis is known as ‘global reductionism’.  
The basic objection to Hume’s global reductionist thesis is that it simply does not  accord with 
the reality of how we come  to acquire justified beliefs, and to know about the world around 
us.  Coady, for example,  declares: 
 many of us have never seen a baby born, nor have most of us 
examined the circulation of the blood nor the actual geography of 
the world nor any fair sample of the laws of the land, nor have we 
made the observations that lie behind our knowledge that the lights 
in the sky are heavenly bodies immensely distant, to mention some 
of the  many  things we  generally consider ourselves  to justifiably 
believe;  they are beliefs formed not through our own observations, 
or experiences, but on the say-so of others’ (Coady 1992:82). 
  Thus, for example, the acquisition of knowledge in childhood from parents 
or teachers is often cited as a rebuttal of global reductionism. Other 
empirical challenges raised by  Coady and others to Hume’s formulation, 
notably include: (1) that in order to acquire the necessary linguistic skills and 
tools to understand testimony at all, it is surely necessary to form beliefs by 
accepting the say-so of others, and (2)  the notion that reliance on testimony 
must be empirically based invites circularity, since that empirical basis may 
well in its turn be reliant on other testimony.   
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   Jennifer Lackey also questions the possibility of empirically determining 
the  general reliability of testimony  She points out the vast range of beliefs 
which can come to be known through testimony, from those beliefs whose 
reliability is generally high, such as reports about the time of day, or what 
one had for breakfast, to those whose reliability is generally questionable, 
such as testimony concerning the achievements of one’s children, the looks 
of a loved one, or a politician’s testimony concerning the character of their 
political opponents (her examples!).  Consequently, she claims, it is doubtful 
whether ‘it even makes sense to talk about testimony being a generally 
reliable source.’ (Lackey 2006: 162).  Moreover, she argues, even if it could 
be demonstrated, taking all types and instances of testimony and testifiers 
into account, that testimony was generally reliable, that information would 
have very little epistemic bearing on evaluating any particular instance of 
testimony. 
   In practice not only non-reductionists but also modern reductionist 
commentators reject global reductionism.The latter, instead, largely 
support the account of reductionism known as local reductionism.  
       3.3.2  Contemporary Reductionist Accounts 
Elizabeth Fricker, in her essay ‘Against Gullibility’ (1994), offered what seems to be the 
leading account of local reductionism.  After accepting  that the prospects for global 
reductionism were ‘hopeless’, she argued  that the epistemically responsible hearer  should  
instead  seek to assess the trustworthiness  of testimony locally; that is on a case-by-case 
basis, by monitoring the  testifier in question for sincerity (belief in the truth of her 
testimonial utterance) and  competence  with respect to the propositional content of her 
utterance.  Such an appraisal, she suggested, would comprise ‘an ascription of beliefs, 
desires, and other mental states and character traits’,  employing ‘commonsense 
psychology or person-theory’, in an epistemic context, in order ‘to explain her utterance: to 
render it comprehensible why she made that assertion, on that occasion’. (Fricker,1994:148-
9).  The appraisal should also take into account any relevant background evidence of 
sincerity or reliability.  A finding in favour of the testifier on both grounds would show her to 
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be trustworthy  The required degree of monitoring in each case would be that which is  
sufficient to enable the hearer to defend any decision to accept or reject  the speaker’s 
word (ibid.:150-151).7   
    In her later essay, ‘Critical Notice’, (1995),  Fricker conceded  that Coady’s non-reductive 
notion of a presumptive right to believe what one is told should be accepted in relation to 
the acquisition of knowledge in the ‘developmental phase’ of life, though not in respect of 
the adult stages of life.   However, she argued, there was no need otherwise to seek to 
establish any norms regarding the general reliability of testimony  in order to evaluate 
particular instances of testimonially-based belief, if one embraced instead  the concept of 
local reduction formulated in her earlier essay.  One could, for instance still take into 
account any evidence of a particular speaker’s  past record of trustworthiness as a testifier, 
insofar as relevant to the subject matter of her present testimonial statement, as  
background evidence in favour of its acceptance.  (Fricker, 1995:404). 
          The Argument For Local Reductionism 
 The best argument for local reductionism (or at least  Fricker’s iteration of it), for those, like 
myself, who espouse a pragmatic, context-driven, view of testimonial evaluation, is its 
insistence that each instance of testimony must be assessed individually, on its particular 
epistemic merits. It reflects  the reality that a hearer’s evaluation of the trustworthiness of a 
testifier can be a subjective, or instinctive, as well as a rational process, and may depend on 
a number of interactive factors, such as context, situation, and the respective personalities 
and interests of the parties.  Fricker herself freely admits to having ‘wildly volatile’ intuitions, 
as a hearer, from testimonial situations, from a strong inclination to trust the word of a 
speaker to a deeply sceptical response to her testimony. Since testimony is not a unitary 
category, she argues, it neither requires, nor fits, a universal default position, whether of 
trust, or scepticism, towards the testifier (Fricker,  1995: 406-7).  
   The Arguments Against Local Reductionism 
                                                            
7 Many commentators assume that testimonial utterances are oral, or predominately oral, and thus commonly 
refer to testifiers and recipients of testimonial utterances as, respectively, speakers or hearers.  I will therefore 
use these terms where employed by the relevant commentator. 
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   A number of objections have been recorded to the local reductionist thesis.  I list some of 
these below: 
1.  Its limited scope.  Not only does it assume that  testimonial encounters are 
face-to face- events in which the testifier’s words and gestures can be interpreted 
by the hearer, but its scope,  is further reduced by two important carve-outs 
Fricker has accepted from her general thesis.  The first of these is beliefs acquired 
during the early ‘developmental phase’ of life,  and the second covers matters 
‘which common sense psychological knowledge licenses one to expect the 
speaker to be competent about’ (Fricker, 1995: 405).  There may be others, 
though; how, for example, does one evaluate testimony delivered by someone 
whose words, features, or gestures were wholly or partly obscured, say by some 
article of apparel, or whose medical condition requires his speech to be delivered 
by an artificial voice.  Further, and even more importantly, suggests Matthew 
Weiner (2003), Fricker’s disclaimer of the need to find grounds for the general 
reliability of testimony means that local reductionism cannot justify beliefs which 
the testimonial recipient cannot confirm at first hand. These would include beliefs 
about the past, about places we have never visited, and most scientific and 
mathematical laws and theories, all of which depend on the notion of our being 
able to accept what we are told, unless there is positive evidence against doing so 
(Weiner 2003:257).   
2.  Local reductionism has no mechanism for dealing with cases of the absence or 
inadequacy of the requisite evaluatory skills on the part of the hearer, or the presence 
of epistemic vices in her character  such as an identity-based prejudice against the 
speaker. 
 3. The absence of a declared starting default position either of acceptance of 
testimony as true or rejection of testimony as false makes for unecessary practical 
difficulties.   Michaelian (2012) argues it amounts to a ‘default monitoring’ policy, 
which offers a far less attractive cost-benefit ratio for the formation of justified beliefs, 
and the acquisition of knowledge, than the default acceptance policy of non-
reductionism. In reality, he argues, monitoring  usually means monitoring for 
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dishonesty, since competence is more likely to be assumed and more difficult to 
disprove than honesty, especially in a one-off face-to-face encounter. Further, he 
argues, deception detection is in practice ‘cue based’—based on cues offered by the 
speaker’s words or gestures- rather than ‘knowledge based’-based on prior 
background knowledge, such as knowledge of the speaker’s testimonial record. 
Default monitoring as a general practice is thus only justified on the assumptions that 
dishonest testimony is frequent, that reliable cues to dishonesty exist, and that 
hearers can and do in practice effectively monitor speakers for dishonesty. However, 
he claims, empirical studies of monitoring suggest either that these assumptions are 
untrue, or at best that the evidence in support of them is weak.  In fact, he says, they 
tend to indicate that agents have a built-in tendency to evaluate testimony as honest. 
Consequently, he concludes, default acceptance of the speaker’s word, which limits 
monitoring to cases where the hearer has positive reasons to doubt it , is both a more 
efficient means of acquiring knowledge, and one which results in the formation of 
more justified  beliefs . 
4.  Alternatively to the argument in the preceding paragraph, local reductionism does 
not really offer an epistemic account of testimonial justification, but more an 
epistemically worked through description of a perceptual and psychological process 
of evaluating a testifier and her testimony which occurs, more or less instinctively, in 
the course of any face-to face oral testimonial encounter.  In other words, local 
reductionism does not have its own epistemic foundations. 
   3.4 Justification as an Interpersonal Process:  The Assurance View 
 Both non-reductionist and local reductionist accounts of the justification of our belief in 
testimony , contra global reductionism, appear to accept that it is the trustworthiness, or at 
least plausibility, of the testifier, as opposed to the content of her testimony, which principally 
determines in practice whether her testimony should be accepted or not.   Catastrophe 
testimony, such as Holocaust testimony, I would argue, weights that balance particularly 
heavily in favour of belief in the testifier, not only because it concerns experiences, or events, 
which lie beyond the realms of the testimonial addressee’s lived experience, rational 
contemplation, or even imagining, but also because the strong (though not necessarily 
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indefeasible) moral  authority typically vested in the testifier as a victim and survivor of a 
catastrophic experience militates against not taking him or her  at their word.8   
     The Assurance View (AV) of testimonial justification therefore should, on the face of it, 
be of particular interest in relation to catastrophe testimony, since it seems to go even 
further than both reductionist and non-reductionist accounts in this respect, by putting 
trust in the speaker at the heart of the testimonial encounter.  A successful testimonial 
transmission, says Richard Moran, a leading proponent, of AV, requires a hearer first and 
foremost to believe in the testifier; belief in the testimonial proposition, he claims,  
follows (comes out of) belief in the speaker ( Moran 2006: 273).9 The speaker invites the 
hearer to believe her testimonial proposition, by presenting herself as the reason for 
believing her testimony, and making herself personally accountable for its truth.  The 
hearer, in his turn, in accepting the speaker’s testimonial assertion as true, accepts the 
speaker’s invitation to trust her, by placing reliance on her word.  This, says Moran is what 
is meant by telling someone something, as opposed to letting them know something, the 
latter being no more than an invitation to the hearer to ‘see for himself’ the evidential 
belief-worthiness of the testimonial proposition.  
 The testimonial exchange envisioned by AV thus creates a kind of quasi-contractual 
relationship between the speaker and hearer (providing the hearer accepts the speaker’s 
invitation to believe her, which of course he may not do).  Consequently, for example, it 
would seem that no such contract would hold if the hearer comes to believe what the 
speaker has told him through other means than by relying on her word, for example 
through other evidence, or because, having  disbelieved her, he later comes to believe 
the same proposition as a result of accepting the restatement of it by another testifier.  
Similarly, it seems that no such contract could come into being between the speaker and 
someone who overhears her telling someone else something, even if the overhearer 
comes to believe it directly as a result of that overhearing.   
                                                            
8 I am assuming, of course that the addressee is not herself a fellow survivor, or did not participate or witness 
the events or experiences which form the subject matter of the testimony. 
9 Once again, this thesis assumes that testimony is a speech act between a single speaker and a single hearer, so 
I will adopt the speaker/hearer terminology Moran employs. 
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Lackey (2011), though, sees the central dilemma of AV as a disconnect between its 
concept of an invitation to trust the speaker and truth itself.  AV has no mechanism, she 
argues, for correcting a situation in which a speaker regularly makes sincere, but untrue, 
because mistaken, assertions. On the other hand, she argues, rectifying that problem by 
adding  conditionality,  for example by requiring the speaker’s testimony to serve as a 
reliable guide to the truth,  would mean derogating from the  concept of founding 
testimonial justification on the speaker’s interpersonal assurance, or guarantee, of 
truthfulness, which is at the heart of AV, and  possibly even  rendering the speaker’s 
assurance ‘epistemically superfluous’.    
Lackey’s point is, I believe, well made.  Sincerity, according to AV, seems to necessarily 
imply reliability, by in effect taking Reid’s principle of credulity beyond that of an a priori, 
or default position, into an ongoing normative presumption of trust.  If that presumption 
is rebuttable, then AV is non-reductionism differently expressed; if it is non-rebuttable 
then AV amounts to a declaration of faith, and  has no epistemic character.  Moreover, I 
would question how many cases of conveying propositional information can actually be 
deemed to include an implied invitation by the teller to believe her, or implied 
accountability  for the truth of what she says.  It is, yet again, a matter of context:  if I tell 
someone the time of day, or give him directions to the nearest post office, for example, 
it is highly unlikely that I would care very much whether she believed me or not.  And 
again, if I pass on  information gleaned from an authoritative source, such as that Paris is 
the capital of France, I am simply stating what I believe to be a fact, which does not need 
my personal endorsement.  Ultimately, therefore , I have difficulty in distinguishing AV 
from non-reductionism. 
     3.5  Beyond Reductionism and Non-Reductionism 
    The accounts of belief justification examined above offer different approaches to the 
issue of how beliefs in the propositional content of testimony may be evaluated and 
justified from an epistemological perspective, but they do so from a perspective which is 
based on three common assumptions: 
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1.  That testimony is predominantly presented in the form of a spoken utterance 
directed by a single speaker to a hearer, or perhaps a limited group of hearers, in 
her presence. 
2.That it is possible to prescribe normative rules or criteria for the evaluation of 
all kinds of testimony, with certain specific exceptions. 
3.  That the justification of testimonial beliefs as true is, unless specifically stated 
otherwise, a matter of rational assessment requiring no specialist assessment 
skills or experience. 
  The difficulties in applying the criteria or rules of evaluation prescribed in the above 
accounts largely result from the disconnect between these normative conceptual 
assumptions and reality.  Moreover, even where the existence of this  disconnect has 
been recognized the ‘solution’ often seems to involve treating acknowledged exceptions 
to the rules in the same prescriptive manner as the rules themselves.  Take, for example, 
the exception made for ‘development phase’ knowledge acquired in childhood from 
parents or other authority figures. This involves assuming that children routinely accept 
all propositional statements from such sources as fact, but as many parents and teachers 
can confirm, factors such as the age, the intellectual quality and personality, of the child, 
and the personality, competence, or authority of the parent or teacher, as well as the  
nature of the information conveyed, can all affect the child’s willingness to accept what 
she is told as true.  Moreover, her judgment might well be influenced, in the age of social 
media, by other sources of information the child might access, and might, whether rightly 
or wrongly, deem authoritative. In addition, none of the accounts reviewed in this 
Chapter give serious consideration to the fact that hearers sometimes bring to their 
evaluation of testimony pre-existing epistemic preferences, or prejudices, such as those 
of a racial or gendered nature,  which might influence in some way or other their 
evaluation of the testifier’s sincerity or competence.   
       Attempts to fix these problems conceptually may themselves fall foul of similar 
problems.  Jennifer Lackey (2006 (b)), for instance, suggests resolving the 
reductionist/non-reductionist dichotomy by adopting a  ‘Dualist’ approach to evaluation 
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which incorporates both to the need for  the speaker’s testimony  to be ‘reliable or 
otherwise truth-conducive’ and to the need for the hearer to have ‘appropriate positive 
reasons’ for accepting  the speaker’s testimony based on the content of that testimony. 
(Lackey, 2006(b):170). This approach, she argues, would move the epistemic debate on 
both from the reductionist notion that testimony is purely transmissive, which, she 
claims,  gives testimony far too little epistemic credit, and the non-reductionist notion 
that testimony is a basic epistemic source, like perception, memory, or inference, which, 
she claims, gives testimony far too much epistemic credit.  However, whilst Lackey’s 
analysis of the problem she is trying to fix seems sound, her proposal for fixing it seeks to 
apply another set of normative criteria to a vast range of epistemic events which are not, 
in her words, ‘of a kind’.  In other words, we are back, epistemically speaking, to square 
one.  
       Consequently, I am more sympathetic to the view of Martin Kusch (2002) that prescriptive 
or normative accounts such as Coady’s non-reductionist and Fricker’s local reductionist 
accounts  ‘are guilty of what one might call a “psychologistic reification” of a social practice’;   
that is one which is, in reality , determined by the social setting of the testimonial event (Kusch 
2002: 339). He argues that it is communities rather than individuals who are the primary 
bearers of knowledge, and thus how we approach the question of justification largely 
depends on how we perceive that task in the social context in which we are required to 
address it  Consequently, whatever may be the norms of epistemic evaluation to which we 
theoretically subscribe, we end up treating them as basic rules, to be relaxed or tightened , 
according to the social realities of each specific testimonial encounter (ibid. :340). 
   I support Kusch’s general conclusion, and as we will discover it has particular relevance to 
catastrophe testimony.  I would like, however, to add a rider that it is not necessarily only 
social contexts which may cause us to relax or tighten the rules of testimonial evaluation; 
individual circumstances, attitudes, values, and prior empirical experiences, also come into it.  
I would also add (and will more fully discuss later) from the perspective of catastrophe 
testimony, that the social context in which the testimony of survivors of catastrophic 
experiences is evaluated is not necessarily benign.  Apart from the general issue of 
epistemically directed prejudice, such as racial or gender prejudice, the hearer may be 
influenced by a socially determined desire to deny, or distort, the truth of such testimony, as 
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was evident in the case of some domestic post-war trials, both in West Germany and some 
formerly Nazi- occupied territories,  of those accused of war crimes  after the Second World 
War. Thus, whilst I agree that treating evaluatory rules as rules of thumb accords more closely 
with the reality of testimonial evaluation, I am not thereby arguing that the outcome of doing 
so will be necessarily more beneficial or desirable. 
    3.6  Summary 
       Reviewing the accounts of belief justification discussed in this Chapter from the 
perspective of catastrophe testimony thus reveals some of the disconnects between that 
testimony and the kinds of testimony which those accounts largely seem to address.  The 
most serious practical gap is probably that between the conception of testimony as an 
assertoric speech act and the reality of how catastrophe testimony is produced. The 
testimony of Holocaust survivors is an obvious example, since it is overwhelmingly  found 
today in the form of written texts, audio or video recordings, often mediated by an 
interlocutor, or in autobiographical accounts by survivors of their experiences addressed to 
the world at large, including works of autobiographical fiction.10  
    In fact, the idea of testimony as necessarily a matter of arms-length in-person evaluation 
of the statements of speakers has long been questioned.  One widely accepted exception 
already discussed is the beliefs we acquire in childhood.   Wittgenstein for instance, declared 
that much of what we learn as children we simply accept as facts. (Wittgenstein, 1975: 
para.159).  ‘The child learns by believing the adult’, he notes; ‘Doubt comes after belief’ (ibid.: 
160). His point is that these testimonial beliefs acquired unquestioningly during childhood 
constitute a necessary foundation for the development of later epistemological attributes of 
doubting and questioning. Accepting the epistemic authority of others more or less 
automatically, however, is not only characteristic of knowledge acquisition in childhood.  We 
continue to believe  things on the presumed testimonial authority of others throughout our 
adult lives, whether transmitted face-to -face, or heard or seen in other ways, or by reading 
various texts.   As Wittgenstein also observes: ‘I believe what people transmit to me in a 
certain manner.  In this way I believe geographical, chemical, historical facts etc.  That is how 
                                                            
10 Indeed it is sometimes impossible to know where autobiography ends, and fiction begins.  See for example 
the works of Imre Kertesz, such as Fatelessness, Kaddish for an Unborn Child, Liquidation, and Fiasco, or in the 
case of a non-Jewish victim of the Third Reich, Jorge Semprun’s The Long Voyage. 
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I learn the sciences’ (ibid.: para. 175).  In fact, some of the everyday knowledge we acquire 
through testimony is not even acquired reflectively, particularly where little of consequence 
is at stake in accepting the testifier’s word.  It is essentially a matter of context; I may for 
example follow a stranger’s directions to the nearest post office more or less unreflectively, 
if I merely wish to purchase some stamps for general use , but be deeply concerned about the 
reliability  of his information if I am wanting to post an important letter as expeditiously as 
possible.   
   Nigel Pleasants  suggests, following Wittgenstein, that the process of building beliefs is one 
in which beliefs may be initially acquired via an empirically unverified ‘culturally transmitted 
world picture’, which, if they are not subsequently defeated, may in time lead to an 
empirically or inductively based more general presumption of trust in testimony of particular 
categories (Pleasants, 2018: 20).  Another way of expressing this might be that the difference 
between childhood or early stage learning and adult or mature learning is essentially one 
which relates to the size and nature of the cultural ‘world’ in which  information is transmitted 
through testimony. In childhood, that world may be, environmentally and empirically 
speaking, comparatively tiny,  but as the child grows, so does its world, spatially, temporally,  
relationally and empirically.  Such growth, though, is not necessarily uniform; I may come to 
learn more and more about, say language, or mathematical theory, but  comparatively little 
more concerning, say, the history of North America, or the rules of chess. I may also come to 
know things by disproving things I previously thought I knew. 
     Accepting, though, that there are  many cases in which the testimonial recipient will be 
required, or will want, to find a positive reason to believe the word of his informant, rather 
than taking it at face value, non-reductionism and local reductionism appear to offer distinctly 
different ways of going about the process of evaluation.  The former offers a starting or 
default position of defeasible acceptance of the testifier’s word. The latter does not appear 
to have a starting position at all, and indeed the notion that every testimonial statement 
which is not accepted more or less unreflectively should be critically monitored for sincerity 
and competence implies that there should not be one. On that basis a starting position of 
default acceptance seems to be more  epistemically beneficial and realistic, but I am far from  
convinced that there is any practical significance in this debate. As Fricker points out, a 
hearer’s feelings of trust or doubt in the speaker’s word may change, or even fluctuate, 
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sometimes rapidly, or wildly, in the course of a testimonial encounter.  An a priori 
presumption of trust in a  testifier may be defeated in seconds, but so might a resolve to 
critically interrogate her testimony for evidence of insincerity, or unreliability.  Once again, it 
is a matter of context.    
  Finally, when it comes to applying non-reductionist and reductionist methodologies to 
trauma testimony in general, and catastrophe testimony in particular, a further question 
arises as to what extent it can be assumed that such testimony is rationally evaluable by its 
recipient.   Assuming accounts of personal traumatic experiences to be intelligible, or even 
communicable, may be epistemically and psychologically unwarranted, even where their 
language appears familiar  to the recipient.  Jean Améry, for instance, said that the only way 
he could really communicate the experience of being tortured to another person would be 
to similarly torture them, but even that were possible how would I, say, be able to relate my 
sensory and psychological experience of being tortured by him to his experience of being 
tortured by the SS? 
   There are, however, other accounts of belief justification which their proponents claim offer 
better epistemological insights than non-reductionism, or reductionism. In the following 
Chapter, I investigate that claim specifically from the standpoint of catastrophe testimony, 













   CHAPTER 4.  OTHER ACCOUNTS OF BELIEF JUSTIFICATION       
   4.1  Inference to the Best Explanation 
      Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE)  is principally used in relation to the justification of 
scientific hypotheses.  As Duncan Pritchard notes, IBE employs a form of inductive reasoning 
known as abductive reasoning, which ‘does not make appeal to a large and representative set 
of observations.  Instead, it simply proceeds from a single observed phenomenon to the best 
explanation of that phenomenon’ (Pritchard,2014:195).   In other words, abduction, like 
induction, but in contrast to deduction, is  ampliative (its conclusions go beyond what is 
logically entailed by its premises), but whereas induction appeals to a body of observed 
frequencies, or statistics, to justify its inferential conclusions, abduction appeals to 
explanatory considerations (which may or may not include such frequencies or statistics) to 
do so. Moreover, the hearer’s warrant to infer the best explanation in this way is defeasible, 
if some better explanation is subsequently indicated by other evidence (Douven, 2017:  4).   
    IBE is most frequently cited in the context of scientific methodology in the form of the 
argument that the best of all possible explanations for the apparent predictive success of our 
most successful and longstanding scientific theories or hypotheses is that they are either true, 
approximately true, or highly likely to be true, since it would be ‘miraculous’ if the hypothesis 
in question were to be false, yet at the same time consistently predictively successful.   Hence 
this argument is sometimes called the ‘no-miracle’ argument11.  This, in turn, claims Peter 
Lipton, one of its principal proponents, implies that IBE is ‘truth-tropic’, since it is the 
inferential method which led us to establishing the truthfulness of these theories, or 
hypotheses (Lipton, 2004:191).  An adaptation of IBE suggested  by Jonathan Adler as a means 
of justifying testimonial utterances is that: ‘ [t]he best explanation for why the informant 
asserts that P is normally that….he believes it for responsible reasons and…..intends that I 
shall believe it too’. (Adler, 1994: 274f, cited at Douven, 2017 : 4). 
      The obvious question, therefore, is: How is IBE different from a non-reductionist 
entitlement to trust the testifier?  Lipton argues that IBE’s inferential account is more valid 
than Coady’s non-inferential presumptive trust thesis, because our testimonial beliefs are 
                                                            
11 For a detailed analysis of the IBE methodology see, for example, Finke, 2011: Chapter 2.   
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generally more inferential than Coady’s non-reductionist account allows.  They are, he argues,  
cognitively integrated with all our stored  beliefs from other epistemic sources, and our 
experience of evaluating them, and it is this coherence of beliefs and practices which  we 
bring to our evaluation of a particular testimonial statement.  Thus, for example, even where 
we may appear to accept information, say, about the price of a return rail ticket to Sheffield, 
at face value, our acceptance is in reality made against a background of experience of the 
price of rail tickets generally.   Consequently, Lipton claims, an inferential process, such as IBE 
is a more accurate representation of the process of selecting those testimonial beliefs we 
accept, than an a priori presumption of trust.  On the other hand, Lipton argues, IBE also  
constitutes a general account of inductive reasoning which does not require a presumption 
that inferences from testimony  need to be reduced to inferences from ‘testimony-free 
premises’’ (Lipton, 1998: 24).  Rather, IBE permits a ‘default-trigger’ notion of testimony, in 
which a default situation of accepting what we are told  ‘may be overridden by a trigger that 
switches us into inferential mode’ (ibid. : 26). Thus, Lipton argues, his IBE account also differs 
from local reductionism in offering as a starting position the truth of the speaker’s assertion 
as the best explanation of why she said it, whilst conceding  the need to actively assess the 
speaker’s testimonial performance and to take into account the ‘essential role of background 
belief’ (ibid. :30).  
    Axel Gelfert makes similar claims on behalf of IBE.  He argues that as an  account of 
testimonial justification which adopts neither an a priori position of trust/acceptability in 
testimony (‘trusted acceptance’)  nor one which presupposes the need to monitor testimony 
counterfactually (‘rational rejection’) it can embrace both positions, according to the context 
of the testimonial encounter.  Thus, he claims, we can employ IBE  to identify both instances 
of testimony which should be accepted, and those which should be rejected in a non-
antagonistic manner (Gelfert, 2010: 394-395) 
       Strenuous conceptual and practical objections to IBE as a justificatory methodology, 
however, have been raised by those such as Bas van Fraassen who hold the  ‘scientific anti-
realist’ view that science aims at the truth of the observable world but not the unobservable 
world (van Fraassen, 1980, 1983, 1985,1989). Two of these objections, which seem to me 
particularly difficult for proponents of IBE are: 
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     1. Its circularity.  The success of a particular hypothesis, theory, or account, is said to be 
best explained by the fact that it is true (approximately true, highly likely to be true) which is 
claimed, in turn, to validate  the success of IBE as a reliable epistemic yardstick.  In other 
words, the explanation validates the hypothesis which in turn validates the explanation.  
Lipton (2000) accepts this inevitable circularity, but deems it ‘benign’.  It is, he contends, 
typical of the ‘self-evidencing’ explanations commonly found in science, in which hypotheses 
are supported by the very observations they are supposed to explain, and the observations, 
in their turn, support the hypothesis precisely because it would explain them.  He cites  by 
way of example Darwin’s theory of natural selection. However valid this defence may be in 
relation to IBE as a  process for evaluating a data-driven scientific hypotheses, however, it 
must be questionable how far it applies to the evaluation of a testimonial belief, and 
particularly one which, as in the case of catastrophe testimony, relies on a subjectively 
produced mental image of a past event.  Consequently the issue of  circularity raises valid 
questions in relation to the efficacy of IBE as a reliable epistemic means of belief justification 
in the context of testimony.  
     2. The other  crucial objection to IBE is that it offers no clear idea of  what we mean by the 
term ‘best explanation’, or  what criteria we can apply in selecting from any given pool of 
candidate explanations the one that we deem to be the best explanation.12  Lipton (2000, 
2004) responds that the ‘best’ explanation should mean not the likeliest explanation---the 
one which appears most probable--- but the ‘loveliest’ explanation---the explanation that 
would, if correct, provide the greatest degree of understanding. Lipton identifies scope, 
precision, mechanism, unification, and simplicity, in this context, as measures of ‘loveliness’, 
in the context of scientific hypotheses, but concedes that the evaluatory criteria applicable in 
relation to testimonial statements might perhaps be less data-driven and more inclined 
towards a psychological judgement of the testifier and her testimony. Such criteria might 
include sincerity, intelligibility, plausibility, or coherence with background evidence of the 
testifier’s reliability or truthfulness.  
                                                            
12 The IBE process logically seems to presuppose that there is more than one candidate explanation, and that 
none of the candidate explanations is clearly identifiable as the actual explanation prior to the application of the 
IBE test, since otherwise the process would be otiose. 
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      Van Fraassen, though, further argued that in order to be deemed reliable, IBE should be 
capable of identifying, at least typically, the explanation of the relevant evidence which is 
absolutely the best of all conceivable explanations, and not merely the best explanation 
among those candidate explanations of which the particular agent ( the hearer, in the case of 
testimony)  can conceive. In other words, IBE’s reliability depends on at least one of the 
candidate explanations being absolutely the best explanation. Otherwise, he argues the 
explanation identified may well be no more than ‘the best of a bad lot’ (van Fraassen, 1989: 
143, cited by Douven, 2017: 8).  Consequently, he argues, since we cannot assume that an 
agent is typically capable of identifying such an absolutely best explanation, IBE is, a priori, 
implausible (ibid. : 144). 
     This objection, though, strikes me as less convincing than that outlined in the preceding 
paragraph, and one has to question whether van Fraassen’s absolutist bar is not implausibly 
high, at least in relation to the justification of a testimonial utterance, and particularly one 
relating to a catastrophic experience. Moreover, the assumption in van Fraassen’s argument 
that the determination of an  absolutely best explanation for the success of a given hypothesis 
is typically objectively possible, even in a scientific context, may itself be questionable.  
Richard Rudner (1953) argues, for instance, that the perceived dichotomy between making 
value judgements ‘in a typically ethical sense’, and the ‘methods and procedures of science’ 
is a false one. No scientific hypothesis, he said, can ever be deemed  completely verified, and 
accordingly scientists are bound to make value judgements in deciding whether to accept or 
reject them. Moreover, these decisions may be ethically guided, for example by the  
consequences of making a mistake in accepting or rejecting a hypothesis, such as one which 
posits that a toxic ingredient of a drug is not present in a lethal quantity (Rudner, 1953:2-3).  
Helen Longino (2019) also repudiates the popular conception of scientific hypotheses  being 
epistemically reliable because they are based on the results of experiments and observational 
studies which are supported by independent repetition.  In practice, she maintains, the 
findings of many such studies are accepted on trust, as indeed are some reports of the failure 
to replicate their results. Thus, she says, in the scientific world as in the non-scientific world 
‘knowledge grows by depending on the testimony of others’ (Longino, 2019: 4).  Longino also 
stresses the social dimension of scientific knowledge; its reliance on shared ethical values 
across the scientific community, but also its susceptibility to various forms of bias, for example 
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along gender, language or nationality lines. Rudner and Longino’s comments seem to me to 
make the application of IBE to testimony, and catastrophe testimony in particular, appear 
more possible.  
     My own principal reservation regarding IBE in the context of this dissertation, though, is 
whether, and to what extent, it really opens up new pathways in the evaluation of testimony.  
How far would its application typically result in an evaluatory outcome materially different 
from that applied by an epistemically virtuous and alert non-reductionist, or local 
reductionist, in an identical situation, with an identical social background, character, and 
prejudices? What evidence is there, in a testimonial context, and especially one relating to 
the evaluation of catastrophe testimony, that IBE is  methodologically superior in practice to 
other accounts?  Certainly, it seems potentially well equipped to deal specifically with the 
justification of testimony whose truthfulness may  ultimately not be objectively or empirically 
demonstrable, and this might point to its possible appeal in relation to catastrophe testimony 
in particular.  That potential, though, is limited so long as the discussion of issues such as what 
constitutes  the ‘best’ explanation is constrained by the boundaries of the epistemic 
evaluation, and I don’t myself see, within the conceptualisation of IBE, a means of its 
liberation from that constraint.   Moreover, IBE, as in the case of the other accounts examined 
in this chapter, still appears largely wedded to the concept of testimony as an assertoric 
speech-act, as Lipton concedes. 
    4.2   Virtue Epistemology   
      The basic idea underpinning virtue epistemology is that ‘knowledge is true belief that is 
gained as a result of the reliable operation of  epistemic virtues, or cognitive faculties’ [of the 
knowledge acquirer]  (Pritchard, 2014: 58). Cognitive faculties in this context are natural, or 
innate, faculties, such as perception, intuition, and memory, whilst epistemic virtues are 
‘cultivated’ character traits, such as conscientiousness, intellectual courage, perseverance, 
and open-mindedness, which ‘promote intellectual flourishing’, or ‘make for an excellent 
cognizer’ (Turri, Alfonso and Greco, 2019: 3).  In what follows, I assume that the term ‘virtue 
epistemology’ embraces both cognitive values and epistemic virtues.  
      Virtue epistemology aims to take the issue of the formation of true beliefs beyond  
conventional epistemic preoccupations with the concept of knowledge as justified true belief 
into other  cognitive realms, such as deliberation, understanding, wisdom and empathy, and 
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into contact with other  fields of cognitive studies, such as psychology, sociology, and life 
sciences (ibid: 4).  The virtue epistemological  concept of knowledge as  ‘non-accidentally true 
belief’ posits that an epistemic agent, such as the hearer or reader in the case of testimony, 
can only acquire true beliefs through the competent employment of her intellectual virtues, 
and not, for example, through epistemic luck.  Sosa, for example, suggests an analogy 
between a person who acquires true beliefs in this way and an archer who reliably hits the 
bullseye of his target through skill and judgment, rather than through a lucky shot (one, for 
example, which is mis-aimed, but hits the bullseye due to the lucky intervention of a gust of 
wind).  In other words, virtue epistemologists claim that you can only know something if you 
deserve credit for believing its truth.  Consequently, they argue, knowledge is more valuable 
than true belief acquired non-virtuously, even if both serve equally well for guiding the 
agent’s actions (ibid: 6-8).  
The idea of knowledge as true belief acquired though learned cognitive virtues, notes Linda 
Zabzebski, can be traced back to the notion of episteme ‘(knowledge’, or ‘understanding’), 
which Plato associated  with techne; practical human arts or skills which might be acquired in 
such diverse fields as medicine, hunting,  shipbuilding, and cooking, perhaps as part of some 
more holistic quest to become a more virtuous person (Zagzebski, 2001: 240).   Aristotle also 
taught that epistemic virtues, as distinct from perceptions, must be learned over time, by 
exercising them, as builders learn by building, or musicians by playing  instruments (ibid., 
citing Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics: 1103a, 14-25). Epistemic  virtues  are thus also social 
virtues,  in that they are learned from others within epistemic communities,  for example by 
imitating virtuous agents, or from taking to heart cautionary tales of epistemic vice, and are 
then in turn passed on to others who also wish to acquire them.  The question, therefore, is 
whether the epistemic virtues which may be cultivated in this way might include those which 
are relevant to the evaluation of testimony. 
     Criticisms of virtue epistemology as a compelling universal account of knowledge 
acquisition  focus both on its premise that acquiring knowledge requires the exercise by an 
agent of cognitive skills, or abilities, and/or epistemic virtues, and  upon the claim that virtue 
epistemology offers a solution to the problem raised by Gettier cases: scenarios in which an 
agent acquires a justified true belief yet at the same time lacks knowledge relating to that 
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belief  because that belief is luckily true.13 The nub of the latter criticism is that the agent’s 
performance, however epistemically competent, can  never be immune to chance.  In the 
archer scenario, for example, the skilled archer’s next attempt may have  found the bullseye 
only because his shot, having been blown off-course by an unlucky gust of wind, had then 
been luckily  redirected to its target by a second, lucky, gust of wind.  How, in such 
circumstances, the argument goes, could he be said to deserve credit for hitting the bullseye 
on the first occasion, but not on the second? 
    Jennifer Lackey (2007) presents  the following scenario in support of her argument that 
one can acquire knowledge without deserving any credit for its acquisition: 
 Having just arrived in Chicago, Morris asks the first adult passer-by how to get to the 
Sears Tower.  The passer-by, who happens to be a Chicago resident who knows the 
city extraordinarily well, provides Morris with impeccable directions to the Sears 
Tower.  Morris unhesitatingly forms the corresponding true belief.   
      Morris, argues Lackey, has clearly acquired testimonial knowledge concerning the location 
of the Sears Tower as a direct result of the local knowledge which the passer-by whom Morris 
luckily accosted happened to possess. However, Morris deserves no particular credit for 
forming his true belief, and therefore cannot, according to virtue epistemologists, be said to 
know the location of the Sears Tower.  Alternatively, if acquiring a true belief in this way can 
be creditable, then Gettier-type cases of lucky belief are equally creditable, in which case the 
notion of credit espoused by virtue epistemology means very little epistemically, if anything 
at all (Lackey, 2007: 355).  Moreover, she suggests, even if Morris’s choice of speaker had 
been more ‘creditable’--- if for example, cognisant of the fact that his destination was in a 
business district, he had deliberately approached a passer-by whose appearance was that of 
a businessman---the most salient causal factor of him acquiring a true belief in the location of 
his destination would still have remained the local knowledge his informant happened to 
                                                            
13 An example of a Gettier case is the ‘stopped clock’ scenario, in which the agent forms a belief about the time 
of day by looking at a stopped clock she reasonably supposes to be working.  However, since she happens by 
pure luck to be looking at the clock at the precise moment when it is showing the right time of day, she in fact 
forms a  belief about what the time is, which is both true and justified.  Her belief does not, however, constitute 
knowledge, because it is pure luck that it is true.  Gettier cases therefore show that the analysis of knowledge 
as justified true belief is not universally sustainable (Pritchard, 2014: 202). 
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possess.  Lackey thus concludes that what she calls the Deserving Credit View of Knowledge  
must be false. 
   It seems hard to deny that Lackey’s illustration exposes a significant challenge to the virtue 
epistemology conception of knowledge, though not perhaps one which amounts  per se to 
proof of its falsity.  What it certainly demonstrates, however, is that VE is  another conceptual 
account of belief justification, or knowledge acquisition the criteria governing which are 
subject to  significant exceptions, which may  lead to its rules being seen more as rules of 
thumb,  as in the case of  non-reductionist, or reductionist rules. Moreover, from the 
perspective of catastrophe testimony, it does not seem to me that any failure (if such it is) of 
virtue epistemology, or any other epistemic account , to offer a Gettier-proof account of 
knowledge is really that significant in practice.  Perhaps, then, we should simply allow that 
the virtue epistemic thesis, in common with other epistemic accounts, is flawed and does not 
apply in certain important cases, such as mundane testimony, and perhaps others categories 
already discussed, such as knowledge acquired  from a parent or teacher in childhood, or from 
an expert, or authoritative, source in later life. 
  In fact, if virtue epistemology is to have particular value and importance from the 
perspective of catastrophe testimony, this does not appear to me to lie principally in its 
development as a specifically epistemic thesis. Rather, it lies in the possibility of its application 
more holistically, as a virtue-theoretic hermeneutical contribution to the development of an 
account of hearing or reading catastrophe testimony in which epistemological, psychological, 
and ethical elements might be brought together, which is the direction in which I find this 
dissertation organically turning given that the reach of its subject matter extends significantly 
beyond that of propositional statements. The key question, therefore, is whether 
approaching the task of evaluating catastrophe testimony within a virtue-epistemological 
framework might constitute a fruitful approach to the task of rendering the testimony of 
victims of catastrophic experiences intelligible in ways beyond those which are possible via 
other epistemic accounts.  By way of illustrating some of the points at issue in relation to such 
an exercise I now turn briefly to a different but to my mind analogous context in which such 
a question has previously been considered: that of ‘epistemic injustice’.  
 
   
53 
    Case study:  Epistemic Injustice 
      ‘Epistemology as it has traditionally been pursued’ says Miranda Fricker in her introduction 
to her book Epistemic Injustice, ‘has been impoverished by the lack of any theoretical 
framework conducive to revealing the ethical and political aspects of our epistemic conduct’ 
(Fricker, 2007: 2).  Her book is in part an attempt to rectify this perceived deficiency, in the 
specific context of what she calls epistemic injustice.  Epistemic injustice, Fricker says, arises 
whenever a speaker is the victim of ‘identity-prejudicial credibility deficit’ (IPCD); that is when, 
as a consequence of often unreflective identity- prejudicial stereotyping, such as that arising 
from racial or gender prejudice, the speaker is given a deflated level of credibility by a hearer 
specifically in her capacity as a knower.  Testimonial  injustice, says Fricker, is the form of 
epistemic  injustice which results when IPCD prejudices a hearer’s judgment of a speaker’s 
credibility as a testifier.  Hermeneutical injustice, on the other hand, says Fricker,  is the form 
of epistemic injustice suffered by members of a ‘hermeneutically marginalised’ groups in 
society who are deprived of the social language in which to articulate, or even develop a social 
awareness of, the injustice they suffer.  The example she cites is that of women who suffered 
sexual harassment before that concept became  properly socially recognised or understood, 
and as a consequence were prevented  from rendering their experience credible or even 
intelligible to others, and even to themselves (ibid. :4-7).  And of course testimonial injustice 
and hermeneutical injustice are causally connected, since each acts on the other. 
   The part of Fricker’s book which most closely connects with the themes of this dissertation 
is  that in which she seeks to demonstrate how the tendency to make identity-prejudicial 
credibility judgements can be corrected by hearers through cultivating  epistemic virtues 
specifically targeted at seeking out and correcting for  identity-prejudicial bias in 
themselves.    She suggests that this work should be carried out by hearers within a virtue 
epistemological framework, in which the hearer can, through developing epistemic virtues 
such as open-mindedness, balance, and intellectual courage, become a ‘responsible’ or  
‘virtuous’ hearer.  Fricker envisages this process as one akin to the   Aristotelian notion of 
developing other knowledge-based virtues through cultivating them over time, like those of 
builders or musicians, but in a  moral context, so that a hearer becomes someone who 
learns to exercise ‘rational sensibility, without inference, so as to be critically open to the 
word of others’ (ibid. :71). 
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    Fricker claims that credibility judgments made in a virtue-epistemological framework can 
be more socially and morally nuanced than those made following the principles laid down by 
‘theory-laden perceptions’, such as non-reductionism or reductionism.  Her declared 
objection to non-reductionism is methodological rather than conceptual.  She argues that it 
wrongly assumes that our critical faculties are awakened from ‘snooze’ (critically unreflective) 
mode into an alert critical mode only on receiving some ‘cue for doubt’, whereas in reality 
our critical faculties are in a constant mode of ‘critical openness’.  However  I think she 
unjustifiably conflates the non-reductionist presumptive right of trust, or a-priori entitlement 
to accept the word of others as a default position, with that of a permanent unreflexive 
cognitive state.  Nevertheless, it seems she is not conceptually opposed to and is conceptually 
non-reductionism.  She is, however, apparently conceptually opposed to  reductionism 
though she seems to conflate it with global reductionism, whereas her virtue-epistemological 
framework in my view much more closely resembles that of local reductionism, as expounded 
by Elizabeth Fricker (1994,1995).  The key point, however, is that contra both non-
reductionism and reductionism, Miranda Fricker argues that the epistemic virtues required to 
become a ‘responsible’ or ‘virtuous’ hearer must be specifically learned or cultivated; that  
the sensibility and perceptual capacity of  hearers need to be  developed in such a way that 
they come to see the world ‘in moral colour’, but remain at the same time  able  to exercise 
their judgment in a non-inferentially rational way thus enabling them to give a ‘suitably 
critical’ reception to the word of others (ibid. :71).   The virtuous hearer, she suggests, is 
analogous to  a virtuous ethical agent - someone who, through a proper moral upbringing and 
socialization has developed a sensitivity to the morally salient features of any given situation 
in which he finds himself. The virtuous hearer, on the other hand, is someone who has a 
socially  developed sensitivity to the epistemically salient features of  any given testimonial 
presentation - notably  the testifier’s sincerity, and competence -  which is  guided  but not 
ruled, by  epistemic norms or criteria, and allows for an evaluation which is both intellectual 
and phenomenal.  A perception of a speaker as trustworthy, for example, would embody a 
feeling of trust in her (ibid. :80).  Fricker envisages that her paradigmatic ‘virtuous’ hearer 
would be able to develop a spontaneous (unreflective) critical sensitivity which is 
permanently ‘in training’, and continuously adapting and developing towards a  non-
inferentialist epistemic ‘second nature’ which is both rational and ethical in nature ( ibid. :81-
5).  
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    Fricker’s thesis is not without its critics.  The following are the key issues that have been 
raised by commentators: 
1. What Fricker describes as testimonial injustice is not a distinct phenomenon, but 
rather a context in which the phenomenon of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit 
manifests itself.   
2. Identity-prejudicial credibility deficit is not a distinctly epistemic phenomenon, 
though the harm it does may be epistemic in nature.  It is rather an instance of a more 
widely experienced social and cultural phenomenon of identity-prejudicial 
judgements typically derived from the social or cultural stereotyping and devaluation 
of speakers by reason of their gender, race, ethnicity, or membership of some 
community or group.  Moreover its application in practice can vary, depending on 
factors such as context, the social situations of particular hearers relative to the 
relevant speakers, the respective characters of the parties, and their personal 
interaction. 
3.  Fricker has not shown that a virtue-epistemological framework is conceptually or 
methodologically necessary for the task of monitoring or correcting for testimonial 
injustice, or can successfully develop generally applicable epistemic virtues which 
cannot be developed through the application of  other moral or epistemic principles 
or methodologies.  More broadly, since stereotypical identity prejudice is a social 
phenomenon, and often held unreflectively, the extent to which it is correctable 
through what Fricker calls a distinctively reflexive critical social awareness must be 
debateable.    
        Benjamin Sherman is one critic who questions Fricker’s notion of there being a virtue of 
testimonial justice for which she says individuals can aim in practice; that is that identity- 
prejudiced credibility judgements can be self-corrected by hearers (Sherman, 2016: 229-231).  
Firstly, he points out, such prejudices, are typically deeply embedded in social structures,  and 
correcting them may thus require  societal rather than individual action. Secondly, he cites 
the arguments of ‘situationists’, who deny that humans have stable character traits that are 
exercisable consistently over a whole range of situations, arguing instead that situational 
factors irrelevant to moral or epistemic reasoning can have a  significant impact on human 
thoughts and actions. Thus, he notes, one cannot simply assume that because an individual 
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may exhibit a virtue such as  intellectual courage or open-mindedness in one situation he will 
be  disposed to do so in all situations (ibid.:233-4).  Thirdly, he questions the extent to which 
correcting for epistemic injustice is psychologically possible in practice, rather than merely a 
worthy ideal.   If your racial or gender prejudice is unconscious, for example, how can you 
knowingly correct for it?  And even if you are made aware of it, what evidence is there that 
your likely response would be to correct for it?  In the absence of evidence of the existence 
of a general disposition to correct for such prejudices, asks Sherman, would it not be better 
to see testimonial  injustice as symptomatic of a wider  social prejudice  avoidable or 
correctable, if at all, through the development of appropriate  counter-strategies based on 
existing general rational and moral criteria, rather than the development of  a specific virtue-
theoretic framework targeted at the specific aim  of epistemic  or testimonial justice.   
    José Medina  offers a socially-centred critique  of Fricker’s notion of epistemic injustice, 
which stresses the importance of connecting specific instances of injustice to what is 
happening in societies as a whole.  He  sees identity-prejudicial credibility deficit as part of a 
much  wider,  more socially pervasive, phenomenon in which certain groups in society are 
routinely  given disproportionally excess collective creditability and others routinely given  
disproportionally deflated credibility, across a whole range of social situations, both banal 
and otherwise (Medina, 2011:17-20). He cites by way of  example, studies which show that  
teachers in American universities are typically invested with more authority by students if 
they are white, or male, or native English speakers, than those who are not.   
   The criticisms of Sherman and Medina seem to me largely valid.  Of course I accept that 
identity prejudice affects judgements concerning a speaker’s credibility, but I don’t see 
testimonial injustice as a distinct epistemic phenomenon directed specifically against the 
speaker in her capacity as a knower.   Rather, I see it as a particular manifestation of a 
prejudice  against her as a human being in the form of an attack on her credibility as a knower.  
More to the point from the perspective of this dissertation, I  agree with Sherman that even 
if testimonial injustice were to be considered as an epistemic phenomenon, it is doubtful that 
a specifically virtue-epistemological framework is necessary or especially effective means of 
correcting for it, or indeed that such injustices are  systemically correctable at all.  Nor, as 
Sherman says, does Fricker offer any practical guidance as to how epistemic agents might 
develop truth-seeking epistemic virtues which typically achieve epistemic success, for 
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example in evaluating the traumatic memories of survivors of catastrophic experiences, 
assuming they are not specifically professionally trained to do so. Finally, I would maintain 
that, as Fricker herself concedes, many identity prejudices such as racial prejudice and gender 
prejudice are frequently so deeply and widely socially embedded that identifying and 
correcting for them is a task that can only be undertaken by collective action across societies 
rather than individually. 
    The fundamental point, though, is that the virtues which are needed to correct for vice of 
making identity-prejudicial judgements of others, such as tolerance, open-mindedness, or 
fairness, are not specifically epistemic virtues, but general human and social virtues.  
Sometimes such virtues can be self-cultivated, and sometimes the prejudice is too deeply 
ingrained to be corrected, but this depends on the character, social background, and personal  
experience of the agent, rather her adherence to a ‘top-down’ conceptual framework.  To call 
the process epistemological then, however liberal the epistemological framework one 
chooses, simply unnecessarily reduces the  scope of one’s contemplation of it.  And of course 
Fricker does not claim her thesis applies outside the realm of propositional statements – in 
fact her case studie involve specifically the role of propositional statements as evidence, 
which to my mind narrows the scope of their application even further. 
   4.3   Understanding  
    Linda Zagzebski (2001) argues that the ‘information model’ account of knowledge 
acquisition - that which  emphasises the epistemic values of certainty, and belief 
justification, and  the acquisition of knowledge though the transmission of propositional 
information—is only one of two historically dominant such accounts.  The other account, 
she says, which has been neglected in modern times, but which has its origins in the 
thinking of Plato and Aristotle, is based on a more ethical concept of knowledge, which 
emphasises the epistemic values of understanding and explanation, rather than certainty 
and justification.  This account understands the work of epistemology as being concerned 
with non-propositional as well as propositional ‘structures of reality’, as for example in 
understanding the character of a person, a piece of music, or a work of art.  The concepts of 
knowledge and understanding are closely related, Zagzebski notes, having a common root in 
the Platonic/ Aristotelian notion of episteme (discussed in the preceding section).  However, 
she maintains, understanding ‘aims at comprehensiveness, not exactness’ (Zagzebski, 2001: 
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244). She argues for the rehabilitation of the understanding-based account of knowledge  by 
contemporary philosophers. 
       The criteria for what constitutes successful understanding though,  Zagzebski admits, are 
‘not as clear as we would  want’, and neither are they, in a testimonial context, easy to 
envisage.   A definition of understanding, she concedes, cannot be as specific as a definition 
of knowledge, but can, she claims, be arrived at by looking at those intellectual virtues which 
aim not at truth, but understanding; virtues which are as yet unanalysed, even unrecognized, 
and hard to pinpoint, but which, like knowledge, can be taught, or self-taught.  This should 
therefore be epistemology’s project (ibid. : 249-50).  In effect, as I read her thesis, she is 
endorsing virtue epistemology as a methodological framework, but suggesting replacing the 
acquisition of knowledge as its objective with understanding. 
    I am instinctively sympathetic towards the goals of this project, but once again cannot 
really envisage how it could work specifically in relation to  catastrophe testimony.  Even if it 
were possible to demonstrate that  understanding is distinguishable from ‘informational’  
knowing, one would have to demonstrate further how that distinction made it possible to 
‘understand’ elements of catastrophe testimony which could not  be understood following 
the information model of evaluation, and I don’t find any evidence in Zagzebski’s account  of 
how this might be done.   Further I have the same problem with the notion of there being 
‘understanding-specific’ intellectual virtues as I had with Fricker’s notion of there being 
epistemologically specific intellectual virtues. 
    4.4  Empathy   
        If the ability of those who hear or read catastrophe testimony to understand it may be  
limited, then the ability of hearers or readers of such testimony to empathise with testifiers 
is perhaps even more limited, since as well as  knowing what testifiers are thinking and 
feeling, empathy requires hearers or readers to ‘emotionally engage with them and share 
their thoughts and feelings’  (Stueber, 2019: 1).  The term ‘empathy’ notes Karsten Stueber, 
was introduced into the English language in 1909, as a translation of the German term 
Einfühlung (‘feeling into’) , after the German philosopher Theodor Lipps, in which context it 
is ‘more specifically understood as a phenomenon of ‘’inner imitation’’ where my mind 
mirrors the mental activities or experiences of another person based on observations of his 
bodily activities or facial expressions’, for example instinctually imitating  the angry face of 
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another person by feeling anger (ibid. : 3).  Lipps apparently claimed that empathy should be 
seen as a primary epistemic means for gaining knowledge of the minds of others, but , says  
Stueber, failed to explain how this could give us an epistemically sanctioned understanding 
of the minds of others, or why ‘feeling into’ the mind of another person ’is more than a 
mere projection’ (ibid. :4).  
   Stueber notes Lipps’s claims for empathy are likely to be rejected by those who believe 
epistemic agents always act within a social and cultural context - those in the hermeneutical 
tradition, for example,  for whom a reading of other minds which is not culturally mediated 
is a naïve one (ibid. :9). Psychologists, on the other hand, are  concerned to distinguish 
empathy and other reactive emotions.  Notable among these other emotions from the 
perspective of catastrophe testimony are sympathy - an emotion having as its object 
another person’s negative emotion, or plight, from someone who cares for their wellbeing, 
but not one which is congruent with that other person’s feelings -  and personal distress -  
responding emotionally to another person’s negative emotion, or plight, not by feeling 
distressed for them, but just by feeling distressed ( ibid. :13-14). 
  Jean Améry firmly rejected the notion that those who had not themselves been victims of a 
catastrophic experience such as that endured by Holocaust victims could ever empathise 
with former victims like himself, however good their intentions.  The context is a passage in 
his essay ‘On the Necessity  and Impossibility of Being a Jew’, the last essay in his book At 
the Mind’s Limits, in which he points out to  those Jews who were not victims of the 
Holocaust that they should not claim to  existentially identify with those who were. He 
continues; 
    By no means do I say this with pride.  It would be ridiculous enough to 
boast of something that one did not do but only underwent.  Rather it is with 
certain shame that I assert my sad privilege and suggest that while the 
Holocaust is truly the existential reference point for all Jews, only, we, the 
sacrificed, are able to spiritually relive the catastrophic event as it was or fully 
picture it as it could be again.  Let others not be prevented from empathizing.  
Let them contemplate the fate that yesterday could have been and tomorrow 
can be theirs.  Their intellectual efforts will be met with our respect, but it 
will be a sceptical one, and in conversation with them we will soon grow 
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silent and say to ourselves: go ahead, good people, trouble your heads as 
much as you want; you still sound like a blind man talking about color (sic). 
(Améry, 1999: 93). 
When Améry talks of ‘good people’ empathizing, what he is actually talking about, per 
Stueber, is those people sympathizing, or, if their emotions are self-directed , 
exhibiting personal distress, or what might also be called sentimentality. 
   4.5 Moral Expectation of Epistemic Trust 
    The final suggestion for developing the notion of belief justification I want to briefly note is 
that described by Sanford Goldberg (2019) which he calls  the ‘moral expectation of epistemic 
trust’ (MEET).  This account argues from the anti-reductionist  premise that recipients have a 
default but defeasible entitlement to accept ‘observed testimony’ as true to an ethical 
conclusion that testifiers should enjoy a  corresponding default but defeasible moral 
entitlement to expect their (undefeated) testimony to be accepted as trustworthy .  This 
suggestion is  particularly intriguing in relation to catastrophe testimony. 
 Unfortunately, though,  Goldberg sees any attempt to establish a direct  link between the 
notion of an epistemic entitlement to accept the word of a speaker, and the notion that the 
failure to accept her word should be deemed as in some way morally ‘disrespecting’ her as 
problematic, because whilst anti-reductionist accounts establish a right or entitlement to 
believe the word of a testifier, they do not deem it epistemically improper not to believe 
her. Consequently, he finds that some ‘bridge’ needs to be established to connect the anti-
reductionist hearer’s entitlement to believe to a putative speaker’s moral right to be 
believed. After canvassing and rejecting other options14, Goldberg concludes that such a 
connection would require a ‘particularly strong’ version of anti-reductionism, which would 
not only deem it epistemically permissible for recipients to accept ‘observed testimony’ as 
true (absent defeaters) but also impermissible not to accept such testimony as true.  The 
suggestion is that this would in turn make non-acceptance not only a breach of an epistemic 
requirement but also a manifestation of a kind of disrespect for the testifier’s authority, 
thus putting the recipient in breach of a moral requirement to accept that authority. That, 
says Goldberg, is not workable;  one simply cannot argue from  anti-reductionism to MEET 
                                                            
14 Goldberg’s analysis merits a closer and more detailed reading than the focus of this dissertation can allow. 
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merely by  inferring the existence of ethical features of the act of testifying. The fact is that 
anti-reductionism grants an epistemic permission to accept the speaker’s say-so but does 
not oblige the recipient to accept it, and thus cannot constitute a viable premise for  the 
establishment of a speaker’s moral entitlement to expect to be trusted. Consequently, 
Goldberg concludes, since any plausible account of  MEET will  have to employ anti-
reductionism as its premise, the prospects for its successful application must be considered 
to be dim.  Moreover, as in the case of other accounts of epistemic or epistemically derived 
justification reviewed above, the debate around MEET analysed by Goldberg assumes that 
the act of testifying constitutes a speech act addressed to one or more hearers in the 
speaker’s presence, which would in any event severely restrict its application to catastrophe 
testimony. 
  4.6  Summary 
   I have endeavoured in this and the previous chapter to canvass as widely as is feasible within 
the scope of this dissertation a variety of epistemological accounts of belief justification and 
knowledge acquisition in an effort to test the possibility of extending the epistemological 
concept of justified true belief beyond that relating to the propositional content of 
catastrophe testimony. In effect, I have been exploring the possibility of narrowing the 
epistemological chasm between testifiers and the world manifested by such testimony by 
transforming the ‘informational model’ of belief justification into   a more philosophically 
holistic model which could embrace non-propositional and even subjective elements of 
testimonial content, and also non-epistemological concepts of belief justification.   That this 
goal has proved unattainable is not a criticism of the epistemological accounts  of testimony 
I have examined but more a confirmation of the reality that accounts specifically conceived 
for the purpose of epistemically justifying beliefs in verbally transmitted propositional 
information cannot in my view be reconfigured so as to permit other kinds of evaluation, or 
the evaluation of other kinds of testimonial content.   
   The epistemological chasm between survivors and the world revealed by catastrophe 
testimony is thus essentially that in which one finds everything said by the testifier in relation 
to her catastrophic experience, or her existence as a survivor of that experience, which cannot 
be justifiably believed by a recipient of her testimony as a propositional statement. Sensations 
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and feelings such as the pain of torture, or the fear of being selected for the gas chamber, for 
example, are located in that chasm. 
    What I also discovered, however, is that the chasm between survivors who produce 
accounts of their catastrophic experiences and the world is much more than a knowledge gap. 
It is an existential, experiential and moral chasm, of which the epistemological chasm is an 
important but by no means the only part. The story of my exploration of the nature and extent 
of that chasm is told in the following chapters of this dissertation,  I begin that journey of 




















                                                    PART THREE 
 
                  THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF   CATASTROPHE TESTIMONY 
    
  CHAPTER 5. CATASTROPHE TESTIMONY’S ORIGINS IN  MEMORY  
    5.1 Background to and Scope of This Chapter 
    Catastrophe testimony is sourced from memory, or more specifically from the post-
traumatic recollection of catastrophic personal experiences held in the testifier’s memory. 
The period for which they have been held in memory prior to their retrieval for the purposes 
of testifying might be as short as a few hours, or as long as decades.  Similarly, such retrieval 
might be occurring  for the first time,  or it might be the latest of many retrievals of that 
memory belief—perhaps thousands. If, for example,  someone was to say of  an experience 
occurring ten years earlier that ‘not a day goes by when I do not think of it’, then even if 
recollection had occurred only once during each day, that would amount to  more than 3,500 
separate instances of recollection within that period. Hence the importance of engaging  with 
the question of how memory functions, or malfunctions both generally, and specifically as a 
source of catastrophe testimony. 
  There are a number of different kinds of memory recognised by philosophers, and also by 
psychologists and others engaged in studying the workings of the human mind.  Catastrophe 
testimony, however, mostly involves what is referred to as  episodic memory, though it also 
sometimes incorporates what is referred to as semantic memory.  Episodic memory is 
memory of experiences and events from one’s own past, such as when I remember driving 
along a particular street or dining at a particular restaurant in Paris. Semantic memory is 
memory of things one has learned about the world without having  experienced or witnessed 
them directly, for example that Paris is the capital of France, or that there is a well-known 
restaurant in Paris  called La Rotonde.  However, memories of events from one’s own past 
can also be acquired semantically, one example being ‘relearned’ experiences, such as 
remembering a visit you made to the Eiffel Tower as a child only as a result of your parents 
having  subsequently related the story of that visit to you.  Episodic and semantic memory are 
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known as declarative memory - memory which can be stored in and retrieved from a subject’s 
consciousness (Michaelian and Sutton, 2017: 4-5).15   
      In addition to there being different kinds of memory, there are also a variety different 
contexts in which memories might be recollected and conveyed to others as testimony.   In 
the case of memories of catastrophic experiences, such as those of  Holocaust survivors, these 
might include evidence given in judicial proceedings, witness statements given to  
investigatory bodies, sound or video recordings made for the benefit of archival institutions, 
speeches made in public or at private events, programmes made for radio, television, or 
internet distribution, or  memories evoked in the course of a therapeutic process.  Last, but 
by no means least, a vast range of such recollections can be found in personal accounts by 
survivors of their lives, in many narrativized forms, including autobiographies, and ‘factitious’ 
works (fictionalised  treatments of autobiographical   experiences, such as  Imre Kertesz’s  
account of a teenager’s experience as a concentration camp inmate, in his novel 
Fatelessness), essays, and poems.  
    From a historical perspective, general philosophical speculation concerning the nature, and 
role, of memory goes back at least as far as the writings of Plato, but contemporary discourse 
has  more proximate origins in the writings of Locke, Reid and Hume.   The three philosophers 
differed in their conception of the nature of a memorial belief, and more specifically that of a 
retrieved memory belief, but all of them subscribed to what we nowadays call  the 
preservationist, or archivalist, account of the function of memory. This account has long been 
regarded as the classic account of memory’s nature and role, but has in more recent times 
been challenged by other accounts more aligned to contemporary research into the workings 
of memory carried out by psychologists and cognitive scientists, the  most widely accepted of 
which are those which espouse the generativist, constructivist, or reconstructivist account of 
memory (collectively referred to as the generativist account herein).     
   More will be said on the distinctions between these accounts below, but in simple terms 
the preservationist account views the role of memory as essentially passive; that of encoding,  
storing, and ultimately reproducing, in a form which is as near its original form as the power 
of the individual’s memory permits, the content of a  particular memory.  The generativist  
                                                            
15 The term episodic memory was coined by Endel Tulving as ‘ the what, the where, and the when memory’ of 
an experienced event in Tulving, 1972. Tulving later developed his theory In Tulving, 1983, and Tulving, 1985.  
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accounts of the functioning and role of memory, on the other hand, hold variously that 
memory plays  a wider, dynamic, cognitive role, which has the ability to, and typically does, 
generate, or construct new informational content, and/or reconstruct or reimagine, existing 
memorial content, at every stage from encoding up to, and especially at, retrieval.16  This 
debate can no longer be confined purely within a philosophical context, since the question of 
how memory functions is one that has also become important to psychologists, at least since 
the time of Freud, and others active in various fields of cognitive science.  Of particular 
interest to contemporary commentators is whether what have been traditionally perceived 
as intentional or unintentional memory errors, inaccuracies, or malfunctions, such as 
forgetting, misremembering, or confabulation, should  be reinterpreted within the context of  
the wider operation of a more intentional cognitive process, of which  memory is only a part.  
   Two alternative accounts of the workings of memory are also briefly  summarised below.  
The first is the causalist theory of memory, which lies conceptually somewhere between the 
preservationist and generationist accounts.  It requires, as necessary and (more or less) 
sufficient conditions for successful remembering, the existence of a causal connection, 
generated through a continuous memory trace, between an original remembered experience 
and the retrieved memorial representation of it, but does not require the retrieved memory 
trace to match precisely the original memory belief, nor that the rememberer  should be 
aware of the connection.  The second account is the simulation theory, which sees episodic 
remembering as a process of mental time travel akin to mindreading. 
   My objective in this Chapter is limited to  setting the contemporary  debate concerning the 
nature and role of memory within a  context  which will facilitate the discussion which follows 
it, concerning the particular case of remembering and recollecting  traumatic personal 
experiences, and specifically catastrophic experience. 
 
 
    
 
                                                            
16 There are a number of variations on these non-preservationist themes; see, for example Lackey, 2007, Shanton 
and Goldman, 2010, Michaelian ,2011, 2013, and 2016, and De Brigard ,2014. 
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     5.2  The Historical Foundations of the Debate Regarding the Nature and Role of Memory 
 
            Plato  
In Plato’s Theaetetus, concerning the nature of knowledge, Socrates asks Theaetetus, in one 
passage, the  ‘Wax Tablet’ passage (190e-196c), to imagine that our mind contains a wax 
tablet , and that whenever we want to remember something it stamps the impression of what 
it is we wish to remember into the wax tablet, as if making an impression with a signet ring, 
in order that it can be preserved there until it is erased  (forgotten). 
In one part  of the passage, Socrates likens variations in the quality of individual memories to 
variations in the quality of wax;  a good memory is like a good  quality wax,  one which is deep 
and smooth, and of the right consistency, easily absorbing and retaining a faithful impression, 
whilst a poor memory either leaves insufficiently deep impressions, like a wax which is too 
hard, or leaves an impression which is unclear, like a wax which is too soft, or impure. 
(Theaetetus, 194-5).17  Aristotle,  in his later conception of the Wax Tablet analogy, in  De 
Memoria et Remiscentia (450a-b), compares soft wax to the memories of children, forming 
images which do not ‘remain in the soul’, and hard wax with the memories of old people, 
which leave no, or too faint, impressions. (Draaisma, 2000: 25). 
   The wax tablet analogy thus suggests two foundational notions concerning the nature and 
role of memory. The first is that the role of memory is a preservative one; to record, and retain 
as clear and faithful an impression of the original content of the subject’s memory as her 
cognitive powers allow, for as long she continues to remember it.  The second is that the 
quality of the content of a  retained memory varies according to the cognitive condition, or 
quality, of the mind which retains  it.  Plato’s vivid conception of memory was largely adopted 
by Locke, Hume and Reid, and informed the classic preservationist view of memory. 
       Empirical Accounts of Memory:  Locke, Hume and Reid 
  Differences between the accounts of the memorial process presented by John Locke, and 
David Hume, on the one hand, and Thomas Reid, on the other hand, centre upon the 
question: what is the direct object of  memory?  If, for example, I remember an event or 
                                                            
17 For detailed commentaries see, for example,  Draaisma, 2000,  pp.24-27, and Woolf, 2004, pp. 573-604. 
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experience from my past, to what is my mind directed?  Is it to the event or experience itself, 
as Reid held, or to some mental representation of it in the form of an impression or idea of it, 
as Locke, and Hume, held? 
    In his  Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1975 [1690], Locke describes memory as 
the ‘Store-house of our Ideas’,  but saw ideas in this context as no more than past perceptions. 
However, since he also believed that the same  perception could not come into existence on 
more than one occasion, he needed to explain how perceptions could recur as memories in  
some other way.  His  answer was to suggest  that  memory constituted a mental power   ‘to 
revive Perceptions,  which it once had, with this additional suggested Perception annexed to 
them, that it has had them before’, thus  enabling memory to ‘ paint [ those original ideas] 
anew on its self, though some with more, some with less difficulty; some more lively, others 
more obscurely.’ (Locke, 1975, Book 11.x.1-2).  Reid attacked Locke’s account of memory on 
the grounds  of circularity, pointing out that in order to be able to revive the original 
perceptual experience one must first have remembered it, and further that in order to 
produce a later perception that is qualitatively similar to an earlier perception, one must first 
be able to recall the quality and character of the earlier perception. However, Reid argued, 
since neither of these processes appeared possible if, as Locke held, a perception cannot 
come into existence on more than one occasion, the claim that perception could  be revived 
by memory was false (Copenhaver, 2014: 3 , and Senor,2019: 4) 
   Hume’s alternative account of memory, which is found in his A Treatise of Human Nature, 
2015 [1739], Book 1, Part 1, Sect 3 (Hume, 2015: 9) on the other hand argues that the 
immediate objects of  perception are impressions,  which the mind could later recollect  as a 
memory, which ‘ in its new appearance [] retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, 
and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea’, or as something ‘faint and 
languid’  which is’ ‘of the imagination’, and which, if it loses its vivacity entirely, becomes a 
‘perfect [pure] idea’ (ibid.). Thus, Hume notes,  whereas memory is ‘tied down’ by the ‘ order 
and form’ of the original impression, which it has no power to vary,  the imagination is not so 
tied down.  In fact, he adds, it is the chief purpose of memory to preserve the order and form 
of the original impression, so that departures from that form constitute defects or 
imperfections of a memory (ibid). 
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   Reid, whose criticism of Hume’s theory of memory is underscored by his general opposition 
to Hume’s theory of ideas, questioned the justification for Hume’s  taxonomy of vivacity.  In 
his Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, 1764, (Reid, 1983, [1764]: 
99-100), he argued that whilst Hume’s notion of differing degrees of vivacity being 
attributable to perceptions, memories, and imaginings, might have some empirical validity, 
the hierarchy was by no means immutable; some memories could be more vivid than the 
perceptions which gave rise to them, or less vivid than imaginings based on them.  A flashback, 
for example, of an earlier  experience may be more vivid than the original perception, or 
image, of that experience (though that would not necessarily make it more epistemically 
reliable). 
   Much later, Bertrand Russell, in his Analysis of the Mind (1921), suggested that what 
distinguishes a memory- image from  an imagination- image lies not in the intrinsic quality of 
the image, but in the fact that memory-images, unlike imagination-images, ‘are accompanied 
by a feeling of belief which may be expressed in the words “this happened” (Russell,1921: 
175-6).  
   Standing in opposition to the theories of Locke and Hume  is  Reid’s direct realist account of 
memory.  Reid’s theory of memory holds that the direct objects of memory are not ideas or 
impressions of that which is being remembered, but the thing itself, such as, in relation to 
episodic memory, a past event in which the remembering subject participated, or which she 
witnessed: 
     We may remember anything which we have seen, or heard, or known, or done, or 
suffered; but the remembrance of it is a particular act of the mind which now exists, 
and of which we are conscious.  To confound these two is an absurdity, which a 
thinking man could not be led into, but by some false hypothesis which hinders him 
from reflecting upon the thing which he would explain by it.  (Essays, 3.1: Reid, 
1983,206-7). 
 Moreover, argues Reid, ‘Memory is always accompanied with the belief of that which we 
remember’ (ibid.:207) and it is this combination of memory and belief that gives us 
‘immediate knowledge of things past’ as opposed to perception, which gives us immediate 
knowledge of things present (ibid.: 206).  
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    Modern reviews of Reid’s direct realist theory seem to be mixed.  Copenhaver, for example 
notes that it ‘captures how memory, like perception, represents the world, rather than our 
experiences of the world’ (Copenhaver, 2014: 8). Marina Folescu, however, questions 
whether it really differs from Locke’s conception of memory as a storehouse of ideas (past 
perceptions) (Folescu, 2018: 217), which is a valid question, since both accounts seem to me 
to envisage the subject becoming reacquainted with a past experience through a recollection 
of it, and the question of whether that recollection is conceived as a reimagining, as in Locke’s 
case, or a re-experiencing as in Reid’s case, does not appear to affect the substance of it.  
Senor suggests that a serious problem facing proponents of a direct realist theory of memory 
is that of error; if we say that memory gives us immediate knowledge of the past, this does 
not appear to allow for the fallibility of memory, yet we know that memory is fallible 
(Senor,2019: 7). Copenhaver, on the other hand, suggests that Reid could in fact have dealt 
with the challenge of memory errors by  characterising them either as an imagining (if you 
purport to remember something which didn’t happen, or didn’t happen to you), or a 
misremembering (if you  misremember things about the remembered event), akin to 
misperception.18 
    My understanding is that Copenhaver sees the theories of Locke and Hume as forerunners 
of the modern preservationist account of memory, but suggests that Reid’s opposition to 
those theories does not necessarily make him a forerunner of the generativist/constructivist 
account of memory, because his views are not detailed enough concerning how memory 
preserves an acquaintance with the past to enable one to determine whether they are 





     
                                                            
18 Taken from my notes of comments were made by Copenhaver in her presentation to the Philosophy of 
Memory Virtual Seminar hosted by Kourken Michaelian and organised by The Centre for Philosophy of Memory, 
Grenoble, France, on 22nd April, 2020, in which I participated. 
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   5.3 Philosophy  Refracted Through Psychology:  The Modern Debate Concerning The 
Workings of Memory 
       5.3.1:  The Preservationist Legacy  
    Modern preservationist accounts of memory continue  to take remembering to be 
‘essentially a matter of encoding, storing and retrieving information’ (MIchaelian and Sutton, 
2017: 12).  In epistemic terms, the classic preservationist view  thus remains that memory 
cannot be an original source of knowledge, or justified belief; that we cannot come to know 
(or justifiably believe) that p from memory, unless we have first come to know (or justifiably 
believe)  it from a prior source, such as perception.  That view entails, in its strict form, not 
only that memory cannot generate new knowledge (or justified beliefs), but also that it cannot 
transform an irrational belief into a rational belief, or change the epistemic status  of an 
originally justified belief. All it can do is preserve both belief and justification, but only, in the 
latter case, if the belief was justified when it was formed (Senor, 2019: 13). 
    The preservationist account of memory  has been increasingly challenged in recent years.  
Jennifer Lackey (2005, 2007), for example, illustrates, through the presentation of three 
falsifying scenarios, her claim that the preservationist assumptions that: (1) a proposition  
which is not known or justifiably believed when first committed to memory cannot come to 
be  known or justifiably believed  at a later time, and (2) any knowledge or justified belief that 
p acquired through memory must first have been  acquired through a  non-memorial source, 
are both false (Lackey, 2005: 636-7).  
Senor, in his (2007) response to Lackey argues that preservationism ‘carefully construed’ 
merely contends that no belief ‘based on memory’ can be known or justified, unless known 
or justified at an earlier date, just in virtue of being preserved, which does not preclude a 
belief  becoming justified after becoming a memory belief through  ‘additional evidence just 
received’  constituting a new source of justification. (Senor, 2007: 205-207). This, he argued, 
was not inconsistent with a preservationist contention that: (1) memory cannot, unlike 
perception or introspection, be a source of prima facie justification or ‘epistemization’ of a 
belief, and so cannot be generative, in the sense that those other cognitive sources can be 
generative, and (2) any power of memory to transform prima facie justified or epistemized 
beliefs which are defeated into ultima facie undefeated justified or epistemized  beliefs, even 
if such a transformation were possible, would fall short of being an epistemically generative 
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power19.  Lackey (2007) describes this interpretation as revisionist, and, absent some  further 
and better particulars concerning the permitted scope of any ‘new source of justification’, it 
certainly appears arguable that Senor’s interpretation/reinterpretation  of preservationism 
is, in reality, a weak form of generativism. 
Matthew Frise (2017), in another challenge to the preservationist  account of memory, 
identifies three dilemmas which, he claims, confront the argument for memory’s capacity to 
preserve the original justification for the beliefs it retains : (1) the problem of stored belief 
(the problem of explaining how beliefs continue to be epistemically justified merely by virtue 
of being stored); (2) the problem of forgotten evidence (the problem of explaining how a 
belief can remain justified when all past direct evidence for it has been forgotten); and (3) the 
problem of the failure of recollection ( the problem of explaining how, if an agent is unable to 
recollect when asked, the answer to  the question whether p or not-p, her belief that p can 
nevertheless be considered to remain  justified). 
      However, perhaps the most telling  contemporary challenge to the preservationist notion 
of memory is empirical, namely that it is not only fundamentally at odds  with generativist 
notions of memory, but also with a substantial, and growing, body of scientific evidence and 
hypotheses produced by psychologists and cognitive scientists concerning the nature and 
functioning of memory, some of which are explored below.  
5.3.2  The Causal Theory of Memory 
The basic idea underpinning the causal theory of memory is the requirement for an 
‘appropriate’ causal connection between a subject’s recollection of an experience and the 
experience itself as a necessary and sufficient condition for successful remembering.  The 
classic modern account of causal theory is that of Martin and Deutscher (1966), and their 
exposition of the theory is perhaps best illustrated by two scenarios described by them.  The 
first is that of a painter who paints a scene which he believes he has depicted from his 
imagination, but which in fact unconsciously revives a ‘memory trace’ of a scene he originally 
witnessed in childhood.  This is a case of successful remembering, according to Martin and 
                                                            
19  ‘Epistemization’ in Senor’s parlance is the process which converts a belief into knowledge. He adds that a 
belief is prima facie epistemized ‘ if it attains the level of epistemization which, in the absence of  undefeated 
epistemic defeat , will be sufficient for its being ultima facie epistemized.’  Ultima facie epistemization is 
achieved when a prima facie epistemized belief is undefeated.  Typical Gettier cases, he adds, are cases where 
the epistemization of a belief, rather than its justification, is defeated (ibid.:206-7). 
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Deutscher’s account of causal theory, because there is a causal connection between  the 
painter’s  childhood experience and his painting of the scene, even though the painter does 
not believe this to be the case, just so long as some memory trace of that original experience 
has been continuously preserved.  The second case is that of someone who experiences, but 
then forgets, an event, is subsequently reminded of it by a third party, but then forgets being 
told about it, and finally believes that she directly remembers it as having occurred.  This is a 
case of unsuccessful remembering according to Martin and Deutscher’s account because 
although there is a causal connection, it is not an appropriate connection - one between the 
recovered memory trace  of having been told of the experience, and the ultimately retrieved 
representation of it – but rather one between the recovered memory trace of  the original 
experience and the retrieved representation of it. This is so even though in this case the 
rememberer believes she has remembered the original experience. In other words, the causal 
connection which causal theory requires is one ‘which exists continuously in the interval 
between experiencing and remembering and which contributes to the production of the 
retrieved representation’, irrespective of what the agent believes or does not believe 
(Michaelian and Sutton, 2017: 15).20   
      The most significant of the issues raised by critics of causal theory, as with the 
preservationist account of memory, is its apparent indifference to the possibility of  work 
being done  by memory  between the initial memorising of the original experience and its 
subsequent recollection, beyond the retention of the original memory trace. Moreover, 
epistemologists might well argue that since causal theory is essentially preservationist, yet 
does not require the rememberer to believe that the retrieved memory is in fact a memory 
trace, it is essentially an account of successful remembering, rather than one of  belief 
justification, hence epistemically inadequate. 
       5.3.3  Generativist  Accounts of Memory  
    The argument for a generativist, constructivist, or reconstructivist account of how memory 
functions, in contrast to the preservationist and causalist accounts, is multi-disciplinary in 
nature. It draws not only on philosophical considerations, but also on data, evidence and 
theorising from the realms of psychology and cognitive science more generally. It seems clear 
                                                            
20 Another interpretation, suggest Michaelian and Sutton, might be that the first scenario is a case of successful 
episodic memory, whereas the second scenario is a case of successful semantic memory (ibid.) 
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that for psychologists and neuroscientists, the hippocampus (the seahorse-shaped 
component of the brain which plays an important part in the formation, inter alia, of episodic 
and autobiographical memories) is generally believed  to possess both generative, and 
constructive/reconstructive elements, though the precise nature of the work done by the 
hippocampus, relative to other parts of the brain, may not yet be fully understood. 
Generativist and constructivist accounts of memory from a   philosophical perspective thus in 
practice occupy territory which is shared  with psychological and  scientific investigation into 
the workings of memory21.     
     Memory’s cognitive capacity, according to generativist accounts of it, is far reaching. 
Michaelian  identifies four components of the cognitive work which it has been said can be 
done by memory at any time between encoding the original experience into memory, up to, 
and including, its retrieval, and also between any given retrieval and a subsequent retrieval.  
These are selection (selecting which incoming stimuli to encode as memory); abstraction 
(abstracting meaning from the words and language of the message received into memory); 
interpretation (interpreting what is received in the context of relevant prior knowledge); and 
integration ( producing a holistic integrated representation of the product of memory and the 
other components) (Michaelian, 2011: 325). 
Thus, the adaption, construction, or reconstruction of a belief held in memory may involve 
the elimination of memory content, or its incorporation with other memory content into a 
composite memory trace, and a constructed memory may itself be subsequently 
reconstructed, including  on retrieval.  In fact,  Michaelian suggests that, in the case of episodic 
memory, retrieval routinely invokes reconstruction, implying that  episodic memory beliefs 
presented at retrieval in effect supercede those held in memory prior to retrieval; that is that 
memory ultimately produces beliefs. (ibid.).  Taking  that logic one step further, in relation 
specifically to a  testimonial utterance, if we say that the source of such an utterance is 
memory, then what we mean more precisely is that the source is, in the case of each particular 
testimonial utterance, whatever memorial belief is retrieved and presented  by the testifier 
at the time of testifying.   
                                                            
21 For a recent overview of the interdisciplinary nature of recent studies of the metaphysics of memory see 
Michaelian and Sutton,2017, Section 1 and generally. 
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     5.3.4  The Simulation Theory of Memory 
   Episodic memory according to the simulationist account of it described by Karen Shanton 
and Alvin Goldman (2010); is a cognitive process of ‘high-level simulation-based mind 
reading’; that is a process of intrapersonal simulation (self-directed simulation) using  
imaginative skills, such as visualisation, to project oneself into the past similar to those 
employed in mind reading, thus implying that the two processes employ the same type of 
cognitive mechanisms (Shanton and Goldman, 2010: 531, 534).  The idea behind the 
simulation theory of memory, roughly speaking, is that humans are capable of mental time 
travel, that is of mentally transporting themselves into the past, and transposing images of 
past events into a ‘construction of the personal past’,  incorporating those images, together 
with a ‘conscious feeling of re-experiencing or re-enacting a previously experienced event’, 
which Tulving called ‘autonoetic consciousness’ (see also  fn.24 above).  Episodic memories 
are thus characterised by their phenomenal resemblance to the originally remembered event 
or experience. 
   Shanton and Goldman caution, however, that intrapersonal simulation of the type they 
describe is  subject to ‘egocentric bias’ – that is reappraisal of the rememberer’s  reaction to 
past events in the light of subsequent experience. They cite the example of subjects who had 
felt sad and angry at the withdrawal of a U.S. Presidential candidate, but later recalled much 
lower levels of sadness or anger  if they had in the meantime switched allegiance to another 
candidate (ibid: 533-4). Michaelian and Sutton note that successful remembering, in a 
simulationist context, is thus reliant on the ability of the rememberer’s imagination to 
construct an accurate representation of the past experience, but leave open the question of 
how accuracy, in this context, may be objectively measured (Michaelian and Sutton, 2017: 
18).   
       5.4  Memory Errors 
       Much of the contemporary psycho-philosophical debate surrounding the workings of 
memory concerns the real nature of what have been traditionally construed as memory errors 
or malfunctions, such as forgetting, misremembering, and confabulation. Are they  cases of 
the unsuccessful, or unreliable functioning of the  faculty of memory, or simply a feature  of 
the ordinary and generally reliable, though not infallible,  functioning of memory as a cog in 
a larger a cognitive wheel ? Michaelian (2013), for example, suggests that, rather than being 
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symptomatic of some general cognitive malfunction of the agent’s memory, they may be  
instances of untypical methodological lapses in an otherwise  generally reliable, though 
imperfect, adaptive cognitive process, the function of which is to enhance  our ultimate 
capacity to produce true beliefs from recollection, for example through applying inferential 
reasoning to  stored or retrieved memorial content.  Felipe  De Brigard similarly suggests that 
what we think of as memory errors may be a sort of epistemic glitch inherent in the operation 
of a cognitive system that ‘mixes and matches’ different components of encoded memory 
traces into ‘optimized’ representations of possible past events (De Brigard,2014: 155). 
Evidence gathered over three decades by cognitive scientists, he declares, ‘clearly shows that 
people frequently and ordinarily misremember past experiences’ (ibid.).  This, he suggests, 
poses two challenges to philosophical accounts of memory: firstly, a general epistemological 
challenge to the assumption that memory is necessarily factive (S remembers that p can only 
be true if p is in fact the case), and secondly, a specific challenge, to our philosophical  
understanding of the function of episodic autobiographical memory (ibid.: 156-7). 
   Focusing on the second challenge, De Brigard argues that many cases of ‘seeming to 
remember’ types of misremembering  demonstrated by paradigmatic scientific experiments 
do  not really demonstrate instances of memory malfunction.22 Rather, he suggests, they are 
everyday phenomena, of which we are often unaware, usually resulting from drawing 
plausible, but incorrect, inferences about the occurrence of experiences which might well 
have happened to us, but did not in fact happen (ibid.: 161-3). I might, for example  seem to 
remember seeing an item on a list of items which did not actually appear on that list, but 
which was of a type closely associated with those that were on the list, such as medical 
products (of course  my recollection would still be epistemically invalid, as an untrue belief, a 
point which De Brigard concedes). 
    On De Brigard’s simulationist  account, these memory errors occur because memory 
retrieval  triggers underlying  mechanisms which reconstruct an ‘optimized mental 
representation from the encoded perceptual information according to probabilistic 
constraints dictated by previous experience’. These, he says, usually coincide with the 
                                                            
22 De Brigard cites the study in Loftus and Pickrell (1995) which reported that 25% of participants actually falsely 
remembered being lost in a shopping mall as children if they received suggestive information to that effect in 
interviews. 
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originally encoded memory belief, but often do not quite ‘map onto’ it, causing instances of 
(apparent) misremembering, or confabulation( ibid. :173).  In other words, memory lapses 
must be expected to occur,  as a  result of the interaction of the cognitive processes which 
are engaged in the ordinary course of retrieving episodic memory, even though episodic 
memories  are generally reliable.  Sarah Robins (2016), points out, however, that an account 
which characterises memory as a construction, in which successful remembering, 
misremembering, and confabulation result from the same cognitive, or inferential process, 
effectively negates the ability to distinguish, in individual cases, between successful memories 
and unsuccessful (misremembered)  memories, without recourse to some  external 
processing methodology (Robins, 443-4).23  In his  response to Robins, Michaelian (2016) 
seems  to concede that  the generativist interpretation of a reliable  episodic memory as  one 
produced by a generally reliable episodic construction system (one which tends to produce 
mostly accurate representations), in effect allows that memory can be both reliably produced 
and at the same time fail to produce, in any given instance, an accurate representation of a 
prior memory belief (Michaelian,2016: 7).24    
    From the perspective of catastrophe testimony, then, the issue is how far  these 
conclusions,  relating as they do to memory errors or malfunctions demonstrated by ‘normal’ 
subjects, usually in scientifically controlled test environments, can be considered relevant to 
the assessment of  the memories of survivors  of  traumatic experiences, and specifically those 
invoked in the context of  catastrophe testimony.   How would a recollection in the form of a 
traumatic flashback, for example, ‘map onto’ the inferential cognitive process described by 
De Brigard?  Consequently, whilst it seems right to assume that the generativist account of 
memory, supported as it is by psychology and science, is the most plausible currently available 
account of the workings of episodic memory in unexceptional situations, including the 
                                                            
23 See Robins, 2016.  Her own account of memory utilises the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) experimental  
paradigm widely used in false memory research, in which patients are shown a list of semantically related items, 
such as ‘nurse’,’ hospital’, and ‘ medicine’, and shortly after a list containing these items plus semantic ‘lures’: 
semantically  related but previously unlisted items, e.g.’doctor’, and unrelated items, e.g. ‘apple’, and asked to 
recognise previous items. The experiment shows ‘ recognition’ of previously unlisted lure items is commonly as 
high as recognition of originally listed items, and much higher than recognition of unrelated items.  Robins argues 
that whereas causal theory can distinguish these cases of successful and unsuccessful remembering, neither 
preservationist theories nor constructivist/simulationist  theories like De Brigard’s can  do so.  She argues for a 
hybrid account of successful remembering, combining a preservationist  notion of recollection as the retrieval 
of a discrete representation of the past event, and a constructionist notion of the retrieval process.  
24 I should point out that this is a simplified version of the conceptual argument developed at length in 
Michaelian (2016), which is  aimed only at the ground specifically covered by Robins. 
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overwhelming majority of testimonial encounters we might experience, its ability to ‘map 
onto’ memories of catastrophic experiences requires further consideration, in the light  of the 
nature of those experiences. 
 5. 5   Episodic Memory as a Belief Source : Attempts to Disentangle Truth, Justification, and 
Accuracy  
    How compatible, then, is the generativist account of the workings of memory with the 
epistemological identification of memory’s value with its reliability as a source of justified true 
beliefs, or knowledge? 
  The epistemic notion of true belief  requires both that I justifiedly believe that p and that p 
is fact true. However, if, as  both Michaelian and De Brigard appear to have conceded, 
retrieved memories of past experiences may not be  accurate, in the sense of a faithful 
correspondence with the originally remembered experience, and if truth in the context of a 
memorial representation is construed as synonymous with an accurate representation of the 
object of the representation ( that is in the case of episodic memory the recollected 
experience), then it would appear that there is a disjunction between the generativist concept 
of the workings of memory and the epistemic concept of justified true belief. Michaelian 
(2012) for example argues that the fact that memory may be designed to serve the agent’s 
own best interests does not mean it works to provide the agent with the most accurate 
information.  In fact it may mean that it provides the agent with a good deal of inaccurate 
information, or perhaps a new representation of the original experience not previously stored 
in the agent’s memory at all, or even ‘previously entertained by the agent’ ( Michaelian, 2012: 
501). Some psychologists, in fact, go further, by claiming that since memory is constructive it 
is bound to be false, in the sense of being counterfactive.  Thus, some commentators argue,  
the notion of factual correspondence with the original experience as a measure of accuracy  
should be abandoned, at least in the case of episodic memory, in favour of  that of 
authenticity; correspondence  between the retrieved memory representation of that 
experience  and the subject’s original experience of it (Michaelian and Sutton, 2017: 24, citing 
Bernecker, 2010).  This seems to presuppose, however, the agent’s ability to distinguish 
between the two,  which Michaelian suggests is in fact the case, though I am not sure how 
this has been, or indeed can be, demonstrated. 
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    Michaelian and Sutton, in a rider to this debate,  suggest that another way to resolve the 
disjunction between the generativist account of memory and the epistemological account of 
justified true belief might be to develop   ‘a more sophisticated criterion of truth’, in relation 
to memory belief; one that acknowledges that remembering need not be fully accurate to be 
fully adequate; that ‘truth in memory comes in degrees’ (ibid.: 15).  However,  such a concept 
of truth seems to be clearly at odds with the epistemic notion of truth, in dispensing with the 
need for an objectively evaluable assessment of true belief, in favour of a  reference point 
which relies,  to some unverifiable extent, on the faithfulness of the testifier’s  recollection of 
his original experience. Michaelian (2012) had previously suggested that such a recollection 
would need to have a distinctively phenomenological character; a ‘subjective sense of time’ 
which would allow the agent to distinguish remembering and imagining by reference to a 
feeling of pastness or familiarity that accompany remembering, but not imagining. However, 
given that such qualities are externally unverifiable, I find it hard to see such a suggestion as 
amounting to anything more than that the testifier’s word must be taken on trust, unless 
there is compelling counter-evidence of his untrustworthiness.          
    The issue of belief justification, once one accepts the argument that memory functions  as 
a belief-producing mechanism thus seems to me to follow a similar logic to that suggested in 
the case of true belief. Recollections presented in the form of testimony which can be 
evaluated by reference to external evidence, such as background evidence or other 
testimony, may be verified, and justified or defeated, accordingly.  Testimonial utterances 
which cannot be so evaluated, and which represent introspective, or phenomenal, 
representations of  the testifier’s experience, can ultimately be taken on trust, and thus 
deemed justified, unless there is compelling counter-evidence of untrustworthiness on the 
face of the testimony itself, or by way of background evidence, but perhaps only epistemically 
justifiable if we interpret the Reidian principles of veracity and credulity as raising a strong 
presumption of trust in the testifier. 
         Senor (2009) tackles the issue of belief justification from a different perspective, by 
asking, even if it were conceptually possible to justify  memory beliefs epistemically, what 
epistemological  account could do the necessary epistemic work.  He examines that question 
in relation to what he considers the most important candidate accounts: foundationalism, 
coherentism, deontological theories, and reliabilism.  None of them, he finds, is adequate for 
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such a task, and concludes that although we may be capable, in scientifically controlled 
experiments, of successfully testing the memorial performance of individual subjects in 
specific conditions or situations, we remain unable to demonstrate or test epistemically, the 
general reliability of human memory.  Consequently, he concedes, we have no choice but to 
trust, in the vast majority of cases, what people tell us from memory. 
     One of the accounts deemed inadequate by Senor is what he called ‘experiential 
foundationalism’, and had , in an earlier, more extensive treatment of it (Senor, 1993), called 
‘phenomenalistic foundationalism’.  Michael Huemer is a leading advocate of this account of 
belief justification (more generally known as ‘phenomenal conservatism’, but sometimes 
called ‘epistemic conservatism’, or ‘doxastic conservatism’).  For the purpose of this 
dissertation, my description of his views follows that enunciated in Hasan and Fumerton 
(2018), 25 according to which Huemer’s  account holds, in simple terms, that if it seems, or 
appears, to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S has prima facie justification for 
believing that p26.  Phenomenal conservatism, thus defined, permits far more propositions to 
be prima facie justifiably believed than classical foundationalism does, including apparent 
memories.  Proponents of phenomenal conservatism suggest that  seemings, or appearances, 
are distinct from beliefs, or inclinations to believe, yet ‘belief-like’ in having propositional, or 
representational, content. They also have, it is argued, a distinctly phenomenal force,  such 
that it  ‘feels as if’ they are true, or provide some  ‘assurance’ of truth, which suggests a link 
between the strength of the seeming and the degree of the justification it evidences, which 
seems to echo earlier accounts of memory, such as those of Hume, and Russell. 
   This concept seems attractive from the perspective of justifying beliefs in the phenomenal 
elements of catastrophe testimony, but the principal argument raised against phenomenal 
conservatism, Hasan and Fumerton note, is that it sets the justification bar too low, notably 
by assuming that seemings, or appearances, accurately represent the world around us. Does, 
for example, my seeming to see a ghost really constitute a prima facie justification for 
believing there are ghosts, or simply evidence my particular fear of ghosts?  
                                                            
25  The study focuses on foundationalism about justification. Hasan and Fumerton suggest, however, that much 
of what they, and those they cite, say, applies also to foundationalism about knowledge. 
26 Seemings, or appearances, note Hasan and Fumerton, could be sensory, perceptual, intellectual, intuitive, 
mnemonic, or introspective, but in practice phenomenal conservatist accounts are typically limited to perceptual 
seemings, or appearances. 
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   5.6  Memory as Faithfulness to the Past  
     A more holistic account of the role, and value, of memory as a portal into the past is that 
offered by Sue Campbell (2006).  She rejects the argument that the conception of memory as 
a dynamic and reconstructive process necessarily raises questions  as to its reliability and 
integrity as testimony to the past.  Successful remembering, she argues, is a richer experience 
than faithful reproduction, one which seeks to recapture the significance of the past in the 
present, and may thus be reconstructive,  selective, or emotionally invested.  Memorial 
accuracy is thus not necessarily synonymous with truth-aptness; sometimes it is the 
emotional accuracy of memory which determines the significance of the past in the present, 
the affective side of memory being an integral quality of its representational character.  
Following the work of Adam Morton (2002), Campbell presents a notion of accuracy as one 
of a precision which ‘adds value to truth’, in two ways. The first of these is by selecting from 
the sometimes confusing detail of a memorial representation that which  is significant in the 
context of the recollection in question, and so worth remembering, thus ensuring that the 
memory is functioning  accurately in the sense of being faithful to what it is evoking, rather 
than just accurately representing the detail of it. The second way in which value is added is 
by recontextualising the emotional content of memory, to ensure its environmental fit, or 
appropriateness to the time of its recollection and also the future.  In other words, memory’s 
role, in an episodic context, is also to be faithful in the sense of ensuring the evolution of what 
was true of the remembered experience, or event, in the past into a present truth of it;  one 
which is  imbued with ‘emotional salience’, and can also direct future recollections of it.  This 
seems to me particularly apposite in the case of catastrophe testimony, which often invokes 
memories of experiences which occurred years, or even decades, previously.  
How, though, can we guard against a memory which has been reconstructed unwittingly 
distorting the past?  Campbell concedes that there may be tensions between the demands of 
accuracy in a veridical sense, and faithfulness in the sense she portrays, which may sometimes 
be unresolvable.  In other cases, she suggests, resolving the tension will depend on the 
rememberer’s  integrity, underpinned by the fact that she is accountable to others in the 
present for getting the past right. In that light, Campbell argues, the reconstructive quality of 
remembering, rather than undermining the possibility of accuracy and integrity of memory, 
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‘opens up our attention to the nature and complexities of these virtues’ (Campbell, 2006: 
377).   
  5. 7   Summary 
    Preservationist and generativist accounts of the role and functionality of memory represent 
fundamentally  opposed concepts of the nature, and workings, of memory, and I have not 
been able to identify any existing or proposed philosophical account of memory which 
plausibly unites both accounts in a manner which would both satisfy the retentionist 
requirements of Preservationists and embrace the adaptive, constructive,  reconstructive, or 
simulationist notions of Generativists.   
    Contemporary psychologists and cognitive scientists, on the other hand, appear to be  
firmly in the generativist camp, as regards their understanding of the cognitive processes at 
work in relation to memory.  To maintain a wholly, or largely, preservationist view of memory 
seems, therefore, to require discounting much  empirical evidence from the fields   of  
psychology and  cognitive science regarding the workings of memory. It is not theoretically 
wholly implausible for philosophers and cognitive scientists to diverge conceptually in specific 
cases, since as Arieh Schwartz notes, psychologists and cognitive scientists account for  
mental states like memory in terms of human behaviour, whereas philosophical theorising 
generally addresses the role of memory in the context of knowledge acquisition, or justifying 
or warranting belief in the word of others (Schwartz, 2018: 11).  Thus, for example, the 
distinction between someone ‘seeming to remember’, and ‘remembering’, which may be 
crucial to justifying testimony from an epistemological perspective is not necessarily 
important  from a behavioural perspective. 
   Nevertheless, plausible philosophical theorising of a conceptual nature in fields which are 
also heavily populated by specialists from many other, more case- focused, disciplines, such 
as in the case of memory, and specifically the memory of traumatic experience, is  difficult to 
achieve.  Aviezer Tucker, for instance, argues that the kind of esoteric thought experiments 
espoused by epistemologists—those brains in  the vats, and fake barns—are unnecessary in 
relation to explaining  the  workings of memory, because existing studies of memory by 
psychologists and cognitive scientists have already  generated  a large volume of specific data 
which can  be used to settle epistemological debate in relation to the formation of beliefs 
from memory empirically and scientifically (Tucker, 2012: 417).  
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    Consequently, for the purposes of this dissertation, I am following the generativist account 
of memory, though  like Robins I am not inclined to forego the requirement for a retrieved 
memorial representation of an original experience to incorporate some  concrete information 
relating to that experience.  In other words, although I  accept the generativist  account of 
how memory works to produce a  testimonial account of a past experience, as well as 
Huemer’s phenomenal foundationalist account of how that representation might be  prima 
facie justified, I also accept the epistemic argument made from their different perspectives 
by Robins and Senor, that this does not, of itself,  warrant the ultimate unquestioning 
acceptance of whatever is produced from memory. 
   The above comments apply to catastrophe  testimony as they do to any other form of 
testimony sourced in memory.    The distinction between catastrophe testimony and other 
testimony is not conceptual; it lies, as I perceive it, in the nature of what is remembered (a 
past traumatic experience), and how it is remembered (the effect on the workings of the 
testifier’s memory, for example, of trauma-related phenomena, such as post-traumatic stress 
syndrome).  Whilst this may profoundly affect what is recollected, and represented as 
testimony from a testifier’s perspective, though, the fact remains that a retrieved memory, 
from the perspective of the recipient, ‘is what it is’.  That is to say that, save in the case where 
there is other testimonial or background evidence available which might either corroborate 
or refute a testifier’s account of a particular experience, or some clear  evidence, within the 
testimony itself,  of its untruthfulness, or unreliability,  the recipient of his testimony may 
have no rational choice other than take the testifier’s  account of his experience at face value.  
    However, I contend that any fruitful reading of catastrophe testimony must involve 
reaching beyond the realms of epistemological enquiry, to address wider questions 
concerning the personal and social issues arising from the existential re-engagement  
between survivors of catastrophic experiences, and the world to which they return.  Later in 
this dissertation, I  develop this argument, focusing on particular challenges which face 
testifiers and those to whom their testimony is addressed, and especially the existential and 
moral chasm which catastrophe testimony illuminates, and also sometimes creates, between 
testifiers and their recipients (and societies more generally).  Before attempting that task, 
however, I will need to examine more deeply the issue of  what is known as ‘traumatic 
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   CHAPTER 6.  RECOLLECTING, AND EXTERNALISING MEMORIES OF VICTIMHOOD AND            
      SURVIVAL:  PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
     6.1   Introduction  
       In the discussion of memory errors in Section 5.4 above, I noted de Brigard’s suggestion 
that memory functions as part of a cognitive system for ‘optimizing’ representations of past 
events.     Where the events in question are profoundly traumatic experiences, however, the 
question of what constitutes optimization might not be entirely straightforward.  Does it , for 
instance, include the implementation of strategies for coping with psychological trauma, in 
which case might not forgetting or misremembering, constitute the ‘optimal’ strategy? And 
if, from a  generativist perspective, retrieving memorial images for the purposes of testifying 
is an act of producing rather than reproducing memorial images of  catastrophic experiences, 
does that mean that different images of the same past experience might be produced on 
different occassions depending on the context of the testimonial event – a hostile cross-
examination in a courtroom, say, as opposed to a psychotherapeutic interview – or at 
different points in the survivor’s life?    Jean Améry, for example, described in his  Preface to 
the first edition of At the Mind’s Limits how difficult and traumatic just writing an unmediated 
autobiographical account of one’s experience victimhood and survival can be, even twenty 
years after the event: 
    For two decades I had been in search of the time which was impossible to lose, only 
it had been difficult for me to talk about it.  Then, however, once a gloomy spell 
appeared to be broken by the writing of the essay on Auschwitz, suddenly everything 
demanded telling.  That is how this book came about.  At the same time, I discovered 
that while I had contemplated a good many questions, I had not articulated them with 
nearly enough clarity.  Only in the process of writing did I recognize what it was that 
until then I had indistinctly caught sight of in half-conscious intellectual rumination 
and that hesitated at the threshold of verbal expression…...Slowly and arduously, I had 
groped forward in  what was familiar to a surfeit, but had remained alien nonetheless 
(Améry, 1999, Preface to the First Edition: xiii). 
     In fact, the post-traumatic recollection of images which may have been stored in the 
testifier’s memory for years or even decades can represent a sometimes difficult 
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confrontation between the testifier  and his former victim self.  In Améry’s case, for example,  
being commissioned to write and broadcast a series of essays on his existential condition as 
a victim and survivor required him to confront some difficult aspects of his own past, notably 
in his essay ‘How Much Home Does a Person Need?’, when he wrote of the inauthenticity of 
his rural Austrian childhood, and his essay ‘On the Necessity and Impossibility of Being a Jew’, 
when, as the title implies, he wrote of the existential dilemma of his post-traumatic identity. 
    Consequently, studying the existential condition of being a victim and especially a survivor 
of a catastrophic experience through  catastrophe testimony is by no means a straightforward 
process. It involves much more than analysing a documentary account of the testifier’s 
catastrophic  experiences, or his or her subsequent life. A core aim of the remainder of this 
dissertation is therefore to both to follow, and hopefully illuminate as far as possible, that 
process. 
   6.2  Sources 
     Testimony relating to  catastrophic experiences such as rape  and other forms of sexual 
violence, torture, or collective persecution such as that experienced by prisoners in the Nazi 
concentration camps is readily available,  abundant, and of a  generally high quality.  So great  
is the amount of existing testimony and commentaries on, or analyses of, testimony relating 
to the experiences of Holocaust survivors, for instance, that the production and dissemination 
of it has been fairly characterised as an  ‘industry’.  Consequently, I do not suggest that the 
texts selected for this dissertation are in any sense representative of all available material; 
rather, my principal consideration in selecting them has been to choose testimony which I 
feel  best illuminates the issues and arguments examined herein. 
    Catastrophe testimony exists in many forms, the main ones being  evidence  given  in  
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, professionally witnessed testimony given to archival 
institutions, whether in writing, orally, or in the form of video testimony, ‘trauma stories’ 
elicited as part of a survivor’s psychotherapeutic  treatment, and the autobiographical 
memoirs of survivors. In this dissertation I will be mainly relying on testimony in the form of 
survivor memoirs, rather than in any dialogic form,  on the grounds that, notwithstanding any 
issues of narrativity, and the lack of  spontaneity of such  testimony,   accounts resulting from 
unmediated self-reflection ought to constitute, relatively speaking, the most authentic, and 
direct accounts of catastrophic experiences, and of the existential, psychological, and moral 
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condition of survival27.  I say ‘relatively speaking’ because catastrophe testimony (and indeed 
trauma testimony more generally) in any form  raises fundamental questions  regarding the 
degree of correspondence between an original experience and the testimonial recollection of 
it, and between the testifier’s phenomenal experience of trauma and her description of it.  
Relying principally on unmediated first person accounts also avoids the issues which can arise 
from mediated accounts, such as the extent to which such testimony speaks with the 
authentic voice of the testifier. Nevertheless, I will  be taking very much into account of the 
perspectives of witnessing professionals in relation to the interpretation of survivor 
testimony.    
     The distinction between unmediated and mediated testimony, however,  can be somewhat 
blurred.  The most obvious examples are the accounts of survivors who have received prior 
psychotherapeutic treatment, as in the case of the testimony of Karyn L. Freedman examined 
in Chapter 8.  However, the accounts of many more survivors  may have  been less directly, 
and whether consciously or unconsciously, mediated, for example as a result of what he or 
she has learned subsequently concerning the circumstances surrounding his or her 
experience, or similar experiences, and of course the testimony of every survivor is ‘mediated’ 
by their  particular  objective in testifying.   Seeking the ‘truth of the matter’ from catastrophe 
testimony may thus depend to a large extent on  what truth one seeks, and where one 
chooses to look for it. Nevertheless, I want to respect, insofar as this is possible,                            
the ‘sad privilege’ which Améry claimed for survivors of being the only ones who will ever be 
able to spiritually relive the catastrophic event as it was, or picture how it could be again 
(Améry, 1999: 93).   
  6.3   Defining Catastrophe Testimony  
The expression ‘catastrophe testimony’ as used in the following chapters of this dissertation 
refers to the testimony of survivors of experiences involving, as Judith Herman puts it, ‘threats 
to life or bodily integrity, or a close personal encounter with violence and death’,  which 
‘confront human beings with the extremities of helplessness and terror, and evoke the 
responses of catastrophe’ (Herman, 2015 [1992]; 33).  These include grievous, and often 
                                                            
27 Kenneth Waltzer notes, though, that as a Holocaust historian he often uses ‘dialogic testimony in unguarded 
form’ to test the truthfulness of what a survivor has written in a memoir of her experience, where this is feasible 
(Greenspan and others, 2014: 201).   
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sustained, or repeated, assaults deliberately inflicted by others, such as forced deportation, 
rape and other forms of serious sexual assault, torture, and those atrocities which occurred 
on a daily basis in the Nazi concentration camps and were largely intended to terrorise and 
physically and psychologically degrade their victims. Such actions are notable in being  aimed 
at inflicting  ‘psychological blows, wounds to the spirit’ as well as physical injury;  notably 
terror, humiliation, degradation, fear of annihilation, and dehumanization (Hacking, 1995: 
183). This wounding of the victim’s spirit, like the physical injuries which accompany it, is also  
notable for  its lasting nature.  Améry, for example, recalled  in 1965, that his experience of 
his torture was indelible; twenty-two years after the event, he said, he  was still mentally  
‘dangling over the ground by dislocated arms, panting, and accusing myself’, as he had been 
in 1943, in the torture room at Fort Breendonk.  (Améry, 1999: 36 ).  
    Beyond this there is very little one can say in general terms about the phenomenal 
experience of being a victim or a survivor of a catastrophic occurrence; it is by its nature 
different for every testifier.  One can nevertheless discern some apparent similarities between 
the descriptions given by testifiers of their experiences. Freedman’s account of her 
experience as a rape survivor, and Améry’s account of his experience as a survivor of torture, 
for example, record similar sensations of  shame and humiliation  at having been physically 
and mentally violated and overwhelmed in an intensely personal way, and at their own 
helplessness to prevent it.  Améry’s experience of imprisonment in Auschwitz, on the other 
hand, appears on the face of it quite different to that of Primo Levi, or Charlotte Delbo, but 
that may have more to do with their different objectives in testifying, and the proximity of 
their testimonies to the experiences they describe, rather than any significant differences in 
the experiences themselves.  In fact Améry gives two very different accounts of his own 
experience of Auschwitz in different essays. In his 1964 essay ‘At the Mind’s Limits’, written 
for broadcast to an audience of German intellectuals, and in the hope of some kind of re-
engagement with them, he is determined to depict his fate primarily as one which had 
befallen him as an Austro- German intellectual  who happened to be of part-Jewish descent, 
rather than a Jew; one who was being unjustly deprived of his cultural and intellectual 
heritage, and whose suffering had been felt most keenly in the destruction of his intellectual 
and philosophical foundations and beliefs. In his 1977 essay ‘Being a Jew’  (originally entitled 
‘Mein Judentum’), on the other hand, written specifically as a discourse on his conception of 
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his Jewishness, and not long before his suicide, Améry describes his experience of Auschwitz 
from the  perspective of a Jewish ‘common’ prisoner in far more personal and visceral  terms, 
focusing on the  fate of Jewish prisoners as the ‘slaves of slaves’, and the brutality of their 
treatment not only by the SS guards but also other prisoners.     
     Consequently, my concentration on the testimony of Jewish survivors of Auschwitz in 
Chapter 9  is not intended to imply that their experiences represent some kind of paradigm 
as far as collective catastrophic experiences are concerned.  In fact, the Jewish victims of the 
Third Reich  were not even a homogenous social or cultural group. In Germany and other 
countries of Western Europe, one could find both highly assimilated, and largely secular, 
‘Western’ Jews many of whom identified more strongly with their country than their religion, 
and more recently arrived, unassimilated both in appearance and customs,  and mostly 
religiously orthodox ‘Eastern’ Jews, seeking refuge from persecution and economic 
deprivation in Russia and other parts of the Russian empire.  Moreover, many Western Jews 
shared the distaste for and sense of alienation from Eastern Jews felt by non-Jews, and thus 
were wholly unprepared for and profoundly shocked by their own inclusion in the collective 
caricaturing of Jews  as dangerous, subversive, Bolsheviks, or degenerate subhumans, by the 
National Socialist propaganda machine.  Consequently, the success of that  propaganda 
machine, in ultimately reducing  many  of them to self-identifying  with the  caricature 
fashioned by their persecutors, and thus appearing to some to have acquiesced to, or even 
collaborated in, their own destruction, is one of the truly extraordinary achievements of the 
National Socialist regime.   
       The seemingly endless fascination with the Holocaust   is therefore understandable.  Some 
have gone as far as to characterise it as a unique event in human history, but this is not a view 
I share.  On the contrary, the fact that, as extraordinary as it might have been , it could 
nevertheless happen again, is, I believe, one major justification for  continuing to study it not 
as an event in history, but rather as a means of contemplating the possibilities involved in 
being a victim and a survivor, or indeed a perpetrator, of such an experience .     
  6.4  Believing Catastrophe Testimony 
    What has been said in earlier chapters of this dissertation concerning the epistemological 
chasm between survivors of catastrophic experiences and the world, and also the workings 
of memory, has two implications as far as catastrophe testimony is concerned.  The first is 
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that the epistemological foundations of testimony sourced from episodic memory may be less 
stable than that sourced from  other epistemic sources, and the epistemological foundations 
of episodic memory sourced from traumatic experiences in all probability less stable than 
other kinds of episodic memory. The second implication is that  if catastrophe testimony is to 
be accepted as a reliable and valuable source of knowledge about the world in  a wider moral, 
socio-political, and cultural sense than that which is purely informational,  grounds must be 
sought for believing such testimony beyond those which are acceptable in relation to the 
epistemological evaluation of information or propositional statements.  It is the latter 
implication on which I focus in this Section. 
     The issue is whether and how we can seek  grounds for accepting as true both propositional 
and non-propositional statements contained in catastrophe testimony, and specifically those 
statements about experiences which lie beyond our lived experience and understanding; for 
believing, that is, the incomprehensible.  Are we entitled, for instance, to presume, say on the 
evidence of the Auschwitz number tattooed on the testifier’s forearm, his trustworthiness as 
a witness to what happened to him, and others, in that place, and thus to deem his testimony 
to be at least prima facie true?  Can we simply choose  to believe catastrophe testimony, or 
as it is sometimes stated ‘trust the testifier for the truth’ of it, in circumstances where the 
reliability of the content of the testimony cannot, as a consequence of its extraordinary 
nature, either be non-inferentially assumed or inferentially tested as required by the 
epistemic methodologies  previously examined? Or do we need some conceptual framework 
within which reliance on such testimony might be justifiably placed? 
     Jonas Ahlskog (2018), following the earlier work of B. McMyler (2011) concerning the 
justification of our belief in  ‘extraordinary’ testimony, suggests that there might exist  a quasi-
epistemological framework  in which we can  the justify such beliefs.  It is, suggests Ahlskog,  
essentially a matter of whether we can treat the testifier as an authority in relation to the 
subject matter of her testimony; if we can then we should be entitled to trust her for the truth 
of her utterances, notwithstanding any apparent improbability of its content. As Ahlskog 
acknowledges, this concept has its roots in the   the Assurance View of testimonial justification 
discussed above.  His ‘AV Plus’ variant essentially aims at  underwriting the testifier’s 
invitation to the recipient of her testimony to trust her for the truth in the case of 
extraordinary testimony ( testimony ‘which by definition tells of extraordinary and prima facie 
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highly unlikely actions and events’) by the addition of a further assurance of  her status as an 
authority in relation to the subject matter of her testimony.  Ahlskog then goes on to develop 
this idea particularly in this context the testimony of Holocaust survivors.    
     As Ahlskog acknowledges, though, the key objection to his proposal lies in the question  
Paul Ricoeur (2004) asked: how can we come to believe what we cannot understand?  If we 
have no grounds for relying on the deemed authority of a testifier save her deemed assurance 
what is its epistemic value?  Ahlskog’s response is that  accepting the authority of the testifier 
permits us not to understand her experience,  which we are not experientially equipped to 
do, but to increase our understanding of what is possible, from the greatest of evils  to the 
extremes of goodness, in human interactions.  To achieve this, however we have  to be willing 
to trust the testifier for the truth of what might have previously seemed  both extraordinary 
and implausible to the extent required to enable us to believe what we are told. (Ahlskog, 
2018; 68-69).  This argument is pragmatically and ethically attractive, but conceptually 
problematic.  Firstly, it appears susceptible to objections of circularity - we justify our 
acceptance of the testifier’s word by accepting her authority, and justify  our acceptance of 
her authority in turn  by the need to take her at her word. Secondly, we know that on a 
generativist account of memory, its cognitive processes are not necessarily aimed at 
preserving the factual truth of an experience;  testimony which is authoritative may thus also 
be untrue in the sense of not corresponding factually with the original experience, for 
example if it is misremembered or memorially reconstructed. Ahlskog’s thesis therefore 
seems to require an alternative definition of what constitutes truth.   Thirdly, is accepting the 
authority of someone who is telling us things we cannot understand on account of the 
catastrophic nature of her experience anything more than a moral choice, in which case why 
would we need to justify it in epistemological terms?  
   Nevertheless, the important point which Ahlskog’s thesis raises is whether, where our belief 
in  testimony such as catastrophe testimony cannot be epistemically or empirically justified,  
we still need to make  some intellectual effort to justify holding that belief. In other words , 
should we see belief in such testimony purely as a moral good – choosing to believe what we 
feel it is right to believe – or as both a moral and intellectual good? This was the point Améry 
had addressed some forty years earlier in his Preface to the Reissue of Jenseits von Schuld und 
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Sühne, when he declared that his readers should aim for a state of mind in contemplating his 
essays: 
  [which]embraces more than just logical deduction and empirical verification, but 
rather, beyond these two, the will and the ability to speculate phenomenologically, to 
empathize, to approach the limits of reason……This is why, now as well as earlier, I 
always proceed from the concrete event, but never become lost in it; rather always 
take it as an occasion for reflections that extend beyond reasoning and pleasure in 
logical argument to areas of thought that lie in an uncertain twilight and will remain 
therein, no matter how much I strive to attain the clarity necessary in order to lend 
them contour….enlightenment is not the same as clarification.  (ibid. : xi).  
This is  as clear a statement as I have found on the matter, and one I try to follow, however 

















     CHAPTER 7. TRAUMA, MEMORY, AND TESTIMONY VIEWED FROM THE OUTSIDE 
    7.1  Introduction 
     In Chapter 5 I examined  the nature of memory, and especially episodic memory, as a 
source of testimony. In this Chapter I will take that examination a stage further, by focusing 
specifically on memory as the source of catastrophe testimony. As previously noted, the 
recovery, articulation and transmission of memories of traumatic experiences in the form of 
catastrophe testimony may occur in a number of different ways, and environments, and some 
of these involve the participation of those with a specific professional interest in what the 
testifier has to say. One obvious example is testimony given as evidence in judicial 
proceedings, usually  in relation to the prosecution of an alleged perpetrator of a crime.  
Another is testimony given to interviewers in specialist archival institutions established for 
the collection and study of such testimony.  The most valuable form of such mediated 
testimony, though, from the perspective of revealing  the psychopathology of trauma and 
survival is the ‘trauma story’ -  the survivor’s  account of his or her traumatic experience and 
survival, produced with the assistance of a professional witness - which has been a key 
element of the treatment process for those suffering from post-traumatic psychological 
disorders  for many years. Published accounts of the production of such testimony, either in 
the form commentaries by witnesses, studies of such commentaries, or sometimes the 
accounts of survivors themselves, have also been extensively used as source material by 
professionals from a range of disciplines with an interest in the particular events recorded in 
the testimony in question, and/or the psychology or phenomenology of traumatic experience, 
including catastrophe testimony , more generally.   
    The process of getting survivors to tell their own trauma stories, in tandem with diagnosing 
and treating their psychological disorders, and where possible setting them on  the road to  
recovery, though, is  a complex, and often extended one. Evaluating testimony produced in a  
psychotherapeutic setting  should therefore ideally involve not only evaluating  the testimony 
itself, but also of the process by which it was  developed, and if possible the role played by 
the therapist or other witnessing professionals in  its production. This task is realistically 
beyond the vast majority of recipients of such testimony, and this obviously impacts in turn 
on the issue of how recipients can justifiably rely on such testimony.  In this Chapter I 
endeavour, inter alia, to illuminate that issue within the framework of this dissertation.  To 
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begin with, though, I will briefly review the origins of the study of traumatic memory as a 
phenomenon, and something of the process by which it is accessed in a clinical environment. 
   7.2  Origins and Development of the Clinical Concept of Traumatic Memory 
   The notion that traumatic experiences might induce psychological as well as physical trauma  
originated in Paris during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and  was already in 
circulation when Freud arrived there to study in 1885.  It was focused around the study of 
episodic amnesia, that is the idea that experiences which had caused damage to the brain in 
a physical or neurological sense could also produce psychological symptoms, such as 
hysterical amnesia - loss of memory of the experience caused by the shock to the brain 
induced by the trauma. This was generally seen at the time as a condition largely suffered by 
women which could be treated by hypnosis which, if successful, would allow the lost memory 
to be recovered (Hacking, 1995:183).  Modern studies of the problems of lost memory from 
a clinical perspective, and more recently from a  philosophical perspective, however, notes 
Hacking, have centred on the possibility of a traumatic  experience, being reinterpreted in 
memory (as discussed in Chapter 5). (ibid: 192). 
  The modern discourse concerning psychological trauma has its immediate origins not in 
study of the traumatic experiences, or memories, of women, but rather those of veterans of 
the Vietnam War, and more specifically the psychological disorder now commonly known as 
post-traumatic stress disorder , or PTSD.  PTSD first appeared as a recognised category of 
mental disorder in this context, notes Judith Herman, in the official manual of the American 
Psychiatric Association in 1980. However, she adds, the Women’s Liberation Movement had, 
since the 1970s, also been pressing for the clinical recognition of the post-traumatic disorders 
suffered by female victims of sexual violence and domestic abuse, not only with the objective 
of highlighting their plight and pressing for the treatment of individual victims, but also in 
order to of bring about changes in the social and legal categorisation of such acts. The 
Movement’s aim was to raise the general level of consciousness of the sexual abuse of 
women, to eliminate the social pressures on them to deny, keep secret, or feel ashamed 
about, their experiences, and  ultimately to remove the barriers imposed by victims on 
themselves against revealing, and bearing witness to, their experiences. Thus rape became 
redefined as a crime of violence,  and ‘rape trauma syndrome’ recognised  as a pattern of 
psychological reactions to having been raped. Additionally, acts of violence perpetrated not 
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only by strangers but also by persons known to the victim came to be recognised as potentially 
constituting criminal offences, such as date rape,  marital rape, and other forms of assault or 
coercive behaviour.  This, in turn, led to similar work being undertaken in relation to the 
sexual, physical, and psychological abuse of children, whose sufferings have become 
increasingly highlighted, in recent years (Herman, 2015:27-31). Herman sees the clinical study 
of traumatic memory as being driven by these social and political initiatives, but  Hacking 
argues that the political movements Herman describes actually latched on to existing 
scientific enquiry into memory in order to legitimize their political arguments, for example in 
relation to PTSD (Hacking, 1995: 213).  In any event, it seems agreed that the study of 
traumatic memory has in recent years  been marked by the interaction of  science and politics. 
   7.3 Unlocking Traumatic Memories: The Role and Challenges of Psychotherapeutic   
Intervention  
 Retrieving and externalising memories of catastrophic experiences, whether as a mediated 
or unmediated process, involves a huge psychological, moral and existential investment on 
the part of the testifier in being believed.  It requires  the recovery of memories of experiences 
of a profoundly traumatic nature, which the survivor may  find shameful, and humiliating, and 
the recollection of which he or she may have previously suppressed or at least decided should 
remain unarticulated, over a period of years, or even decades.  Further, it requires those 
recovered memories to be rendered intelligible, in the vast majority of cases to those who  
will  never have experienced anything remotely similar to the experience in question. Even if  
the testifier can overcome these challenges, though, he or she is faced with a real possibility 
that his or her testimony will be disbelieved -  characterised as irrational, unreliable, or even 
incredible, especially by those who seek ‘epistemic-grade’ justification of its contents, such as 
lawyers and historians.  In this light testifying, as  part of a  psychotherapeutic process in which 
the therapist’s role is specifically to assist and support the testifier, might reasonably be seen  
as offering  not only a relatively  psychologically benign means of testifying, but also  one 
which might be  conducive to producing an accurate and reliable, hence trustworthy, account 
of the testifier’s experiences. 
However, whilst this assumption may often be justified, commentators concede that the 
participation of the therapist as a disinterested, yet supportive, witnessing professional is by 
no means a given ( see, for example, Herman, 2015, Hacking, 1995, and McKinney, 2007). It 
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may, for example, be undermined not only as a result of the therapist’s natural emotional 
involvement with her patient’s trauma story, but also from the political or social attitudes, or 
clinical beliefs she may  hold.   Judith Herman, for instance, examines at length one of the 
most important manifestations of a therapist’s unhelpful emotional involvement in her 
patient’s trauma - ‘traumatic countertransference’ - in which the therapist becomes 
overwhelmed emotionally by the patient’s story, and starts  experiencing  some of the terror, 
rage, or despair of the patient, or even symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, such as 
nightmares, or a feeling of helplessness.   She cites cases of therapists working with Holocaust 
survivors being “engulfed by anguish”, or “sinking into despair”, to the extent of having to 
withdraw from the therapeutic process entirely, which may in turn adversely affect the 
testifier’s own psychic state.  More worryingly, she cites other cases of therapists beginning 
to identify with the perpetrator by becoming highly sceptical of the patient’s story,  
minimising or rationalising the abuse suffered by him, , or even  experiencing voyeuristic 
excitement, such as sexual arousal, at his account of it.  Another form of countertransference 
commonly cited in reports  of those working with Holocaust survivors, Herman found, is 
‘witness guilt’ -  a sense of guilt at being spared the patient’s suffering,  or a feeling of having 
displayed insufficient zeal, or commitment in helping the patient (Herman, 2015: 140-147).   
    Examples of  pre-existing social, or political  attitudes  influencing the therapist’s analysis 
or treatment of her patient’s traumatic disorder can be found, it seems, particularly in the 
cases of sexual or domestic violence towards women, and the treatment of psychiatric 
disorders experienced by combat veterans.  They are also exemplified, observes Kelly 
McKinney, in the ‘sanctification’ of the trauma memories of Jewish survivors of the Holocaust 
by clinicians in the United States and Israel, which she contrasts with the less emotionally 
responsive attitude of  recipients of the testimony of  survivors of other cases of collective 
violence, for example in Africa. (McKinney, 2007: 288-9). Finally, a therapist may also be 
predisposed by her adherence to particular clinical hypotheses or explanations of the 
behaviour of patients with generically similar disorders to that of the subject patient to  
diagnose  their disorder in a manner which is consistent with the favoured hypothesis or 
explanation.   
  Karyn L. Freedman, herself a survivor of a violent rape and a recipient of psychotherapeutic 
treatment, whose story is examined in Chapter 8, also underlines the danger for therapists in 
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failing to recognise the distinction between  two sides of the post-traumatic condition of 
survivors of catastrophic experiences. The first she calls the ‘shattered self’ - the  intense 
personal suffering occasioned by the traumatic experience which impacts on the emotional, 
psychological, and physiological wellbeing of the survivor. The second is what she calls the 
‘shattered world view’ (which Améry referred to as his ‘loss of trust in the world’)  -  the loss 
of  belief in the world  as a just and safe place. ‘ For the survivor’, says, Freedman, ‘the idea 
that the world is basically safe is, like a Popperian conjecture, falsified in one bold test’ 
(Freedman, 2010:78). Whilst symptoms of the shattered self, she notes, typically evidence a 
disordered psychological condition from which the therapist should aim to help her patient 
recover, the survivor’s shattered world view should not necessarily be seen in the same light. 
In fact, the survivor’s experience may have actually resulted in the survivor holding a greater 
proportion of ‘well-ordered’ (non-accidentally true) beliefs concerning the world than before.  
A female survivor of a violent sexual attack, for example, may have more realistic beliefs about 
sexual violence towards women generally than before she was attacked, thus making her 
‘shattered world view’ not only not disordered, but actually both more epistemically reliable, 
and more morally justifiable than her former ‘just world’ view (ibid. :79). Freedman’s 
argument echoes the more visceral response of Jean Améry, forty five years earlier, in his 
essay Resentments (1965). After noting that those Holocaust survivors suffering from post 
traumatic disorders had been described as ”warped” in a recent psychoanalytical publication, 
Améry retorted that his ‘warped state’ constituted ‘a form of the human condition that 
morally as well as historically is of a higher order than that of healthy straightness’ (Améry, 
1999: 68).28  As R.D. Laing famously pointed out in relation to schizophrenia, a seemingly 
‘warped’ state of mind might actually represent a sane reaction to an insane world. 
              Thus, whilst a clinically mediated ‘trauma story’ may be more intelligible than one told 
in the patient’s own unmediated  language,  it may also be one which to some extent reflects 
the therapist’s reading of the testifier’s state of mind, rather than a story told in  the patient’s 
own words. Though  clinically well-informed, such mediated testimony may not necessarily 
reflect a total understanding of what the patient is actually struggling to articulate.  In his 
book Rewriting the Soul, Ian Hacking expresses this point in more philosophical terms when 
                                                            
28 These comments concern psychiatric analyses which were made long before the identification and 
psychological studies of PTSD were initiated, and at a time when the attitude to survivors of the Nazi 
concentration camps  in Germany  remained  often unsympathetic, if not openly hostile. 
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he warns against attempting to ‘rewrite the soul’ of victims of traumatic experiences by 
treating the  analysis of  their retrieved memories of their  experiences  solely as  objects of  
scientific enquiry.  This, he argues, whilst disproving one misconception of the human soul as 
an object of religious contemplation, risks replacing it with another misconception of the 
human soul as ‘something of which we have knowledge’ (Hacking, 1995: 251). 
   7.4   Clinical Analysis of the Post- Traumatic Condition  
‘The salient characteristic of the traumatic event’, writes Judith Herman, ‘is its power to 
inspire helplessness and terror’. She characterises the symptoms of  post- traumatic stress 
disorder in victims of sexual violence and combat veterans as falling into three main 
categories.  The first is ‘hyperarousal’ -  the persistent expectation of danger.  The second is 
‘intrusion’ -  the constant reliving of the traumatic event as an abnormal form of memory 
which spontaneously breaks into consciousness as vivid sensations and images without a 
narrative frame, for instance as flashbacks during waking states, or nightmares during sleep.  
The third category is ‘constriction’ -  dissociative splitting off of traumatic memory from 
normal consciousness, so that only selected fragments of the experience are retained in 
memory.  Intrusion and constriction, she says, together form a ‘dialectic of trauma’, in which 
the subject’s mind oscillates between the extremes of reliving the trauma and amnesia, or 
intense emotional responses and lack of emotion. This instability in turn heightens the 
subject’s sense of the unpredictability and helplessness of his condition, making the dialectic 
of trauma potentially self-perpetuating. 
   Like Freedman, Herman highlights what she terms disconnection as a particular salient 
characteristic of PTSD; that is the loss of the subject’s autonomy, or ‘sense of self’, on the one 
hand, and the  loss of trust in the world as a safe place on the other, leaving the survivor 
feeling abandoned by, and alienated from, society.  Herman notes how rape survivors, in 
particular, suffer this sense of disconnection on both levels ,experiencing high levels of PTSD 
both due to the ‘physical, psychological and moral violation of the person’ they have suffered, 
which was specifically designed to terrorise, dominate,  humiliate, and render them helpless, 
and also as a result  the social effects of the  not uncommon disjunction between the 
survivor’s actual experience of being raped, and the communal perception of what 




7.5 Traumatic Experiences in Captivity 
     Herman considers those who have undergone repeated traumatic experiences as a 
consequence of being held in captivity as a particular category of trauma victims. She points 
out that whilst those held in prisons, or concentration and slave labour camps, are obvious 
examples of victims in this category,  captivity may also be the de facto condition of those 
who may appear, on the surface, to be at liberty, such as followers of some cults, sex workers, 
or victims of domestic violence.  She appears to have in mind, though, principally situations 
in which there is prolonged one-to-one contact between the perpetrator and the victim, 
leading to  a  relationship of coercive control, in which the perpetrator seeks the willing 
submission of the victim (and is thus to some extent in turn psychologically dependent on him 
or her). Nevertheless, whatever the relationship between the victims and perpetrator(s), 
prolonged periods of captivity in which psychological trauma is experienced repeatedly, and 
in a variety of ways, clearly intensify that trauma. As Herman points out, repeated acts of 
violence, and especially violence which is unpredictable, or inconsistently applied, is the 
universal method of terrorising and dominating the victim in any situation of captivity.  It 
instils in the victim both a fear of death, and a sense of gratitude towards the perpetrator for 
being allowed to live, and where accompanied by the perpetrator’s control of the victim’s 
bodily functions, such as eating, sleeping, going to the toilet, or exercising, erodes, and may 
ultimately destroy, the victim’s sense of autonomy.  The victim’s only means of maintaining 
her autonomy in such a situation, notes Herman, may then lie in a refusal to comply, 
particularly where that refusal requires the victim to subject herself to greater deprivation 
than that willed by his or her captor, such as a hunger strike. In the absence of such a will to 
resist, however, the process of psychological degradation can ultimately result in the loss of 
the victim’s basic will to live, as in the case of the Nazi concentration camp  ‘musulman’ -  the 
‘living dead’ prisoner described by Primo Levi, Elie Wiesel, and others, who  ceases to make 
any effort to find food, keep warm or avoid beatings, until death finally claims him. This state 
of submission, Herman emphasises, is not synonymous with that of a person who attempts 
to kill themselves in captivity; suicide attempts may indeed be acts of resistance, and defiance, 
expressed in the willingness to die by one’s own hand rather than that of others.  This view of 
suicide as an expression of free will, and an affirmation of dignity, especially where committed  
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in contemplation of  being killed, is supported by Aharony, who notes that the SS were often 
extremely irritated by incidences of suicide in the Nazi concentration camps, regarding it, like 
an attempt to escape, as in effect a threat to the rules and objectives of the camp (Aharony, 
2015: 134). 
  The intensity, and profundity of the psychological trauma suffered by victims during 
captivity, Herman found, subsequently  manifested itself in chronic forms of PTSD, both 
physically, in amplified forms of hyperarousal such as headaches, back pain, or 
gastrointestinal disturbances, and also  socially, in the avoidance of personal relationships and 
other forms of social and emotional engagement, and ‘the over-development of a solitary 
inner life’ (Herman, 2015: 87).  Techniques of disassociation and ‘trance states’ learned in 
captivity to restrict or suppress physical or psychological suffering  might continue to be 
practised by survivors, for example in a refusal to discuss the past even with spouses or 
children, as Herman consistently found to be the case with survivors of Nazi concentration 
camps.  Such techniques, however, far from erasing the  traumatic memories of the past, 
leave survivors, she says,  with a ‘double consciousness’: a ‘hazy and dulled’ present, and an 
‘intense and clear’ past, the reality of which seems more compelling than that of the present. 
As a result, survivors may develop a ‘contaminated identity’ - one preoccupied with shame, 
self-loathing, and a sense of failure, and marked by protracted periods of depression - but 
also anger reflecting the  ‘humiliated rage’ previously felt but suppressed as a prisoner, and  
directed by the survivor against others, but sometimes also against  himself. 
   The survivor’s sense of estrangement  from the world around him may be intensified  as a 
result of the way in which others judge his role during captivity. Most people who have no 
knowledge or understanding of the psychological effect of captivity, Herman says, tend to 
judge chronically traumatised survivors extremely harshly, becoming frustrated with the 
symptoms they display, condemning  their betrayal of any friendships, loyalties, or moral 
values they may have been compelled to betray, and commonly ascribing their behaviour to 
flaws or weaknesses in their character.  ‘The propensity to fault the character of the victim’, 
notes Herman, ‘can be seen even in the case of politically organized mass murder’, for 
instance in talk of the alleged  ‘passivity’ of  Jewish victims of the Holocaust, and alleged 
complicity in their fate, as notoriously alleged, by, inter alios, Raul Hilberg, Hannah Arendt 
and Zygmunt Bauman (ibid. :115). This tendency, she claims, has also strongly influenced the 
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direction of psychological inquiry, leading clinicians to seek explanations for perpetrator 
actions in the victim’s alleged personality ‘defects’, such as a propensity to be brainwashed, 
and consequently to misdiagnose post-traumatic syndromes as attributable to the victim’s 
presumed underlying psychopathology rather than the nature or extent of the traumatic 
injury inflicted by the perpetrator. 
   7.6  Testimony as  Psychotherapeutic Process 
   The production of the survivor’s own account of her trauma is central to the recovery 
programme Herman describes for the treatment of PTSD.   The aim is to get the survivor to 
tell the story of her trauma in order that her traumatic memory of it can be integrated into 
her own  narrative of her life. The fundamental premise of this process is a belief in the 
‘restorative power of truth-telling’ (Herman, 2015:181). 
     Herman describes two therapeutic techniques for getting survivors  to  produce their 
trauma story.  The first technique she calls ‘direct exposure’, or ‘flooding’, which is ‘designed 
to overcome the terror of the traumatic event by exposing the patient to a controlled reliving 
experience’ (ibid.). The patient is first taught anxiety management/relaxation techniques , 
following which a detailed written ‘script’ of each relevant traumatic event is prepared  and  
narrated aloud by the patient to the therapist, with  the process being repeated as required 
in subsequent sessions.  The second technique is the ‘testimony method’, which involves 
making  verbatim transcripts of the patient’s account of her experience, to create a detailed 
and extensive narrative which the patient and therapist then revise together into a coherent 
testimony that the patient might then read aloud, and which both patient and therapist 
formally ‘sign off’ as party and witness respectively. Herman notes that the testimony method 
is a more socially and politically developed process than the more narrowly focused ‘flooding’ 
method, and thus more  useful to third parties such as human rights organisations, but she 
claims that both methods have been shown to produce positive results in successfully 
relieving post-traumatic symptoms of hyperarousal and intrusion, though not those of social 
disconnection.  Neither method, however, she says, may be adequate for treating cases of 
chronic abuse, especially where the patient has major gaps in her memory.  Moreover, since 
both methods are designed to treat each traumatic event separately, they may be impractical 
for treating survivors of prolonged or repeated abuse. 
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   Even where it is carefully and professionally guided, says Herman, the production of the 
trauma story ‘inevitably plunges the survivor into profound grief’, and initiates a process of 
mourning which is ‘at once the most necessary, and the most dreaded task of this stage of 
recovery’ (ibid. :188). Resistance to mourning is thus to be expected and is one of the most 
common causes of stagnation in this stage of recovery.  It is motivated not only by fear, but  
sometimes also pride—the sense that resistance to grieving will deny the perpetrator his 
victory. Resistance may take the form of  various  fantasies of ‘magical resolution’, such as the 
revenge fantasy, in which the survivor imagines  the roles of the perpetrator and herself as 
the victim being reversed, the forgiveness fantasy, in which the survivor pictures herself 
erasing the psychic impact of the trauma through a ‘willed defiant act of love’, and the 
compensation fantasy, in which the survivor imagines herself being offered some form of 
material or social ‘compensation’ by the perpetrator.  All such fantasies, claims Herman, are 
therapeutically fruitless attempts at self-empowerment.  
    The last stage of the recovery process Herman describes is the reconnection of the survivor 
to the world of the present.  She favours incorporating into this process ‘public truth-telling’ 
- the revelation of the survivor’s experience to others, within a larger framework of human 
rights, or social justice advocacy - though she concedes that this can be  psychologically 
hazardous for the survivor.  It may well involve confronting perpetrators, and others who 
wish, from whatever motive, to discredit the survivor’s account of her experience, and as 
Herman pointed out in her (1997) afterword to her book, even if the perpetrators or 
discreditors cannot succeed in this, they may succeed in nullifying the consequences of 
testifiers being believed.  She cites the example of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, discussed in Chapter 10, in which the perpetrators were able to demand 
amnesty from prosecution as the price of truthfulness, and other cases in Eastern Europe  
where the complicity of whole communities in war crimes rendered criminal action against 
individual perpetrators and their collaborators practically impossible. I would add that the 
judicial process itself may also prove both unsatisfactory and hazardous.   In post-war 
Germany, for example, the efforts of survivor witnesses to help prosecute Nazi war criminals 
in German municipal courts, such as in the Frankfurt trial of former Auschwitz personnel 
(1963-5) exposed survivors to intimidating attacks by defence counsel on their credibility as 
witnesses, permitted by the court as legitimate cross-examination  The proceedings  also 
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proved inadequate in delivering justice, due to  the fact that the only criminal offences under 
which perpetrators could be prosecuted under German law were those of murder or 
accessory to murder (Wittman, 2005, Pendas,2006). Consequently, the potential personal 
cost to the survivors of having to endure assaults on their character or credibility as witnesses, 
including allegations of mental instability, or of  being brainwashed by others, including 
psychotherapists, should be carefully weighed against the expected benefit to them or  of 
their giving evidence, as well as the value of the evidence itself. 
    Although, the treatment model described by Herman has been very widely adopted, it is 
not universally acclaimed. Kelly McKinney (2007) notes that in the early 2000s some clinicians 
began to question whether therapies which rely on verbalizing traumatic memory were in 
fact therapeutically efficacious, or whether they  might actually exacerbate the narrator’s 
traumatic stress.  A major focus of McKinney’s own study focuses on the work of  clinicians 
treating victims of collective  violence, such as genocidal actions, ethnic conflicts, forced 
migration, or torture.  She addresses in particular the problem of clinicians who ‘subordinate 
the social needs of clients to the ethical call to bear witness’  and as a result fall prey to an 
ideology that ‘casts clients as innocent victims, paradoxically denying a sense of their full 
moral and psychological agency rather than restoring it’ (McKinney, 2007: 266-7). What she 
describes, in short, is a clinical iteration of what we will encounter in other contexts as a wider 
problem of ‘hearing’ catastrophe testimony, namely that of succumbing to the temptation to 
objectify, or instrumentalise the testifier, and/or his testimony in order to render it socially 
comprehensible or convenient. 
   McKinney links this distortive tendency most closely to those working with Jewish Holocaust 
survivors who succumb to what Dominick La Capra  calls the ‘grid of victimization’, in which 
‘psychological, moral, and political ambiguity and complexity are eliminated by purifying and 
idealizing victims and demonizing and othering perpetrators’ (ibid. :285). She describes three 
elements identified by La Capra in this structure.  The first is the denial or disavowal of 
aggressive victim fantasies such as revenge fantasies which contradict the idealized picture of 
the victim as pure and innocent.  Such denial, suggests McKinney, amounts to a denial of the 
victim’s human subjectivity.  The second is the rejection of the notion of  survivor testimony 
being evaluable in terms of its accuracy or inaccuracy, in favour of accepting such testimony 
at face value, despite clinicians knowing that traumatic  memory is in reality both 
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psychologically constructed and socially mediated.  The third element is the ‘sacralization’ of 
trauma; that is the characterisation of the experiences of victims as intrinsically inassimilable 
and unrepresentable, and of testifiers as ‘sanctified’ persons,  and  their testimonies as a kind 
of sacred text.  However, not only can the grid of victimization obviously not be applied where 
the victim is also a perpetrator, as in the case of many Vietnam war veterans who themselves 
committed crimes against others, it must be questionable whether it can be universally 
applied even within a Holocaust context.  Can it, for example, be applied to victims who 
collaborated, however unwillingly, in the deeds of perpetrators, such as the Auschwitz and 
Nazi death camp Sonderkommando squad members ?29   
    McKinney thus concludes that whilst the ‘trauma story’ technique, properly employed, 
helps to make sense of the victim’s suffering by contextualising it, and placing it within a 
collective socio-political or historical context, therapists who employ it but succumb to those 
tendencies which promote a ‘grid of victimization’ may end up denying, rather than 
honouring, the moral and psychological agency of their patients, and  hindering, rather than 
aiding, their recovery.  
   Henry Greenspan, a psychologist specializing in interviewing Holocaust survivors, argues 
that two distinct and contradictory ways of looking at Holocaust survivors  have in fact evolved 
since the 1970s, especially in the United States: a ‘ceremonial’ or ‘ongoing life’ rhetoric in 
which survivors are celebrated and honoured as heroes, and a ‘psychiatric’ or ‘ongoing death’ 
rhetoric, in which they are treated as ‘ghosts and wrecks’. Greenspan sees both these 
rhetorical treatments as having evolved as separate and self-sufficient discourses which have 
become increasingly detached not only from each other, but also from remembering the 
Holocaust. Ceremonialists who invite survivors to ‘bear witness’, Greenspan suggests, are in 
fact abstracting the act of testifying from the testimony itself, and focusing on celebrating it, 
whilst leaving the content of the testimony in the background. Adherents of the psychiatric 
                                                            
29  I am not suggesting that Sonderkommando members should be classed as perpetrators.  My point is rather 
that their situation represents clear evidence of the falsity of assuming that all victims should be classified ipso 
facto as ‘pure and innocent’. As I have suggested earlier in this dissertation, the fact is that Jewish 
Sonderkommando members were forced to fulfil the role which  both made them collaborators and intensified 
their own victimisation in a particularly inhuman way. McKinney also cites the interesting case of a child soldier 
being admitted to a programme for the treatment of victims in which she participated as an observer, despite 
the fact that the programme staff normally refused to accept perpetrators.  His acceptance was justified by those 
treating him on the grounds that he had been a child (coded as innocent and pure) at the time of committing 
the atrocities (ibid. :290). 
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model, on the other hand, he contends, abstract the survivor’s  emotional problems resulting 
from the  a traumatic experience from the personal and historical content of the experience  
itself by designating them generically as post-traumatic ‘symptoms’  (Greenspan, 1999: 59).  
Consequently, whilst he accepts that the general ‘blunt and undisguised’ refusal to listen to 
survivors’ stories of their experiences in the years following the end of the Second World War 
and prior to the 1970s makes one feel indignant in retrospect, it did, he suggests, at least 
‘reflect a genuine dread and revulsion in the face of the Holocaust.’ rather than being  merely 
an accepted clinical practice. The terror and guilt evoked by the Holocaust, if it could not be 
faced, had to be denied, and its messengers silenced by excluding them from the discourse.  
(ibid. :56).  These observations, though, should be read in the specifically American context in 
which they were written;  they would not, for example, apply  to the reception of Holocaust 
testimony in Germany or Eastern Europe. Greenspan also suggested more recently  that video 
testimonies recorded by archival institutions, in which the testifier is ‘center-screen’, and the 
interviewer deliberately off-camera, can sometimes evolve into  performative monologues, 
in which the testifier self-consciously makes statements ‘for the record’ or ‘for posterity’.  He 
accepted, though, that  video testimonies do have the advantage of permitting viewers to 
observe the testifier’s body language as well as his verbal or written language, albeit usually 
in an edited form.  Greenspan himself advocates a model of interviewing survivors  
characterized by multiple interviews carried out over a sometimes prolonged period of time, 
in which earlier interviews can be revisited in later interviews, so that an ‘evolving evaluatory 
partnership’ between testifier and interviewer can be fostered (Greenspan et al. , 2014:190). 
   7.7  Psychological Analysis in a Wider Philosophical Context  
    The conclusion I draw from the various commentaries cited above, in summary, is that 
whilst the production of narrative accounts of their experiences by those undergoing 
psychotherapeutic treatment can be an essential tool in the analysis and treatment of their 
psychological disorders, such an account may not be accurate either  in the sense of 
corresponding with the facts of the subject’s original experience, or in the sense of 
correspondence with the pre-therapeutic phenomenal content of that experience.  Further, 
the degree to which the content of such an account may consciously or unconsciously reflect 
the input of the witnessing professional into its production, for example in the language and 
concepts employed by the subject to characterise his experience, or his perception of his 
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psychological condition, is probably unknowable.  The fact, though, is that the purpose of 
psychoanalysis is to explore the nature of specific psychic disorders, and the purpose of 
psychotherapy within that context is to facilitate the treatment and recovery of a particular 
patient, and if possible his reintegration into society.  Thus  testimony in the form of  a ‘trauma 
story’ is a means to a therapeutic end, and one which is not necessarily consistent with the 
objectives of testifying as a means of bearing witness in an evidential sense to the past 
experience or event .  Consequently, one can neither presume that ‘therapeutically induced’ 
testimony will be more reliable, or trustworthy than testimony which is presented by the 
testifier in an unmediated form, such as a radio broadcast,  an unmediated video recording, 
or a written autobiography,  nor that it offers a better means of gaining an insight into what 
Hacking calls the ‘soul’ of the survivor.30 
   Hacking’s study of the issues raised by the analysis and treatment of post-traumatic 
psychological disorders, though specifically directed at the treatment of multiple personality 
disorders,  offers a broadly focused and enlightening perspective on the nature of traumatic 
memory.  Its starting point is the endorsement of the generativist notion that in memory, ‘we 
rearrange and modify elements that we seem to remember into something that makes sense 
……We touch up, supplement, delete, combine, interpret, shade’ (Hacking, 1995; 247).  More 
than this, however, Hacking endorses  ‘the old and valuable Freudian insight’ that the scenes 
we recover from our memories, perhaps some time after their original occurrence, may 
become invested with meanings which they may not have had at the time they were 
experienced.  We may, for example, remember at a later date  what we might have 
considered at the time of its occurrence as a minor act of flirting as constituting a more serious 
act of sexual harassment.  Moreover, the more retroactively we ascribe such meanings, 
suggests Hacking,  the more likely it becomes that the culture, language and norms we are 
applying  at the time of recollection will be different from those which would have applied at 
the time the event occurred.  Consequently, he declares, whilst it may be morally permissible,  
to use later terminology to characterise earlier  events we should at the same time always 
take into account what he calls the ‘indeterminacy of human action’  in the past, that is our 
                                                            
30 Hacking’s analysis is written in the context of his study  of multiple personality disorder, but raises many issues 
which are of value and importance in the context of post-traumatic psychological disorders more generally, 
particularly those of a wider nature than those addressed in predominantly clinical analyses. 
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potential conceptual inability to remember a past action  in the same way as it  appeared to 
us at the time. 
    A particular danger Hacking identifies is what he calls ‘contagion by words’ or ‘semantic 
contagion’ - the use by clinicians of contemporary  generic terms, such as  ‘child abuse’,  to 
‘restore’, as a painter might restore a faded picture, the patient’s images of past actions. Such 
attempts at restoration, he notes, whilst often beneficial, should  not amount to repainting 
old images with entirely new colours from the therapist’s narrative palette rather than that 
of the patient (ibid. :254-5).  That would risk offering the patient a new narrative, into which 
the patient might then fit his experiences, and whilst that may result in a more satisfying 
outcome in terms of the patient’s happiness, capacity for social interaction, increased 
confidence, or reduced terror, it might be at the expense of falsifying his recollection of his 
past experience  A difficult dialectical dilemma might thus arise between truth and morality; 
that of whether, if the patient’s outcome can be  improved by such means, the psychological 
benefit to the patient of such an improvement  should matter more than whether or not the 
patient remembers his past, or his former self, truthfully. Hacking’s commentary thus  to some 
extent foreshadows some of the later discourse on the generativist concept of memory 
examined in Chapter 5. 
      From the perspective of analysing and treating multiple personality disorder, Hacking 
treats the issue of false memory as a particular aspect of a wider phenomenon of ‘false 
consciousness’—the state of someone who has formed importantly false beliefs about his 
own character.  In the case of false memory, this might take the form of ‘ remembering’ things 
in the past which never occurred,  radically reworking one’s memory of events which did 
occur, or suppressing memories of things from one’s past which are central to one’s character 
or nature.  Clinically induced or aided false consciousness, Hacking argues, is a morally 
undesirable condition, whoever is responsible for it, and whether or not it can be justified in 
terms of its outcomes from a clinical or utilitarian viewpoint, because it transgresses, inter 
alia, the idea of autonomy – that is the idea that ‘we are responsible for constructing our own 
moral selves’ (ibid. :264).  Self-knowledge, he contends, should be considered a virtue in its 
own right, and a means by which we can fulfil our own natures by gaining ‘an unsentimental 
self-understanding’, though it may not make us as happy as living with a false consciousness 
of the past.  The concern that therapy can be an impediment to autonomy  by potentially 
107 
distorting our knowledge, or understanding, of our own nature - causing, as it were, collateral 
damage to one’s sense of self - seems to me to echo, in a broader and demedicalized context 
concerns expressed in different ways in the commentaries of Herman and McKinney. To say, 
however, that a state self-knowledge is necessarily more desirable, or of a higher moral order, 
than that of a false consciousness of a profoundly traumatic experience  which assists a 
patient in her recovery from that experience, seems to me to be making a very bold 
statement.  
      Hacking does not argue, on the other hand, that autobiographical accounts of people’s 
lives are necessarily more closely connected with  the reality of the experiences they describe 
than mediated life stories.  On the contrary, when it comes to the language we use to describe 
ourselves, he suggests, ‘each of us is a half-breed of imagination and reality’ (ibid.:233). In 
fact, Hacking argues, the best analogy to autobiographical remembering is storytelling:  ‘We 
constitute our souls by making up our lives, that is by weaving stories about our past, by what 
we call memories-----[whose] real role is the creation of a life, a character, a self’ (ibid. :250-
1).  The point is that, unlike in the case of mediated ‘trauma stories’, in the case of  
autobiographical works it is the biographer who has the sole responsibility for making up her 
life, and the process is thus autonomous. 
  7.8  Trauma Testimony and Evidential Value 
    Hacking’s critique of psychotherapeutic practices highlights, inter alia, two important 
ethical issues.  The first of these, discussed above, is the extent to which the narrative 
accounts by subjects of their traumatic experiences are, or should be, shaped by the therapist. 
The second is the extent to which a balance can be struck more generally between preserving 
the authenticity and perceptual value of a survivor’s unmediated account of her traumatic 
experiences of victimhood and survival, on the one hand, and  benefiting from the enhanced 
evidential value which might accrue from their analysis or interpretation by professionally 
interested third parties, such as a psychologists or historians on the other.  It is particularly 
pertinent in the case of Holocaust testimony, due to the enormous quantity of professionally 
witnessed testimonial material which has been obtained from survivors through various kinds 
of mediation, especially where it has been subsequently made available for general study by  
third parties, but it can apply equally to any other catastrophe testimony  which has been 
similarly obtained. However, I would argue that the issue of how far, and for what purposes, 
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catastrophe testimony should be reinterpreted by third parties is even wider and more 
important than that of professional mediation; it is both ethical and epistemological and it 
should be of interest to anyone who listens to or reads catastrophe testimony with more than 
a passing interest in a good story well told.  I have found the insights of Dori Laub to be 
particularly valuable in addressing this issue, because although his observations were made 
from a clinical perspective, he was also himself a Holocaust survivor.  Laub, who died in 2018, 
was not only a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, but also  a co-founder of the Fortunoff Video 
Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, at Yale University, for which institution he witnessed the 
testimonies of a number of survivors as an interviewer and analyst. In addition, he was a child 
survivor of various concentration camps in Romanian-occupied Ukraine31 to which he was 
first deported, with his family, in 1942, at the age of five, and from which he was finally 
liberated, with his mother, in 1944.   
   In his essay ‘Bearing Witness, or the Vicissitudes of Listening’ (1992(a)) Laub  states that the 
mental state of a survivor such  as a Holocaust survivor who breaks his or her silence 
concerning a massively traumatic past experience by speaking of it in the presence of a 
witness such as himself is one of profound fearfulness, since revealing what he or she knows 
will break down ‘all boundaries of time and place, of self and subjectivity’.  Silence may have 
been the survivor’s prison, but it was also his or her sanctuary.  ‘The fear that fate will strike 
again is crucial to the memory of trauma, and to the inability to talk about it’, says Laub.   
Breaking her silence  invokes a fear in the testifier that the catastrophic experiences from 
which he or she has been hiding will come to life and be relived, ‘only this time around, one 
might not be spared nor have the power to endure’ (Laub, 1992(a): 67). This, says Laub, is no 
idle fear;  Paul Celan, Jean Améry, Tadeusz Borowski, Primo Levi, and Bruno Bettelheim may 
be among the more well known figures who paid with their lives for telling their trauma 
stories, but there have been very many others.  Telling, says Laub, also invokes a  fear of not 
being heard.  He cites the recurring nightmare Primo Levi recalled having suffered in 
Auschwitz, of telling the story of the horrors of his life in the camp to his sister, and others, 
but finding they were not listening to  him - indeed were completely indifferent to his story, 
and continued speaking of other things between themselves, as if he wasn’t there, until finally 
                                                            
31 Laub was born in Chernivsti, also known as Czernowitz under Austrian rule and Cernauti under Romanian rule, 
which is also the native city of the poet Paul Celan. 
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‘My sister looks at me, gets up and goes away without a word’ (Levi, 1987: 65-6). The scenario 
Levi pictured may have seemed nightmarish to Levi, notes Laub, but his fear of not being 
listened to was both common among survivors, and quite justified. However, the primary 
motivation for not wanting to hear the stories of survivors in reality, he suggests, is not the 
indifference Levi  imagined, but another kind of fear - fear of the survivor: 
   ‘Insofar as they remind us of a horrible, traumatic past, insofar as they bear witness 
to our own historical disfiguration, survivors frighten us.  They pose for us a riddle and 
a threat from which we cannot turn away.  We are indeed profoundly terrified to truly 
face the traumas of our history, much like the survivor and the listener are’ (Laub, 
1992(a): 73-4). 
Laub’s comments are absolutely crucial in relation to understanding the epistemological, 
existential and moral chasm between survivors and the world.  It would no doubt be simpler 
and perhaps  also comforting to the rest of society  to think of the existential condition of 
survivors solely in terms of the survivor’s post-catastrophic psychopathology, but the fact is 
that, as Laub points out, we are afraid of  survivors with their tales of horrible experiences, 
and the more we can identify with them socially and culturally, the more we sense that what 
happened to them could happen to us, and the more afraid of them we are. Survivors may 
thus think we do not want to hear them out of indifference or callousness, when in fact we 
do not want to hear them because we cannot bear to think about what they have to say.      
       Laub does not suggest that these issues of telling, listening, and being listened to are by 
any means unique to survivors of the Holocaust, but in a subsequent essay ‘An Event Without 
Witness: Truth, Testimony and Survival’ (Laub, 1992 (b)) he does highlight one extraordinary 
phenomenal characteristic of the Holocaust - that of being  an event which was effectively 
without contemporary witnesses, in the sense of  not having been openly acknowledged at 
the time as happening.  This is true, notes Laub, not only of ‘outsiders’, such as the friends or 
neighbours of the victims, but also of ‘insiders’- Jews  who were not yet victims themselves 
but were, as they would have become increasingly aware, intended to be so.  Laub ascribes 
the failure on the part of insiders to bear witness to what was happening to their being 
trapped inside the event, and having succumbed  not only to the Nazi propaganda narrative 
of their own otherness and inhumanity, but also to a state of frozen incomprehensibility 
concerning what was happening to them and to others like them.   They found it impossible, 
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in effect, to acknowledge the truth of their own annihilation and loss of identity as human 
beings.  Jean Améry, who spent some months in Berlin in 1935, also describes this 
phenomenon.  The capitulation of German Jews to the image of them portrayed by Nazi 
propagandists such as   Julius Streicher could not in the end be resisted, he said, even by the 
brightest and most upright Jewish minds. Their resignation was not moral, or philosophical, 
but in the end nothing more than an acknowledgment of social reality: ‘This, so they must 
have told themselves, is how the world sees us, as lazy, ugly useless and evil; in view of such 
universal agreement what sense does it still make to object and say that we are not that way!’ 
(Améry, 1999:87).  
 Consequently, Laub argues, post-Holocaust testimony is often the only means of bearing 
witness to that event, but it is an imperfect one, since it is affected by the limits of the human 
cognitive capacity to  perceive or assimilate retrospectively the totality of what really 
happened at the time the original experience(s) occurred.  That, he says, is why organisations 
such as the Fortunoff Video Archive, in order  to enable survivors to bear witness, require 
them to relive their experience(s) through narrating their trauma stories in the presence of a 
listener who to a certain extent takes on the joint responsibility of bearing witness to it. Whilst 
this can be an effective means of reconciling  the survivor with the truth of what happened, 
and facing his loss and pain, it cannot, Laub emphasises, efface the past. Indeed, far from 
constituting a healing process it can sometimes end up destroying illusions on which the 
survivor has rebuilt his post-Holocaust life. If this can be the outcome even when an 
appropriately trained and empathetic witnessing professional is involved whose principal 
concern is to alleviate the survivor’s condition, and aid her recovery, one can only imagine 
how much greater the danger of personal destruction might be in other cases of mediated 
recollection -  say in the case of giving evidence in judicial proceedings, especially under cross 
examination, or before military or immigration officials.  The obvious  question which needs 
to be asked in relation to any particular instance of Holocaust testimony and almost certainly 
other kinds of catastrophe testimony, therefore, is whether, and if so how, the right ethical 
balance can be struck between the potential psychological cost to the survivor of testifying 
and the benefits to her and others of recovering and narrativizing the memories of her 
experiences.  Whilst this question clearly needs to be addressed by anyone who participates  
in the process of extracting of the testimony in question, it should also be addressed, I would 
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contend, by all those who may choose to advocate or participate directly or indirectly in the 
solicitation of  catastrophe testimonies  as source material. 
   7.9  Finding Epistemic Value in ‘Unreliable’ Testimony 
    Given the findings of Laub and others, to what extent is it therefore possible to rely on 
catastrophe testimony as a source of  documentary information?  And how far should the fact 
that events or experiences described in a survivor’s testimony may be shown to be 
inaccurately remembered, or even partly imagined, be regarded as invalidating her testimony 
as a true account of the event or experience in question? These are more nuanced questions 
than they might at first appear to be, since, as the following two examples illustrate, it 
involves  determining what we mean when we talk about such an account being true. 
         The first example is a case recalled by Dori Laub, which concerned a woman in her late 
sixties relating her experience as an eyewitness to the Auschwitz Sonderkommando uprising 
of 1944 to interviewers from the Fortunoff Video Library, including to himself.  ‘ “All of a 
sudden”, she said, “we saw four [crematorium] chimneys going up in flames, exploding.  The 
flames shot into the sky, people were running.  It was unbelievable.” ‘ (Laub, 1992 (a): 59).  It 
was, Laub writes, a description offered with such intensity, passion, and colour that members 
of the woman’s audience were transfixed by the images it aroused, but it was also factually 
inaccurate, since only one of the chimneys had in fact been blown up. The videotape of the 
interview was later reviewed at a conference whose participants included historians and 
psychoanalysts,  at which historians argued that because the woman’s memory had  proved 
to be fallible in relation to the number of chimneys destroyed, her whole account of the event 
should be considered more generally unreliable.  Laub disagreed.  The woman, he argued, 
had been testifying to something more radical and crucial than the number of chimneys blown 
up, namely to the occurrence of an event that was almost inconceivable -  a Jewish armed 
revolt in Auschwitz, where such revolts just did not happen.  The fundamental historical  
‘truth’ it revealed was that the ‘total domination’ framework of Auschwitz could be and had 
been broken, however briefly, and ultimately unsuccessfully. The historians had been 
influenced in discrediting the witness’s account by what she had not known of certain  facts 
of the event, but she had  been testifying not to the facts of a single event, but rather to the 
traumatic experience of imprisonment in Auschwitz, and her memory of an event she recalled 
as part of that  experience.  She was, as Laub puts it, testifying ‘not simply to empirical 
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historical facts, but to the very secret of survival and of resistance to extermination’.   The 
testifier ‘saw’ four chimneys blowing up because this was how the glorious unbelievability of 
what happened - the bursting open of the very frame of Auschwitz as a place of subjugation 
and death willed by others, in which resistance was impossible - was represented in her 
memory (ibid. :62).  It was to this ‘eyewitness’ experience  that she had come to testify.  The 
historians, Laub concluded, may have thought that because the woman did not know the 
number of chimneys blown up, or other salient historical facts about the uprising, such as the 
extent of its failure, or the part played in its failure by the betrayal of the resisters by the 
Polish underground, she knew nothing.  But they were wrong; in knowing about the breaking 
of the Auschwitz frame, Laub  considered that  she effectively ‘knew’ far more than they did, 
or could know, of what had happened.  
    In her commentary on Laub’s interview, Larissa Allwork  suggests that eyewitness testimony 
of mind and sense-numbing catastrophic experiences can nevertheless render them 
’speakable’.  She  recounts her own interview with the Holocaust survivor Kitty Hart-Moxon, 
who also worked in the ‘Kanada’ commando at Auschwitz-Birkenau between March and 
October 1944.32  Hart-Moxon recalled   witnessing the continuous procession of people to the 
gas chambers.  ‘You heard them scream and you saw the fire, and you saw the smoke, but 
you couldn’t believe…. It’s just something your brain can’t accept’ she says. She could see the 
ash coming down from the crematoria chimneys, the piles of corpses, the tins of gas, could  
even smell the gas, she said, but still she couldn’t take in the reality that all those people were 
dying ‘because if you could take it in, you would commit suicide’.  Her testimony, notes 
Allwork, underlines the fact that, contrary to the readings of trauma narratives by some 
commentators which emphasise the ‘unspeakability’ of experiences such as that of Hart-
Moxon, and despite her claiming that her experience was more than her mind could process, 
Hart-Moxon had succeeded in actually ‘speaking trauma’ in describing of their ‘cumulative 
wounding assault’ on her senses (Allwork, 2016: 16-17). 
    The second example of ‘truth-conducive’ rather than factually accurate catastrophe 
testimony is recounted by the renowned historian Christopher Browning, in the context of his 
study of the testimonies of 173 survivors of a complex of Jewish factory slave labour camps 
                                                            
32‘Kitty Hart-Moxon interviewed by Larissa Allwork’, Unpublished Transcript, interview date 19 August 2013, 
cited in Allwork, 2016: 16, fn. 50. 
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in Starachowice, in the Radom district of central Poland, presented as a study of traumatic 
memory.  The theme of Browning’s account is to demonstrate how a historian of the 
Holocaust may use ‘a variety of different, often conflicting and contradictory, in some cases 
clearly mistaken, memories and testimonies of individual survivors  as evidence to construct 
a history  that otherwise, for lack of evidence, would not exist’ (Browning, 2003:39). Such a 
history can be deemed reliable for a historian’s purposes, Browning argues, as long as it 
results not from a default presumption of acceptance of survivor testimony, but rather from 
critical judgments made by the historian concerning his sources based on what questions he 
is asking, and his professional assessment of the capacity of those sources, including 
eyewitness accounts, to provide reliable and relevant information . 
   Almost all of the Starachowice testimonies were given orally and contemporaneously 
recorded, but in three different contexts.  Most (116) of them were taken by German judicial 
investigators, for the purpose of prosecuting alleged Nazi war criminals for specific crimes 
under the German Criminal Code in the 1960s, and the remainder were either taken in Poland 
in the immediate post-war period (as early as 1945) or recorded for various memorial or 
archival institutions in the United States  during the 1980s and 1990s, save for one account 
published as a book-length memoir.   Browning’s account focuses on  events which some of 
the testifiers reported as occurring during the last week of July 1944, when prisoners from a 
subsidiary labour camp were transported to the main labour camp. It begins with the 
prisoners awaiting their impending evacuation from the main camp to Auschwitz-Birkenau, 
whilst also learning of the failed attempt to assassinate Hitler, and more or less  at the same 
time hearing the distant sound of the approaching Red Army forces.  Against the background 
of  these chaotic circumstances which produced in them a state of high excitement but also 
fear, there was disagreement between those prisoners who believed they would be murdered 
in Birkenau and argued that they should  attempt to escape before they could be evacuated, 
and those who preferred to allow  themselves to  be transported in the hope that this would 
give them of a better chance of ultimate survival.  During this period,  some testifiers  recalled 
a specific incident in which  Guta B., an 18 year old female prisoner, attacked the German 
commander of the largely Ukrainian camp guards, Willi Schroth, and was then shot by him 
and left for dead.   However, she survived and her life was later saved as a result of bribes 
given by other prisoners to the camp Commandant in return for letting her live.  Browning 
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analyses the different accounts of the incident, and its aftermath, given in the testimonies of 
various survivors, including two recorded interviews given by Guta B. herself, in 1984 and 
1990. 
   In her 1984 interview  Guta B. recalls the incident occurring when, having been made to line 
up with other prisoners in front of a mass grave, Schroth told her she and the others were to 
be shot.  She reacted by jumping on his back and attacking him, primarily, she said, in order 
to save her parents’ lives by creating a distraction and giving them time to escape.  However, 
she was pulled off by the guards, at which point Schroth attempted to shoot her in the head, 
but only succeeded in grazing her. The guards then scattered, on hearing the sound of 
approaching Russian bombers, and she escaped and was hidden by her parents. The next day, 
she said, on hearing that Schroth had threatened to kill all the prisoners in the previous day’s 
line up if she wasn’t given up to him,  she gave herself up, but was subsequently released 
after the Commandant of the camp, Kurt Otto Baumgarten, had been bribed with valuables 
belonging to her boyfriend, to let her live.  Guta B.’s 1990 account basically repeated this 
story, but added that Schroth had previously made drunken sexual advances towards her. 
   Browning found that there were some differences between the account of Guta B. and that 
of other survivors. Firstly, none of the other witnesses recalled, as Guta B. had, prisoners 
being lined up in front of a mass grave to be shot, or any other incidents of executions taking 
place in the camp, although two of them stated that the guards sometimes staged mock 
executions to torment prisoners. Secondly , other witnesses remember Guta B., on attacking 
Schroth, calling on all prisoners rather than just her parents to escape but them being too 
paralysed by fear to act. Thirdly, two other witness confirm that Guta B.’s life was spared as 
a result of Baumgarten being bribed, but recall that the bribe was a collective one to which 
numerous prisoners, rather than just her boyfriend, contributed. In all three cases, Browning 
judged  the versions of other witnesses to be more plausible than that of Guta B. 
Nevertheless, he believed it was possible to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the main 
facts of her account were true, that she had indeed attacked Schroth, in a singular, brave, and 
virtually suicidal act of resistance, had been shot in the head but survived,  and had escaped 
retribution as a result of a bribe given to Baumgarten.  Bribery was, he found, a recognized 
means widely employed by prisoners to save the lives of their friends and families, but he 
accepted that it was  done in Guta B.’s case in recognition of, and gratitude for, her attempt 
115 
to save the lives of others.   As for her recollection of being lined up in front of a mass grave 
to be shot, Browning concluded this was simply an ‘archetypal Holocaust image’ which had 
become constructively  incorporated   into her memory. 
  The more general finding of Browning’s study was that the ‘core memory’ of the 
Starachowice testifiers regarding their experiences, including the events on which he had 
focused his study, was generally consistent and reliable, despite having been recorded at 
different times, and in very different environments, over a period of fifty years. This he 
suggests,  largely disproved the ‘disparaging cliché’ that memories of such experiences 
becomes sanitized and simplified by the passage of time (ibid. :81).  Survivor testimony, even 
decades after the event, he concluded, remains a valuable source of information for 
historians, provided it is critically analysed, rather than accepted at face value, even if the 
result is difficult to bear.  It might be easier to do this, he conceded, in the case of an uplifting 
story of resistance, such as that of Guta B., but we should be prepared to accept stories of the 
camps that are not particularly edifying, and which tend to confirm the reality that terrible 
persecution does not typically ennoble its victims, with a few ‘magnificent exceptions.’  Thus 
we should not presume the truthfulness of accounts by survivors of their experience just 
because they offer tales of edification and redemption (ibid.:85).  
   Browning’s analysis offers direct  support for the notion that memory even of the most 
febrile incidents, or traumatic experiences, can, whilst unconsciously weaving reality and 
imagination, nevertheless yield reliable information.  The problem, of course, is that it is one 
thing for a highly skilled, and empathetic, yet scrupulously objective, historian like Browning 
to evaluate such testimony for truthfulness, but quite another for such evaluation to be 
carried out by someone not endowed with Browning’s skills or experience, or less impartial, 
such as a perpetrator’s legal counsel, or even someone openly hostile, such as a Holocaust 
denier.  Nevertheless, I read Browning’s message as a welcome endorsement of the spirit of 
Améry’s  exhortation to his readers cited at the end of section 6.4 above. 
   7.10  Instrumentalizing Catastrophe Testimony for  Social and Political Theorizing:  The 
Case of Hannah Arendt 
   In earlier sections of this  chapter I touched upon the clinical and ethical issues arising out 
of the employment  of  ‘trauma stories’ produced in the course of the individual treatment of 
those suffering from post-traumatic psychological disorders for the purposes of supporting  
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social and political objectives espoused by clinicians and others. In this Section, I look more 
widely at the issues arising out of  the use of catastrophe testimony  by social and political 
commentators as evidence in support of their theoretical hypotheses concerning the 
testifiers’  experiences. I will be focusing  on one of the best known examples of such  
theorizing, namely Hannah Arendt’s  depiction of   Nazi concentration camps, in her book The 
Origins of Totalitarianism (Arendt,1951: 437-459).  My objective in doing so is not to offer a 
critique of the substance of Arendt’s theories, but rather to consider the political and ethical 
issues which have been raised regarding her employment of catastrophe testimony in the 
service of promoting such theories. 
   In brief, Arendt regarded the Nazi concentration and extermination camps33, like those of 
some other totalitarian regimes, as ‘laboratories’ in which, she claimed, the Nazi experiment 
of achieving total domination over other human beings was carried out, and, she believed, 
almost perfectly realized: 
  The camps are meant not only to exterminate people and degrade human beings, 
but also serve the ghastly experiment of eliminating, under scientifically controlled 
conditions, spontaneity itself as an expression of human behaviour and of 
transforming human personality into a mere thing…..(ibid. :438). 
  Arendt’s belief that the Nazi experiment had been almost wholly successful did not 
acknowledge the fact that an, albeit proportionately tiny, number of prisoners had 
successfully resisted  this fate and  survived their experience, nor the fact that  accounts by 
survivors of their existence, particularly in Auschwitz, clearly  evidenced the preservation to 
some extent of those human qualities which Arendt supposed  to have been destroyed.  One 
can explain this to some extent by the fact that at the time of writing her book survivor 
accounts such as that of Primo Levi were as yet unwritten, or at least unavailable. Those which 
were in existence had been largely obtained purely for judicial purposes as evidence in actions 
taken against perpetrators in municipal courts in Germany and the formerly occupied 
territories, many of which had become part of the largely inaccessible Soviet empire.  
Moreover, to be fair to Arendt, her depiction of the life of  prisoners in the Nazi camps as a 
                                                            
33 Arendt refers to the camps as ‘concentration and extermination camps’ but the ‘experiment’ she describes 
primarily involved prisoners in concentration camps.  It would also include the treatment of prisoners in 
Auschwitz and other extermination camps selected to survive the gas chambers on arrival at the camp, but the 
accounts on which she bases her thesis are those of survivors of other concentration camps.  
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daily, animalistic, struggle for survival which virtually eliminated moral choices is not 
substantially in conflict with those  produced by Jewish survivors such as Primo Levi.  What is 
of greater relevance, however, from the perspective of this dissertation, is Arendt’s selection 
of her sources from the testimony that was available to her, and her ready adoption of the 
narratives of life in the camps which they conveyed. 
      Arendt’s portrait of the existence of  prisoners in the camps generally  drew heavily on the 
accounts of three survivors - David Rousset, Eugen Kogan, and Bruno Bettelheim - the first 
two of whom were not Jews, and had been imprisoned as political prisoners, and the last of 
whom who was an Austrian Jew, but had been imprisoned in Dachau and Buchenwald in May 
1938, and released in April 1939, before taking refuge in the United States later that year. 
Arendt, notes Michal Aharony, in fact drew her concept of total domination largely from the 
writings of Rousset, a French Protestant and Trotskyite arrested for activities in the French 
Resistance and imprisoned in Buchenwald, whose accounts of his experiences appeared in 
1945-6, notably in L’Univers Concentationnaire (1946), long before there was any real 
discourse concerning the Nazi camps more generally.  Arendt’s thesis therefore applied to  
only a tiny minority of by far the largest category of those murdered in the Nazi camps, namely 
Jewish deportees murdered on arrival at Auschwitz and the ‘Reinhard’ extermination camps, 
and did not apply at all to the two million or so Jews murdered otherwise than in the camps. 
Arendt chose  from a theorizing perspective, suggests Aharony, to see the extermination 
camps as a ‘by-product’ of a total domination experiment designed for  implementation as 
part of a much larger project for the total domination of all ‘inferior’ races  and ‘undesirable’ 
elements of society, which would ultimately incorporate both concentration and 
extermination camps (Aharony, 2015: 53-4).  Unsurprisingly, therefore, Arendt’s thesis does 
not take into account the centrality of anti-Semitism as the particular and crucial driving force 
of the Holocaust.  
    Aharony further questions whether the fate of those Jewish prisoners who did become the 
objects of the Nazi experiment of total domination (those selected for extermination through 
forced labour and starvation, rather than in the gas chambers), actually supports Arendt’s 
claim that the experiment had been carried out nearly to perfection.  She points to the factual 
inconsistency between that conclusion and the accounts of individual survivors like Primo Levi 
of moral, and occasionally physical, resistance to the oppressions of camp life,  of solidarity 
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among prisoners, and of, albeit rare, instances of collective resistance, such as the Auschwitz 
Sonderkommando uprising. She also  queries the extent to which Arendt’s apparent 
acceptance of Rousset’s personal experience of the ‘constant animalistic struggle for life’ in 
Buchenwald can be considered as an invariable feature of life for all kinds of prisoner in all 
types of camps.  Here, though, I think  Aharony’s argument is on weaker ground;  the 
Sonderkommando uprisings in Auschwitz and other camps, for instance, involved a tiny 
minority of prisoners and were  a desperately courageous reaction to the imminent threat of 
collective extermination by those who knew that, as key witnesses to the atrocities 
committed in the camp, they could not be allowed to live.  Similarly, whereas one might see 
the extremely low suicide rates in the camps as  testament to the solidarity and will to live of 
prisoners determined to resist the attempts of their captors to exterminate them, one has to 
balance that against the far greater numbers of ‘musselmanner’  who surrendered, without 
resistance and perhaps with relief, to their fate.  
   Aharony’s most pertinent criticism, though, from a testimonial perspective, relates to 
Arendt’s attitude to survivor testimony.  Arendt argues that the most ‘authentic’ survivor 
accounts were those which dwelt least on those sufferings of victims ‘that evade human 
understanding and human experience’ and suggested that survivor reports were often 
regarded as suspect, and that their truth was sometimes doubted even by the testifiers 
themselves, once they had returned to the ‘world of the living’ (Arendt, 1951: 439)34.  Aharony 
argues that these words evidenced a conscious refusal to give meaning to the suffering of the 
victims, whom Arendt alleged had been deprived of their personality and character, and 
whom she could not thus could  admit to have been ‘capable of reflecting on their experiences 
in any meaningful way’ (ibid. :211)35. She ascribes Arendt’s view partly to her wish to keep a 
sentimental distance from the victims of total domination in order to  avoid the ‘politics of 
                                                            
34 This view seems to be based on the comments of Bettelheim and Rousset (ibid.: fn. 128). 
35 Arendt’s reference to Holocaust victims as having passively gone to their deaths like ‘sheep to the slaughter’ 
in her book Eichmann in Jerusalem: a Report on the Banality of Evil (1963) would probably be ranked by many 
critics as a far more egregious example of what appears to be an unfortunate failing to empathise with the 
suffering of victims of the Holocaust, and specifically with East European Jews, and perhaps also a wish to 
distance herself from their fate.  Arendt was though far from alone in her view, since other prominent figures, 
such as Raul Hilberg,  Zygmunt Bauman, and  Bruno Bettelheim, as well as some Israeli commentators, held 
similar views, and sometimes expressed them in more extreme terms.  In fact  reviews of Arendt’s book on the 
Eichmann trial in the Israeli press  were generally positive, and although the Holocaust was often invoked to 
justify the Zionist project by Israeli politicians at the time, the fate of its diasporic Jewish victims was generally 
viewed rather unempathetically by ardent Zionists. 
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pity’ - the danger of her political judgment being ruled by compassion and pity, rather than 
reason -  but also as evidencing a ‘theory of judgment’ which privileged the ‘representative’ 
view  of the notionally disinterested spectator over the subjective, idiosyncratic view of the 
‘engaged actor’ in relation to political and moral judgments generally.  Alternatively, Aharony 
implies, Arendt may have simply found it easier to represent, or imagine, the standpoint of 
the perpetrator, with whom she could not identify, than that of the victim with whom she 
perhaps preferred not to identify. The probability is that all these considerations influenced 
Arendt’s development of her conception of the existential condition of prisoners in the camps 
generally, in which case, as Aharony contends, the description of the daily existence of 
prisoners offered by  an engaged actor such as Primo Levi represents, despite its subjective 
and idiosyncratic viewpoint, a more epistemically informed and morally balanced view of 
existence in a camp such as Auschwitz than that of Arendt. 
    The stated objective of Aharony’s critique is not to dismiss Arendt’s theory of total 
domination, but rather to show its limitations as a sweeping generalisation, based on limited 
and narrowly sourced testimonial evidence. She argues the need for a more nuanced and 
particularist view of the behaviour, psychological condition, morality, and powers of 
resistance of  prisoners in different concentration camps, which  acknowledges the capacity 
for humanity in inhuman circumstances and places, and that is an argument with which I 
would certainly concur.  There is a wider issue at stake though, which is how one balances the 
socio-political imperative to construct a general interpretative framework  within which one 
might analyse and draw valuable lessons  from the Nazi ‘experiment’ of total domination, on 
the one hand, and the moral imperative to accurately and ethically represent the individual 
humanity of  victims of such an experience – not only their suffering, doubts or weaknesses 
but also, for example, their courage, will to survive, generosity to others and resilience. In an 
ideal world we would benefit from having both  survivor testimony, and a viable theoretical 
framework within which we can attempt to bring the  experiences and existential condition 
of survivors at least to some extent within the realm of our comprehension,  and thus make 
some sort of sense of what happened to them.  In an ideal world, we would also be able to 
settle cases of conflict between the two, for example, as Aharony suggests, by using the 
testimony of individual survivors to refine the concepts or arguments of the theorizers so that 
they become more nuanced, or balanced.   My own sense, though, is that theorizing and 
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testifying are  intrinsically different phenomena, and perhaps that’s how it should be. It is 
perhaps the case, as  Laub and Browning both imply from their different  perspectives, that 
the accounts of survivors, and the evaluations of psychologists, historians, and other 
commentators  may seek, or yield, different kinds of knowledge. As I see it, though, they 
simply have different and not necessarily complementary objectives. It may be that the 
political story which Arendt told was imprecise, ideological, inadequately researched, and one 
told too soon after the event, yet it was, and remains, a story  of immense value, and 
importance in providing a theoretical basis for those who were not there to think about what 
occurred in the Nazi camps, and so we are surely better off for having it. The issue, as I see it, 
is more whether Arendt was right to consider herself intellectually and morally entitled to 
offer  sweeping and dehumanizing  generalisations, in the service of her theorizing, about the 
existence of those whose experiences she had neither shared nor could imagine, whether or 
not they survived, especially when that theorizing amounted in effect to denying their 
individual humanity. 
   7.11  Summary 
    In Part Three of  this dissertation I have been looking at the existential and moral chasm 
between survivors and the world from the perspective of particular recipients of catastrophe 
testimony – those with a largely non-adversarial interest in what such testimony has to say, 
such as psychologists and cognitive scientists, historians and social and political theorists.  
Whilst their interests in analysing and interpreting catastrophe testimony may be different, 
the underlying objective of such recipients in undertaking the task of analysis or 
interpretation appears to me to be essentially the same – to narrow the existential and moral 
chasm between testifiers  and the world by making those testifiers and/or their catastrophic 
experiences more intelligible to themselves, and through themselves to the world.  
Sometimes this might involve the recipient attempting to reach out intellectually and 
emotionally towards  the survivor of the catastrophic experience, but more often it appears 
to me to involve the recipient attempting to repaint the world of the survivor in the  
conceptual and semantic colours of the world of the recipient – that is to reduce the world of 
the survivor to that part of it which can be understood or envisaged by the recipient,  This is 
not to suggest that recipients who adopt the latter approach are acting out of bad or immoral 
motives; the reduction of a survivor’s traumatic narrative by a psychotherapist to something 
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more explicable to herself and the world, for example, may be of real social and psychological 
benefit to the survivor. It is to suggest, however,  that as a general rule whilst recipients who 
attempt to reach out to survivors are more likely to succeed in narrowing the existential and 
moral chasm between them, recipients who attempt to reduce the world of the survivor to 
that which they can understand or envisage are more likely to widen both chasms.  In other 
words, that the price for increased intelligibility may be reduced  authenticity. Hacking, for 
instance, warns of the  danger that rendering accounts of catastrophic experiences clinically 
intelligible, might amount to ‘rewriting the souls’ of their subjects, in order to reconstitute 
the subject’s introspective beliefs as objective, clinically evaluable, ‘truths’. That is, it may 
involve literally taking the subject’s words out of her mouth and replacing them with words 
that may be more intelligible, psychologically explicable and theoretically convenient and also 
easier for the subject to accept as true, but which no longer authentically represent the 
essence of the originally remembered experience, or even of the subject’s subsequently 
constructed representation of it. Hacking, together with Herman, and others, have also 
flagged the dangers of  trauma stories produced in the course of treatment for post-traumatic 
psychological disorders being influenced, or even distorted, by the therapist’s own emotional 
or psychic reaction to her client’s story, her social or political ideology, or her espousal of a 
particular generic clinical hypotheses relating to her client’s condition.    Laub and Browning 
have also, in their different ways, identified failings in the approach of historians and others 
who judge the truthfulness or reliability of trauma testimony in terms primarily of its factual 
accuracy, or consistency with other accounts. Finally,  Arendt’s theorizing  raises the question 
of whether the benefits of such an exercise can ever be justly acquired at the cost of denying 
the humanity of victims of those experiences.      
    Thus, the question of whether mediated, re-evaluated, or reinterpreted catastrophe 
testimony should be deemed  more or less reliable or ‘truth’ conducive than first person 
autobiographical accounts by testifiers of their experiences, like many other questions which 
have arisen in relation to testimony in  general and catastrophe testimony in particular in this 
dissertation, does not invite and should not be met with facile responses.  We should be 
prepared to give credence to both mediated and unmediated accounts of catastrophic 
experiences but in neither case should we do so uncritically, or without having due regard for 
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the context of the account, the perspective of its producer(s), and the motivations which drive 
its presentation or solicitation.    
    The underlying first principle which I argue should drive any evaluation of  catastrophe 
testimony, however, is that testimony which  is not first person testimony is, prima facie not 
testimony.  This is not only true in the sense that testimony should present the testifier’s  
experience of catastrophe and survival as she recollects experiencing it, but also that her 
testimony can only be authentically delivered in her own words.  If such authenticity means  
sacrificing the intelligibility of her testimony to others, then we may have to accept that.  Laub 
and Browning have shown how the best of professional commentators can work around such 
constraints.  The world of testimony is any event rapidly moving on.  The renowned Holocaust  
historian Annette Wievorka said ‘the era of the witness’- the era in which subjective 
eyewitness accounts of Holocaust survivors began to be prioritised over accounts based on 
administrative records -  did not begin in earnest until around 1980.  In the case of subsequent 
genocides, such as those in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, on the other hand, the 
reliance on eyewitness accounts, including those given immediately after or even during the 
events in question, or in real-time oral and video testimony, rather than documentary and 
other forms of historical testimony,  became a fact of  reporting those events.  The problem 
of belief justification, knowledge acquisition and authenticity  has now moved on further, with 
the advent of the smartphone and other forms of instantaneous recording and simultaneous 
transmission, to become one of perception rather than reflection -  of whether we can believe 
what we see or hear in what purports to be real time. Is, for example, what purports to be an  
image of a catastrophic experience an authentic recording of that experience or a piece of 
clever editing? 
  In any event, I am confident that we are on terra firma as regards the authenticity of the 
testimonies of those whose accounts are to be examined in the following chapters. I have 
selected them for this dissertation in part because they seem to me to work on two narrative 
levels: a first  ‘storytelling’ narrative of the phenomenal experience of being a victim or a 
survivor of a particular catastrophic experience and a second metanarrative which reflects, 
through the medium of that first narrative, on the existential condition of victimhood and 
survival more generally. It is with the second of these narratives that I am particularly 
concerned to engage in the next chapter. 
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                                              PART     FOUR 
 
                              CATASTROPHE TESTIMONY IN THE WORLD 
 
       CHAPTER 8.  HOW  SURVIVORS SEE THEMSELVES AND THE WORLD:  INTRODUCTION, 
RAPE AND TORTURE.  
      8.1  Introduction  
   In this Chapter and Chapter 9 I will be exploring the epistemological, existential and moral 
chasm between survivors of catastrophic experiences and the world from the perspective of 
the survivors - asking, in other words, how testifiers see themselves in the present and the 
past, and also how they perceive their existence as survivors in the world.  In this chapter I 
will be focusing on the accounts of Karyn L. Freedman,  a victim and survivor of rape, and Jean 
Améry, as a victim and survivor of torture – crimes which both involve intimate and brutal 
personally directed violations of the victim’s body and mind.  In the next chapter I will be 
focusing on four survivors, from very different backgrounds and with different perspectives, 
of one of the most notorious collective atrocities in history, namely that which occurred in 
Auschwitz and other Nazi concentration camps. The works  featured in this chapter and 
Chapter 9  encompass a variety of presentational forms -  documentary, anecdotal, essayistic 
and poetic - and were written at  different times after the occurrence of  the catastrophic 
experiences to which they relate. Consequently I hope that they will offer as broad a picture 
of survivor experiences and responses as is possible within the constraints of the available 
space.     
    I am making a default presumption for the purposes of this dissertation that all the 
testimonies examined in this chapter and Chapter 9 are truthful, in the sense that they 
faithfully re-present the phenomenally experienced catastrophic experiences of their authors 
as recollected at the time of writing, and also their subsequent experiences as survivors.  My 
justification for making this presumption, beyond my general acceptance of the non-
reductionist account of belief justification, and my general acceptance of the generativist 
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account of memory, is that survivors of horrific experiences  which are extremely painful to 
recollect do not generally publish their testimonial accounts of them unless they sincerely feel 
that those accounts represent, to the best of their intellectual, psychic and emotional ability, 
the truth of such an experience, and want others to know that  truth.  I see that presumption 
as being stronger than the general non-reductionist presumption of trust in a speaker, on 
account of what is at stake personally for the testifier in testifying, but one which may 
nevertheless be rebutted by counter-evidence. However, I stress that ‘truth’ in this context 
means the truth as sincerely understood by the testifier at the point of her testimony.  An 
illustration of the difference between such subjective ‘testimonial truths’ and facticity 
appears in Laub’s report of the case of the female prisoner who witnessed the explosion of 
the Auschwitz crematorium chimney during the Sonderkommando uprising, described  in 
Chapter 7.  She was a member of the ‘Kanada Kommando’- prisoners compelled to undertake 
the grim and traumatic task of  sorting out the belongings of those who had been gassed so 
that any of use or value could be sent to Germany36.  When interviewed, reports Laub, though 
the witness clearly  recalled  secreting some items of clothing and giving them as presents for 
the use of her fellow prisoners, she denied knowing that  these items of clothing were the 
former possessions of prisoners who had been gassed.  For Laub, however, this did not bring 
into question the woman’s general trustworthiness as an eyewitness, but rather illustrated 
the ‘subtle balance’ between what she knew and what she did not or could not know; that is 
between the knowledge  which her mind allowed her to access as memory, and that which, 
because she could not bring herself to acknowledge the truth of it,  it blocked  (Laub, 1992(a): 
60-61).   
     Catastrophe testimony is thus more than just remembering past events; it is an epistemic, 
existential and moral encounter between the testifier and his or her former self. Nor is the 
role which memory plays in that encounter a fixed one.  It may be that of a bridge facilitating 
the survivor’s attempts to recall or interpret the past,  but equally that of a barrier wholly or 
                                                            
36  However grim, though, this was perhaps one of the less degrading and traumatic tasks performed by members 
of the ‘Special’ squads. Other tasks included removing bodies from the gas chambers, extracting gold teeth from 
the corpses, cutting the hair, initially from dead women, and subsequently from those about to be murdered, 
burning corpses, and grinding up the ashes of cremated victims into dust for disposal.  What must have made 
the trauma even more unbearable was that when it was found that the presence of Sonderkommando had a 
calming effect on those about to be gassed, some members of the Squad were made to stay with them while 
they undressed before entering the ‘shower room’ (Chare and Williams,2015: 5). 
125 
partially obstructing those attempts, especially where the survivor scents such an exercise 
might be psychologically hazardous for her. As  Freedman, speaking both as a philosopher 
and a rape survivor, notes: ‘Our minds are powerfully protective of us, and can block 
memories that we lack the emotional resources to handle’ (Freedman, 2014: x).  Alternatively, 
memory might act in a diversionary manner, redirecting the present self’s contemplations 
onto a path which it deems less hazardous, or easier, to travel. Moreover, the underlying 
personality of the survivor may be significant in determining how the memorial process 
functions in practice. Freedman, for instance, whose story is one not only of trauma but also  
at least partial recovery, emphasises the protective role of memory, as part of the wider 
cognitive function of adapting and reconstructing memorial images to conform with the 
psychological needs of the testifier.  Améry, on the other hand, who never recovered from his 
experiences,  found that his sense of alienation not only from the world but also from his 
former self was actually exacerbated by his memories of the past.  He speaks, for example, of 
the ‘genuine’ homesickness his memories of his former Austrian homeland stirred in him as a 
refugee, which, in contrast to ‘traditional’ nostalgic homesickness, invoked ‘self-contempt 
and hatred for the lost self’, the pain of which, he said, was intensified and made almost 
unbearable by episodes of traditional homesickness. It resulted, he said in ‘a totally 
impossible, neurotic condition for which there is no psychoanalytic remedy’ (Améry, 1999: 
51). 
     There do, however, seem to be some  generally recurring themes in the  autobiographical 
accounts of catastrophic experiences examined below,  The first is a sense of disconnection 
between survivors and the post-traumatic world in which they exist as survivors – a sense of 
being in it but not of it.  The second, apparently particularly felt by Améry and Freedman, is 
the  loss of trust in the world to which they return  following their catastrophic experience. 
Most basically, this implies  a loss of trust  in the world as a just and safe place for the survivor 
on a personal level, such as, in the case of a rape survivor, a fear of walking through unlit or 
secluded places.  However, it frequently also involves a much wider loss of social trust – trust 
that one’s physical and mental integrity will be respected by one’s fellow human beings, or 
protected by those in authority. Loss of social trust is most acute in the case of survivors of 
collective atrocities which are perpetrated against them by, or with the active or passive 
support of, states of which they were citizens  at the time, especially if they were perpetrated 
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without visible protest by members of the dominant social group(s) in that state, as in the 
case of Austria and Germany during the Third Reich.  In the most  acute cases survivors rarely 
return to live in such societies,  if they are able to avoid doing so, preferring to start a new life 
in a new country, and often with a new identity.  As Kusch (2017) notes, so many of the 
certainties on which social life is normally based may be lost when trust in society is lost – for 
example that the State is there to protect its citizens, that doctors exist to relieve pain or cure 
illness, and that special protection should be afforded to the sick, the young, and the elderly.37  
One can only  feel at home said Améry, in a place which gives one a feeling of familiarity, and 
personal security. A person  expelled from his native country as he was, he added,  no longer 
even knew who he was: ‘I was no longer an I and did not live within a We’ (Améry, 1999: 44). 
He concluded that his former sense of being Austrian, and truly belonging to that land and its 
people, had been, in hindsight, nothing but an ‘existential misunderstanding’.  
    The other common theme reflected in the testimonies I examine is the fundamental 
problem of communication  which Kusch calls ‘linguistic despair’- the inability of the testifier’s 
words to articulate and communicate the phenomenal nature of his or her experiences, and 
especially the feelings or sensations he or she experienced. An Auschwitz survivor, for 
example, might speak of her ‘hunger’, ‘thirst’, or ‘fear’, whilst in the camp.  But the hunger of 
which she speakers is that of someone constantly deliberately malnourished to the point of 
starvation, and even death, the thirst of which she speaks is that of someone whose throat is 
constricted to the point of being unable to swallow food, or speak coherently, and the fear of 
which she speaks is the constant terror of being murdered by an SS guard or a barracks kapo. 
The images and responses which these words evoke in the minds of any recipient of their 
testimony, on the other hand, will be those which are triggered by that recipient’s lived 
experiences of hunger, thirst or fear, and thus will be wholly different from those the testifier 
is trying to convey, unless the recipient has had substantially the same experiences, and 
experienced them in substantially the same way (a vanishingly small possibility).  Listeners or 
readers, on the other hand, may well believe they have understood what has been said, for, 
                                                            
37 Kusch’s interpretation is derived from his reading of Wittgenstein’s  ‘hinge epistemology’ in On Certainty which 
I would summarise in very simple terms as being that the account given by  survivors, say, of their experiences 
of  Nazi concentration camps to those who have not shared their experiences constitutes, in hinge-epistemic 
terms, an  account of a world of uncertainties given to those who inhabit a world of certainties. One sees this  
reflected, for example, in the use of terms such as ‘Planet Auschwitz’, or the ‘Univers Concentrationnaire’ to 
describe the camps.  
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as Henry Greenspan notes: ‘Whilst listening to survivors’ reflections, nothing is more common 
than to think we follow when we do not’.  (Greenspan, 1999: 47).  Linguistic despair is thus 
not fundamentally semantic in nature, but rather an experiential disconnection expressed 
through language.  Thus it cannot be fixed by the testifier’s use of supplementary descriptive 
words or gestures. Even employing the most extreme descriptive language is of no help; the 
term ‘starvation’, for example, can no more convey the feeling of starvation experienced by 
someone being systematically starved to death in a concentration camp to someone who has 
not had that experience than the words ‘hunger’, or ‘extreme hunger’. In the context of a 
place such as Auschwitz, moreover, the term ‘starvation’ expresses not only a physical  state, 
but at the same time the psychic and existential condition of one who inhabits a ‘death world’ 
which is the complete antithesis of  the social and moral world inhabited by the recipient. 
Thus, as Kusch points out, there is no language the testifier can employ which would capture 
the essence of her horrendous experience without turning it into something unworldly and 
unimaginable, and thus unreal (Kusch, 2017).  The extent of this kind of disconnect, may  be 
exacerbated by the motives of recipients in wanting to hear or read survivor testimony -   for 
example, if they actively seek tales of ‘death in life’ (trauma and injury) or ‘life in death’ 
(resilience and strength) as Greenspan puts it (Greenspan, 1999:49).  
   Linguistic despair is thus not just a semantic phenomenon but an expression of the 
existential and  moral chasm between the survivor and the world.   For ‘those whose task it 
was to write after the war- to witness, to name and rename, to bear their responsibility to 
the dead in whatever form of enquiry and expression this responsibility might take’, Anne 
Michaels observes, ‘, the failure of language was a given’.  ‘Language itself is a witness’, she 
adds. ‘Morality holds us to account, and language, asserting or distorting morality, must be 
accountable’ (Michaels, 2020:37). The failure of language, then, is an innate feature of the act 
of bearing witness.  It marks the semantic, epistemological, existential and moral boundary 
between  effable and ineffable human experiences.   Améry thus  declared that his book At 
the Mind’s Limits had been specifically written against the notion that  ‘clarifying’ his 
experiences, or his existential condition as a survivor, might be possible.   Linguistic despair, 
he was arguing, far from being a problem to be fixed, is not only irremediable but desirable;  
a necessary and valuable semantic symbol of the unhealable nature of the wounds of which 
testifiers speak. 
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    This is why terms like ‘truth’ and ‘accuracy’ must have less specific, more uncertain 
meanings in relation to catastrophe testimony than those we seek in testimony we look to 
primarily as a source of information, evidence, or knowledge. We also  have to accept that 
the ‘testimony’ of survivors of catastrophic experiences may emerge only partially, or 
obscurely from their text -  from its words but also its silences, and despite or through the 
imprecisions and inadequacies of language and argument. This may be anathema to those  
who seek ‘meaning’ in what they hear, see or read; those for example who see  testifiers as 
having a duty to  act as a ‘moral witness’ to the past. Some commentators suggest that  
Holocaust survivors, for instance, should  consider themselves, as  spokespersons  for those 
who did not survive the camps and whose stories could not therefore otherwise be told, not 
in the sense of offering an eyewitness account of their suffering but as someone who, by 
describing their own suffering, and in some sense death, also bears witness to the fate of 
those who did not survive (Horowitz, Greenspan et al., 2014).  The notion of moral witnessing 
may appear ethically compelling but, as Sara Horowitz points out,  instrumentalizing  testifiers 
as quasi-religious witnesses from history  risks diminishing  a more powerful ethical 
imperative that survivor accounts should represent ‘a confrontation with radical 
demonization, evil and suffering that cannot easily be absorbed or explained’ (ibid. :205)   
Listeners or readers might for example be tempted to invest the testifier with a wisdom, or 
moral stature that implies that her suffering had been ‘worthwhile, purposeful, and 
ennobling, rather than random, outrageous and meaningless’ (ibid.). Lawrence Langer 
likewise declares that the ‘shrunken moral universe’ of survivors ’full of ambiguities 
concerning the basis for personal conduct, mocks conceptual efforts, from Plato to the 
present, to determine the relationship between duty and the good life, what it is right to do 
and what it is good to be’ (Langer, 1991; 198).  And Primo Levi famously declared in The 
Drowned and the Saved that the survivors of the camps like himself were not in any event the 
true witnesses to the experience of being an inmate of such a camp, since by surviving they 
had not, unlike the ‘drowned,’ undergone, the final terrible stage of that experience -   that 
of actually dying. Nevertheless, whatever can be said about experiences such as that of 
Auschwitz, beyond the purely factual, is best said in the voice of the survivors, for they alone 
are able to speak the language of catastrophe as a ‘mother tongue’- one whose vocabulary is 
founded in the catastrophic experience itself  rather than an attempted intellectual, moral, or 
emotional appreciation of it. 
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   This leads us to address the issue of narrativization in catastrophe testimony, and especially 
in catastrophe testimony in autobiographical form.  Whilst the question of the content of such 
testimony -  what is remembered -   may be a matter for psychologists and cognitive scientists, 
the question of presentation – how and in what form it is remembered – is a cultural question.  
It is determined by such factors as the personal qualities and experiences of the testifier, his 
or her objectives in testifying, the period of time which may have elapsed between the 
catastrophic experience and the time of writing about it,  the testifier’s state of mind at the 
time of writing, and not least by the testifier’s literary preferences and talents as a writer.  
The documentary or anecdotal  accounts of Freedman and Kluger, for example, are quite 
different from the essayistic accounts of Améry or the poetic accounts of Delbo, and the 
urgent accounts of Delbo and Levi written shortly after their liberation and return home are 
quite different from the more reflective accounts of their experiences written decades later.  
Some of the best examples, at least in my opinion, of catastrophe testimony are also found in 
the form of fictionalised autobiography, such as in some of the works of Imre Kertesz.  I  would 
therefore argue that catastrophe testimony should always be read in the context of the 
testifier’s personal and cultural identity and objectives, which is why I have provided  some 
brief biographical data for each of the testifiers whose works are featured herein.  
    Finally, I want to emphasise that this Chapter, and this dissertation more generally, are 
concerned specifically with survivor testimonies - that is  products of the episodic memories 
of  past events and experiences and the post-traumatic  social, political, cultural and moral 
experiences and perspectives of their authors.  Unfortunately, this precludes the inclusion  of 
studies of  accounts of those victims  who did not survive:  for example, the diaries and other 
records kept by numerous inhabitants of the Warsaw Ghetto collected in the so called 
‘Ringelblum Archive’38, or the writings sometimes called the ‘Scrolls of Auschwitz’ -  the 
testaments written by members of the Sonderkommando39 at Auschwitz-Birkenau and buried 
in contemplation of their impending death, and subsequently  found amid the ruins of  
Crematoria II and III at Birkenau.  I would emphasise, however, that this omission should not  
                                                            
38 A collection of about 6,000 essays, diaries, drawings, posters and other documents produced between 1939 
and 1943 chronicling the life of inhabitants of the Warsaw Ghetto described by Annette Wievorka in Greenspan 
and others, 2014, page 213. 
39 Notably those of Zalman Gradowski, Zalman Lewenthal and Leyb Langfus.  Gradowski was killed either in the 
course of the Sonderkommando ‘uprising’ of July 1944, or in retaliation for it, and Lewenthal, and Langus were 
probably killed in November of that year (Chare and Williams, 2015: 7). 
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be construed in any way as a judgment that such contemporary records are of lesser historical 
or moral value or importance than survivor testimonies. Their moral and historical value or 
importance is immense, but of a different kind.40  There is certainly no question, as Chare and 
Williams (2015) point out, of Sonderkommando members being somehow rendered incapable 
of reliably bearing  witness to the events in which they participated, as evidenced by the fact 
that survivors who had been members did testify at the trial of the former Auschwitz 
Commandant, Rudolf Höss, in 1947, and at the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial 1963-5.   
       In conclusion, I want to emphasize that the fact that I deal with the experiences of rape 
and torture, on the one hand, and imprisonment in Auschwitz on the other, in separate 
chapters does not imply that there are necessarily existential or experiential differences 
between the two.  Indeed rape and torture are not necessarily private acts, and personally 
directed atrocities are not infrequently committed against victims of collective atrocities. 
Karyn L. Freedman (2014), for example, discusses instances of collective sexual violence 
against women and children employed as a weapon of war in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo during her time there in 2008-9,  including rape and vaginal mutilation, as well as more 
‘routine’ demands for sex in return for money or goods needed by victims for their survival.  
She speaks in particular of hearing accounts of such public humiliations as gang rape, or 
fathers being forced to publicly rape their daughters, or sons their mothers. These, she notes, 
were aimed not only at the physical and psychological humiliation, degradation, and 
destruction of individual victims, but more broadly at the terrorisation of groups, and the 
destruction of the social fabric of families and communities, which were objectives equally, 






                                                            
40  There are many studies of such testimonies.  In relation to the Scrolls of Auschwitz, see, for example, the 
extensive treatment in Chare and Williams, (2015).   
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   8.2  Karyn L. Freedman: One Hour in Paris.  A Story of Rape and its Aftermath  
   Freedman’s own traumatic experience occurred in August 1990, when she was violently and 
brutally raped at knifepoint both vaginally and anally in an apartment in Paris over a period 
of approximately one hour, with the physical violence being accompanied by constant death 
threats.  Her attacker was someone whom she had never previously met- a man who was 
sharing the apartment with a close friend  who had invited her to stay with him, but was 
absent at the time of the attack. Freedman records that after the attack she  exhibited a 
number of the typical symptoms of what she was later to come to know as PTSD, such as 
hyperarousal, a constant stream of flashbacks, sleeplessness, shallowness of breathing and 
also an inability to feel safe, even in public places in broad daylight-  a response  manifesting 
the disconnect between what the survivor rationally knows to be true of such a situation and 
her autonomic bodily response to being in it. Although these symptoms persisted, it was 
almost a decade before she ‘came out’ as a rape survivor, other than to her family and closest 
friends, and sought psychotherapy for her condition.  A sense of shame and embarrassment 
in disclosing the humiliating nature of her experience  was a material factor in this delay. This 
included her fear of being judged according to the ‘dominant worldview’ prevalent at the time 
that the world is a basically safe place for women who are sufficiently careful and intelligent, 
and that accordingly she must have carelessly and stupidly contributed to, or even 
collaborated in her fate. 
     The biggest lesson she learned from her own recovery process, Freedman said, was that 
‘in order to break free from the hold of the memory of a traumatic experience you first have 
to live in it’ – to ‘consciously revisit the memory of the experience and move through it’ 
(Freedman, 2014: 95). In the course of that process, she found that whilst certain memories 
of her experience remained ‘crystal clear’, and  permanently etched in her memory , such as 
her assailant’s ‘demonic’ laughter, and the look of distraction in his eyes  as he traced a knife 
across her naked breasts, she also experienced what is known as ‘dissociative amnesia’, or 
‘traumatic blocking’-  in relation to other details of her experience (ibid. :104-5).  These 
dissociated memories, she notes, cannot be integrated into declarative memory, which is the 
part of memory which structures life narratives, but they  either survive as flashbacks or some 
form of somatic remembering, or remain repressed, even after undergoing psychotherapy. 
She could not, for example, recollect  being taken to hospital after being raped, or the fact 
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that she had been assaulted on two separate occasions by her attacker, until she read 
evidence of these facts in contemporary  police files. 
    The single most important thing that we can learn about psychological trauma, says 
Freedman, is that it is permanent - that the images it has imprinted on the survivor’s mind 
never go away, no matter how hard she tries to get rid of them, and so she never fully recovers 
from her chronic traumatic condition.  The best she can do is to try to manage the condition, 
which Freedman herself  clearly made determined efforts to do, including revisiting the 
building in which she was raped, almost twenty years after the event.  This is a process 
neuroscientists call ‘episodic reconsolidation’ which is said by some to stabilize the memory 
by converting short-term memories into long-term memories, so that recollection of the 
traumatic experience reconsolidates ‘with new  emotional information’, theoretically 
enabling the survivor to live more easily with the trauma of what happened (ibid. :161-2).  
Despite her efforts, though, Freedman reports, even twenty-four years after the event she 
continues to experience ‘flare-ups’, as well as remissions, of her  post-traumatic condition, as 
in the case of any chronic illness.  The images of her experience, she declares, have not gone 
away; even in periods of remission they persist, and ‘are easily provoked by signs of 
dissonance in my life’ (ibid. :180). It is when the two parts of her ‘shattered self’ collide that 
the debilitating nature of her condition is most exposed. 
     Freedman’s account of a rape survivor’s loss of trust in the world- her ‘shattered world 
view’ as she calls it- is foreshadowed in her earlier ( 2010) account summarized in Section 7.3 
above, written from her own experience, but more as an essayistic study of the subject.  Her 
autobiographical book, though, is altogether more personal and visceral.  ‘Whether to go 
public with her story’, she opines in 2014, ‘is one of the toughest decisions a rape survivor 
faces’ The survivor’s sense of vulnerability, shame, embarrassment, and the feeling she 
should have been able to prevent the attack, are all reinforced by the dominant world view 
of rape victims she had assimilated. Yet ‘ keeping our rape stories secret lowers the decibel 
level on the magnitude of the problem and perpetuates the idea that rape happens 
somewhere else, to someone else’, thus both making the victim complicit in covering up the 
realities of sexual violence in society, and internalizing her experience as a personal, rather 
than a social, problem (ibid. :77).  The shattering of the victim’s world view, she adds, is not a  
consequence of every traumatic experience, but it is a common experience of survivors of 
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traumatic experiences involving interpersonal violence, which change our understanding of 
human nature, and the world. 
   8.3  Jean Améry.   A  Preliminary Excursus. 
   The essays published in At the Mind’s Limits  were never intended to be read as a narrative 
of Améry’s life. He supplied only such biographical data as he deemed necessary  to elaborate 
their themes, and the fact that the essays were written as radio broadcasts lasting for one 
hour only  allowed little time for autobiographical digression. Consequently, before examining 
his essays in greater detail, I want to firstly to elaborate the two latent autobiographical 
strands which run through them, which essentially reflect Améry’s two ‘selves’. 
    The first of these is his  cultural self - that of   left-wing  intellectual and socially and 
politically engaged humanist of Austro- German cultural and educational background, and a 
German writer whose philosophical foundations were rooted in the neo-positivist philosophy 
of the Vienna Circle, with traces of his prior attachment to German  rural romanticism.  This 
remained his dominant intellectual identity throughout his life, though it became refracted 
through a post-war attachment to Sartrean existentialism, which he adopted as his own 
survivalist philosophy41. This is the Améry who, despite living in permanent self-exile in 
Brussels after 1945, and adopting a francophone-sounding name, addresses his essays  
specifically to his fellow German intellectuals, and sees the legacy of the years of the Third 
Reich as their problem as well as his,  and dreams ‘absurdly’ that they may be addressed by 
them and him together.  
   The second of Améry’s selves was his Jewish self, or rather the Jewish identity he finds 
himself needing to adopt, having declared that despite having ‘masqueraded in ‘white half 
socks and leather breeches’ as a German youth, he had never been one, nor a German man 
(Améry, 1999: 82). Therefore, he said, he must be a Jew, even though he did not want to be 
one, because one he must be something.  He will be a Jew who possesses no ‘positive 
determinants’ of Jewishness beyond that of being a Jewish victim of Nazism.  Améry calls this 
                                                            
41 Améry refers to Sartre as a ‘father figure’ (Améry, 1984: 18), and Heidelberger-Leonard calls Sartre the 
‘midwife’ to his post-war philosophical rebirth ( Heidelberger-Leonard, 2010: 115).  My own sense  of Sartre’s 
function in Améry’s life is that of a kind of  philosophical  ‘life-coach’, though the two men never actually met.   
Améry’s own summary of Sartre’s philosophy was: ‘Man is only what he makes of himself.  Man is free.  Man is 
socially committed’, which clearly signals, in its antithetical relationship to his experiences as a victim, a kind of 
action plan for remaking himself. (Améry, 1964: 27).  
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identity that of an ‘Auschwitz Jew’.  He declares to religious Jews who do not consider him to 
be Jewish that the Auschwitz tattoo on his forearm  is ‘more binding than basic formulas of 
Jewish existence’ (Améry, 1999: 94), and  to Germans that it is the legitimate source of his 
resentments against them concerning the past and present, and of his right to the address 
them as a ‘vehemently protesting Jew’. It was more than a decade later, however, in his  1977 
essay ‘Mein Judentum’  (translated as ‘Being a Jew’’ (Améry, 1984: 11-20)), written less than 
two years before his suicide,  that Améry finally  defined in more concrete terms the 
determinants of his identity as an Auschwitz Jew -  that in Auschwitz he had been forced to 
relinquish his ‘falsely proud consciousness’ of himself as a resistance fighter for that of a Jew. 
‘The Jew’, he wrote, was the sacrificial animal. He had to drink the cup, down to the bitter 
end.  I drank.  And this became my Jewish being’. ‘Judaism was another matter’, he added.  ‘I 
had nothing to do with it’ (Améry, 1984: 17).  
     Next, I want to underline the connection between Améry’s decision to write  the first of his  
Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne essays, on his experience of Auschwitz, and the 
commencement, in December 1963, of a major trial in Frankfurt of various former Auschwitz 
SS personnel,  including the notorious torturer Wilhelm Boger, inventor of the ‘Boger swing’ 
in which helpless victims were suspended in great pain upside down exposing their buttocks 
and genitals to beatings with whips and clubs (Pendas, 2006: 98-99).42  It has to be said that 
the trial did not turn out to be the seismic didactic event that Améry and others would have 
wished for.  Many participants and observers were in fact dismayed with some aspects of the 
proceedings, including the disrespectful and intimidating treatment of witnesses by the 
defendants’ lawyers,  the indifference and inattention of many spectators, and the leniency 
of many of the sentences pronounced on the guilty. Nevertheless, the trial, which lasted for 
twenty months, presented Améry with the ideal contemporaneous backdrop for his 
intellectual and moral assault on the consciousness of  his listeners, and later his readers, and 
particularly those who had either  been born after 1945 , or had been too young to have been 
infected by the zeitgeist of the Nazi era, from whom the truth about what occurred during 
the years 1933-45 had been largely withheld.  Moreover, despite its evident flaws, the trial 
                                                            
42 Pendas  records that  twenty-four defendants were originally charged, of whom  twenty-two were declared 
fit to be tried,  with twenty of them remaining at the end of the trial.  They ranged in rank from Sturmbannführer 
(Major) to Sturmann (Private), including four former members of the camp’s ‘medical service’. The trial lasted 
from December 1963 until August 1965, and involved 359 witness testifying in person, of whom 211 were former 
inmates -   90 Jews, 4 ‘gypsies’, 104 political prisoners and 13 criminal prisoners (Pendas, 2006:100-102).  
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and the often sensationalist media coverage which accompanied it undoubtedly had, as  Irène 
Heidelberger-Leonard observes, some social and didactic significance for the German people 
as a whole.   Most of all, it dispelled the myth that the atrocities committed by the Third Reich 
had been the responsibility of a small ‘Hitler clique’, and fuelling the  political debate 
concerning the extension of the legal limitation period for the prosecution of war crimes 
under German law (Heidelberger-Leonard, 2010: 138-9). Améry’s self-styled ‘tactless’ assault 
on German consciousness of the Nazi era in his essay Resentments, roughly coincided with 
the conclusion of the Frankfurt trial.  
       I also want to underline the fact that Améry’s profound sense of social disconnection and 
existential isolation as a survivor, and loss of trust in the world, ultimately represented the 
cumulative physical and psychological legacy of nearly two years of horrific experiences 
imprisonment.  These included not only his torture, and his time in Auschwitz, but also to the 
intervening months of his imprisonment in Fort Breendonk, which he described as  a ‘small 
concentration camp’, originally for Jewish prisoners, but largely during Améry’s time there for  
political prisoners and members of resistance groups.  Though he does not deal with this 
period with in his essays, it is clear that conditions in Fort Breendonk, where Améry was held 
in solitary confinement from July to November 1943,  were brutal, and life threatening -  so 
much so that he attempted to commit suicide during his imprisonment.43  A report on those 
conditions compiled by the US Army (Headquarters, 21 Army Group) in December 1944 notes 
that solitary cells, in which some prisoners, including Améry, were held, often in handcuffs or 
shackles, measured only 1.95 metres by 1.37 metres and contained only a wooden board for 
a bed which was kept upright from reveille until bedtime, and a latrine bucket.  The prisoners’ 
sole form of exercise was  emptying their latrine buckets once a day44.   Améry’s torturer, 
whom his essay names as ‘Lt Praust’, but is identified in the Report as ‘Lt Prauss’, was, the 
Report notes, ‘considered one of the most brutal of the Guards’ (Report: 54-5), and was  
personally responsible for the deaths of many prisoners (ibid. : 46).  Prauss is cited in the 
testimonies of survivors as one of the ‘greatest brutes’ in the camp, whose ‘cruelty passed all 
belief’ along with the Flemish SS guard Wyss (Weiss), who is probably the guard identified by 
Améry as the ‘SS-man Wajs from Antwerp, a repeated murderer and an especially adroit 
                                                            
43 Améry’s suicide attempt is mentioned by Heidelberger-Leonard (Heidelberger-Leonard, 2010: 43). 
44 Report on German Atrocities by Headquarters, 21 Army Group’, authored by ‘B.L.A., December 1944’, archived 
at The Wiener Holocaust Library, 27 Russell Square, LondonWC1 5DP, Archives Doc 1990. 
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torturer’ in his essay ‘Resentments’ (Améry, 1999: 70). Thus, it is only by taking into account 
the three experiences- torture, imprisonment at Fort Breendonk, and Auschwitz- that the full 
extent of Améry’s persecution, his suffering, and hence the incredibility of his ultimate 
survival can be fully understood.   
   Finally, I want to emphasize  Améry’s  longstanding dedication to the cause of left-wing 
social and political activism, beginning with his verbal and physical confrontations with fascist 
students at Vienna University, and his participation in the unsuccessful  12-15 February 1934 
uprising in support of the Republican Defence Corps against the Austrian Clerico-Fascist forces 
(Heidelberger-Leonard, 2010: 26). As a pamphlet published in English around March 1944  on 
behalf of the Austrian Freedom Front, whose Brussels group Améry joined, reveals, that group 
also intended to establish ‘guerilla units’ of resistance fighters in the Austrian countryside, 
primarily in the mountains of Tyrol, Carinthia, and Styria, after the example of Tito’s Yugoslav 
partisans.45. Unfortunately the stirring portrait of the Front which the pamphlet paints is 
rather spoiled by Améry’s ironically downbeat assessment of his own resistance work,  which 
greatly displeased his former comrades.  It involved, he recalled, the production of ‘rather 
primitive agitation material’ which he now believed the vast majority of the intended 
recipients ‘merely obediently passed on to their superiors who in turn passed them on to the 
Gestapo’ (Améry, 1999; 24).   
       Améry’s  moral and personal courage is thus more than evident.   Sidney Rosenfeld, the 
co-translator of At the Mind’s Limits, speaks of his’ uncompromising ethos of militant 
humanism’, adding that as ‘a victim, confronted with the immorality of history,’ Améry 
‘revolted against it, first as a member of the Resistance, then, after the war, a writer-
intellectual engagé, in the cause of his fellow victims and the threatened and injured 
individual altogether’ (Améry, 1999: 108). W.G. Sebald also pointed out the courageous 
nature of Améry’s determination to face down the hostile reception to his essays he received 
from some Germans concerning his depiction of the illegitimacy of German public 
consciousness of the past,  concluding, that: 
Améry is still the only one who denounced the obscenity of a psychologically and 
socially deformed [German] society, and the outrage of supposing that history could 
                                                            
45 This document is also available in the Wiener Library, in their Microfilm Archive. 
137 
proceed on its way afterwards almost undisturbed, as if nothing had happene’ (Sebald, 
2003: 158). 
  Yet the description of Améry’s essays which remains uppermost in my mind is that of his 
fellow survivor, the Hungarian novelist and Nobel  prize winner, Imre Kertész, in his 1992 
homage to  Améry, which emphasises the profundity of their humanism: 
‘Whenever he writes of his alienation, his loss of ‘faith in the world’, his social 
loneliness and existential exile, Améry in my view goes beyond the narrowly defined 
framework of his book and addresses, quite simply, the human condition of the era’ 
(Kertész, 2011: 74).   
    8.4.  Jean Améry: A Story of Torture and Its Legacy 
    One of the notable features of Améry’s account of being tortured and its aftermath in the 
context of this dissertation is its similarity in some respects with Freedman’s later account of 
being raped and its aftermath. Just as Freedman had been left with a lasting and largely 
irremediable sense of shame and humiliation at what she remembers as her  surrender  to 
her assailant, for example, Améry  clearly feels ashamed and humiliated when he remembers, 
in his  essay Torture, his ‘surrender’ to his torturer in the form of  his  invented, nonsensical 
‘confession’ of his resistance activities, going so far as to suggest that : 
    ‘If instead of the aliases  [of his co-Résistants] I had been able to name real names, perhaps, 
or probably, a calamity would have occurred, and I would be standing here now as the 
weakling I most likely am, and as the traitor I potentially already was’ (Améry, 1999: 36). 
 Speaking of the legacy of those fateful hours, he added: ‘It is still not over.  Twenty- two years 
later I am still dangling over the ground with dislocated arms, panting and accusing myself’ 
(ibid).  
    In the final paragraph of his essay, Améry also offers a much more graphic version of 
Freedman’s ‘shattered world view’ as a survivor of torture: 
‘Whoever has succumbed to torture can no longer feel at home in the world.  The 
shame of destruction cannot be erased.  Trust in the world, which already collapsed 
in part at the first blow [under interrogation by the Gestapo], but in the end, under 
torture, fully, will not be regained.  That one’s fellow man was experienced as the 
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antiman remains in the tortured person an accumulated horror.  It blocks the view 
into a world in which the principle of hope rules. One who was martyred is a 
defenceless prisoner of fear----and also what is called resentments’ (ibid. : 40). 
     These apparent similarities between the psychological and emotional responses of 
Freedman and  Améry are even more  noteworthy  in the  light  of the vast difference between 
the circumstances and nature of their respective experiences and their aftermaths.  Améry, 
for instance, clearly knew what he was getting into as an illegal refugee and former internee 
working for a resistance organisation in Nazi-occupied Brussels whose members were  being 
actively hunted down by the security forces, and if arrested, would inevitably be tortured. 
Moreover, whilst Freedman clearly felt a sense of shame, or guilt, about  having, as she saw 
it, given her attacker what he wanted,  Améry had survived his  torture without disclosing to 
his torturer any genuine information concerning the group’s members or operations (albeit 
because he didn’t possess it). Why, then, did Améry insist that his experience was so 
shameful, humiliating, and personally devastating? 
   The answer which emerges from  Améry’s own account is his recognition, perhaps for the 
first time, how completely and easily his  mental, physical and moral  powers of resistance 
had been overwhelmed by the pain of his torture.  Heidelberger-Leonard records that in 1945, 
at the beginning of  the short euphoric period that followed  his liberation, Améry had written 
an unpublished ‘fragment’ of a novel he called ‘The Fortress of Derloven’, which contained a 
fictionalised version of his experience, in which his fictional alter  ego, Althager, is tortured 
but heroically succeeds in witholding information which might give his comrades away by 
‘tricking’ his torturers with ‘fairy tales’ - a triumph of mind over body (Heidelberger-Leonard, 
2010:150).  This is perhaps how he would have liked to imagine his own experience, but in 
writing his 1965 essay his memory had instead retrieved the reality of what he had 
experienced - that he had been traumatized, even before his torture, by his sense of 
helplessness under the blows of his Gestapo interrogators (which he actually compared to 
being raped), and subsequently mentally annihilated by the extreme pain of torture.  It is, I 
believe, the indelibility of that memory to which he refers when he declares that  ‘torture is 
the most horrible event a human being can retain within himself’ (Améry, 1999:22).  Even in 
1965, it is only after much philosophical discursion that Améry can bring himself to  describe,  
briefly as he can, what actually happened to him in the torture room.  His hands are tied 
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behind his back and fixed to a hook on the end of a chain suspended from a pulley, and his 
body  raised off the floor until he hangs one metre above the ground.  He continues: 
  In such a position or rather, when hanging this way, with your hands behind your 
back, for a short time you can hold at a half-oblique through muscular force.  During 
these few minutes, when you are already expending your utmost strength, when 
sweat has already appeared on your forehead and lips, and you are breathing in gasps, 
you will not answer any questions.  Accomplices?  Addresses?  Meeting places?  You 
hardly hear it.  All your life is gathered in a single limited area of your body, the 
shoulder joints, and it does not react; for it exhausts itself completely in the 
expenditure of energy.  But this cannot last for long, even with people who have a 
strong physical constitution.  As for me, I had to give up rather quickly.  And now there 
was a crackling (sic) and splintering in my shoulders that my body has not forgotten 
until this hour.  The balls sprang from their sockets.  My own body weight caused 
luxation; I fell into a void and now hung by my dislocated arms, which had been torn 
high from behind and were now twisted over my head.  Torture, from Latin torquere, 
to twist.  What visual instruction in etymology!  At the same time, the blows from the 
horsewhip showered down on my body, and some of them sliced cleanly through the 
light summer trousers that I was wearing on this twenty-third of July, 1943.’(ibid.: 32-
3). 
   Despite what Sebald calls ‘this curiously objective’ description of the event (Sebald, 2003: 
156), there is no doubt that of experience of extreme pain, as well as the rapid destruction of 
his intellectual and moral powers of resistance,  was both profoundly traumatic and indelible. 
As Améry himself puts it: 
‘The tortured person never ceases to be amazed that all those things one may, 
according to inclination, call his soul, or his mind, or his consciousness, or his identity, 
are destroyed when there is that cracking and splintering in the shoulder joints.  That 
life is fragile is a truism he has always known - and that it can be ended, as Shakespeare 
says, “with a little pin”.  But only through torture did he learn that a living person can 
be transformed so thoroughly into flesh and by that, while still alive, be partly made 
the prey of death’ (Améry, 1999 :40). 
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      Améry’s suggestion that the experience of extreme pain ‘blots out the contradiction of 
death and allows us to experience it personally’ (ibid. :34) is not as fanciful as it may appear; 
in fact it is  supported by the comparison between pain and death contained in Elaine Scarry’s 
well known 1985 study of torture, in her book The Body in Pain, in which she observes: 
‘Each [torture and death] only happens because of the body.  In each, the contents of 
consciousness are destroyed.  The two are the most intense forms of negation, the 
purest expression of the anti-human, of annihilation, of total aversiveness----
Regardless, then, of the context in which it occurs, physical pain is always a mock 
execution.’ (Scarry, 1985:31). 
      Thus the ‘curiously objective’ and ironic nature of Améry’s description of his torture, both 
Heidelberger-Leonard and Sebald suggest, can be explained by the fact that recollecting and 
recording his experience had strained his composure to breaking point, and objectivity and 
irony were simply a means of retaining his self-control, in the face of the emotional strain of 
that process.  The various metaphors and similes with which Améry intersperses his account 
of his torture, notes Heidelberger-Leonard, ‘are nothing but a kind of all-purpose glue because 
no power of imagination is adequate to verbalize such a monstrous experience’ 
(Heidelberger-Leonard, 2010: 151).  Sebald similarly notes that: ‘It is as if every fragment of 
memory touched a sore point, as if [Améry] were compelled to ward off everything 
immediately and translate it into reflective form to make it measurable by any standard’ 
(Sebald, 2003: 153). Another reason, though, is that  Améry recognized the problem of 
linguistic despair -  that describing sensations such as the pain of torture was simply 
impossible:  
It would be totally senseless to try and describe here the pain that was inflicted on 
me.  Was it “like a red- hot iron in my shoulders,” and was another “like a dull wooden 
stake that had been driven into the back of my head”?  One comparison would only 
stand for the other, and in the end we would be hoaxed by turn on the hopeless merry-
go-round of figurative speech.  The pain was what it was.  Beyond that there is nothing 
to say.  Qualities of feeling are as incomparable as they are indescribable.  They mark 
the limits of language to communicate. (Améry, 1999: 33).  
This is by no means an unusual view among victims of torture.  As Roger Crisp observes: 
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Not (I hope) having been tortured, you might want to ask one of its victims just how 
bad it is. Unfortunately, it is common for such victims to say that is impossible to 
convey this badness.  Jacobo Timerman, for example, who was tortured in Argentina, 
said: “In the long months of confinement, I often thought of how to transmit the pain 
that a tortured person undergoes.  And always I concluded that it was impossible.  It 
is pain without points of reference, revelatory symbols, or clues to serve as 
indicators.”(Crisp,2021: 3). 
     The question remains why Améry’s account of his experience, from his initial arrest by the 
Gestapo to his torture, consistently emphasizes his helplessness and weakness in the face of 
his captors, and the shame and humiliation which the memory of it provoked in him – why, 
when it might seem more natural for him to have sought to portray himself in the best light, 
he deemed it  imperative to make  his listeners and readers understand that a ‘slight pressure  
by the tool-wielding hand’  can turn the victim into ‘a shrilly squealing piglet at slaughter’, and 
that unlike the ‘unforgettable Jean Moulin’, who was tortured to death without breaking his 
silence, it was probably only luck which had prevented him from betraying his comrades.  I 
believe it was partly because Améry valued truth above everything, and partly because he did 
not want to reduce the impact on his audience  of the horror of his experience, but this is 
conjecture.  
      Elaine Scarry’s examination of the relational dynamics between the torturer and his victim, 
though, written twenty years after that of Améry, very much bears out Améry’s account of 
his experience. Scarry notes that the vast majority of acts of torture are not in fact primarily 
motivated  by the need to extract information, though torture rarely occurs without some 
form of interrogation.  The torturer rather uses the feigned urgency or significance of the 
question to ‘neutralize the moral fact’ of the infliction of intense pain: 
‘In compelling confession, the torturers compel the prisoner to record and objectify 
the fact that intense pain is world-destroying.  It is for this reason that while the 
content of the prisoner’s answer is only sometimes important to the regime, the form 
of the answer, the fact of his answering, is always crucial’ (Scarry,1985: 29). 
      Consequently, the fact that  Améry’s absurd, invented ‘confession’, blurted out purely in 
a desperate attempt to bring an end to his suffering, appeared perfectly satisfactory to his 
captors,  can be readily  explained, on Scarry’s account, by the fact that it was the act of 
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confessing, signalling the successful completion of the process of the destruction of his world, 
rather than the content of his confession, that mattered to his torturers.  By the same token, 
what mattered most to Améry about his confession, when he recollected it, is not whether it 
was true or not, but the fact that he had confessed, and thus surrendered to his torturer’s will 
to dominate and destroy him. The fact that he had given his captors useless information, 
rather than information which might have resulted in the death of numerous comrades, made 
no difference because it had not been due to his physical or moral courage and quick-
wittedness in extremis, like that of Althager, but simply good luck.   
    Améry’s account  of his  loss of trust in the world, though similar in its effect to  Freedman’s  
‘shattered world view’, is much harder to pin down in terms of causation. Freedman’s post-
traumatic disconnection from the world appears relatively straightforwardly rooted in  the 
reality that the world had proved to be an unsafe place for her as a woman, and also in  the 
dichotomy between her knowledge of that reality and what she perceives as the generally 
held belief of societies that the world is only unsafe for women who are insufficiently 
intelligent and careful.   The world, she judges, not only doesn’t keep women safe from the 
threat of sexual violence, but is also reluctant to admit the existence and the extent of that 
threat, and thus resistant to accepting evidence to the contrary.   
    Améry’s account of his loss of trust in the world, though, is somewhat more elusive.  From 
his own description, the fundamental elements of it do not appear, on the face of it, to be 
dissimilar to those of Freedman’s shattered world view; the experience of the forced violation 
of body and mind, of his  helplessness as a victim, and of the absence of any form of social 
protection against  being violated.46 It is the last of these elements, though, which is the most 
problematic.  Améry  describes  the ‘trust in the world’ he has lost as : 
 ‘the certainty that by reason of written or unwritten social contracts the other person 
will spare me- more precisely stated, that he will respect my physical and with it also 
my metaphysical being.  The boundaries of my body are also the boundaries of my 
self.  My skin surface shields me against the external world.  If I am to have trust, I 
must feel on it only what I want to feel’ (Améry, 1999: 28). 
                                                            
46 Of course, although neither Freedman nor Améry were in the strict sense members of the society in which the 
violation occurred, she undoubtedly had social and legal rights to be protected ,as a bona fide visitor from her 
home country, whereas he, as an illegal alien actively resisting the de facto rulers of the country,  did not. 
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          Améry’s expectation of social protection though seems rather at odds not only with the 
circumstances of his arrest and torture, but his entire existence since the day in September 
1935 when he concluded that being three-quarters Jewish had made him a ‘dead man on 
leave, someone to be murdered, who only by chance was not yet where he properly 
belonged’ (ibid. :86). Moreover whatever written or unwritten social contract may have 
existed between him and Austrian society, it had been irreversibly broken in 1938.  Indeed, 
by 1943 he had already been forced to flee for his life into exile,  been twice interned as an 
alien in France and escaped, and had then returned to Brussels where he had been compelled 
to live illegally in hiding for two years.  Moreover, he had become a resistance fighter, and 
thus an enemy of the Third Reich in that capacity as well as being a Jew, and what is more 
one that specifically exposed him to the known, and high, risk of arrest and torture.   Zolkos 
(2010) suggests that Améry’s notion of trust in the world  as expressed in his essay is in fact 
closer to  the post-war continental philosophical notion of ‘being with the Other’- not an 
assumption of the ‘certainty of contractual or reciprocal non-infringement  between the 
Other and the self,’  but rather  trust that  the Other will not act towards me ‘from the premise 
of violence’ (Zolkos, 2010: 56).  This, however, seems just as much at odds with the facts of 
Améry’s situation. The explanation of Améry’s declaration which seems to me to be the most 
plausible is  that he was unconsciously folding into his account what was in reality a much 
wider loss of trust in the world, by conflating the psychological legacy of his torture with as 
yet unwritten, but perhaps already contemplated, legacy of his experience as  a Jewish 
survivor of the Holocaust. This interpretation is in fact supported by Améry’s own confession, 
in his Preface to the First Edition of his book, that when he wrote his essay on his torture ‘it 
was unclear to me what significance should be given to the concept of dignity…..whereas 
later, in the essay on my Jewishness, I believed to recognize that dignity is the right to live 
granted by society’.  He also said that it was only in the process of writing his final essay that 
he came to finally see himself as a specifically Jewish victim (Améry, 1999: xiv).  Perhaps then, 
although he had not yet consciously processed the connection at the time of writing his essay 
on his experience of torture, he was already thinking of his loss of trust in the world in a much 
wider context than that of his torture. 
  In fact, an important underlying distinction between Freedman’s experience and that of 
Améry is that between the experience of personally directed psychopathic violence and 
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institutionally directed systemic violence.  Thus, whilst it was the demonic appearance of her 
attacker which, as she recalls it, was most firmly imprinted on Freedman’s mind, it was the 
ordinariness of Améry’s captors which, as he recalls it, was imprinted on his mind.  It began, 
he said, when it dawned on him that ‘amazingly’, whilst those who arrested him wore leather 
coats and carried pistols, as he had imagined they would, they did not, as he had imagined 
the would, have ‘Gestapo faces’, with ‘twisted noses, hypertrophied chins, pockmarks and 
knife scars’; just plain ordinary faces, like everyone else (ibid: 25).  His  interrogators, and later 
his torturers, he said, were not just psychopathically dis-ordered individuals (though that may 
also have been the case) but ‘bureaucrats of torture’-  servants of  de facto rulers, carrying 
out their ‘ordinary business’, which happened to include the torture and destruction of its 
enemies.  More than that, said Améry, the Nazi torturer, or ‘antiman’, embodied the essence 
of National Socialism itself; it was in torture, he said, that the Third Reich ‘materialized in all 
the density of its being’ (ibid. :30). The torture practised by ‘Hitler vassals’ such as Lt. Praust, 
he argued, though clearly similar in kind to that  practised by torturers in other oppressive 
régimes  both before and after the Third Reich, had not, as in other cases,  been carried out 
in the service of any ‘idea of man’-, such as a religious or ideological philosophy, however 
irrational or cruelly enforced. His torturers wanted rather, through annihilating their victims, 
simply to annihilate the decent and just world they represented. The Nazi torturer, Améry 
argued, thus constituted  the apotheosis of National Socialism because his sadism was of an 
existential rather than a psycho-sexual or socially pathological kind, and thus not only 
evidenced his own depravity, but  the depravity of those he served.  Ultimately, then, Améry’s 
depiction of his loss of trust in the world as a victim of torture is that of a loss of trust in an 
entire concept of society: 
   ‘Amazed, the tortured person experienced that in this world there can be the other 
as absolute sovereign, and sovereignty revealed itself as the power to inflict suffering 
and to destroy.  The dominion of the torturer over his victim has nothing in common  
with the power exercised on the basis of social contracts, as we know it.  It is not the 
power of the traffic policeman over the pedestrian, of the tax official over the 
taxpayer, of the first lieutenant over the second lieutenant.  It is not the sacral 
sovereignty of past absolute chieftains or kings, for even if they stirred fear, they were 
also objects of trust at the same time.  The king could be terrible in his wrath, but also 
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kind in his mercy; his autocracy was an exercise of authority.  But the power of the 
torturer, under which the tortured person moans, is nothing other than the triumph 
of the survivor over the one who is plunged from the world into agony and death’ 
(ibid.  :39-40). 
    Améry’s fellow survivor Imre Kertész, though, was not convinced by Améry’s insistence on 
his   torture having a quintessentially National Socialist character.  Kertesz notes that Améry’s 
world view was first and foremost that of a German writer and philosopher, and that 
consequently in his mind the outrage was felt first and foremost as one specifically 
perpetrated by German Nazism. Kertész himself, on the other hand, who experienced both 
Nazi persecution  as an inmate of Auschwitz and Buchenwald, and subsequently  Soviet 
oppression in post-war Hungary, argues that torture was equally the essence of the ‘hammer 
and sickle’ totalitarian state, and ‘of every absolute raised to the level of the state, every 
dictatorship that swells power to autocracy’ (Kertész, 2011; 69).47 Perhaps Améry truly 
thought otherwise, or perhaps he was pursuing his stated didactic imperative of revealing to 
his German audience ‘the darkest and at the same time most characteristic deeds of the Third 
Reich’ (Améry, 1999: xiv).   
    In any event, it seems evident that the worlds in which  Freedman and Améry lost their 
trust were very different.  This makes the similarities between their respective experiences of 
living with survival - the  residual sense of shame and humiliation, of being isolated and 
alienated not only personally but also socially by their inability to feel secure in the world, and 
of  swimming  against a social tide of scepticism, and even hostility in revealing their 
experiences – even more remarkable. Freedman, I feel, would certainly concur with Améry’s  
conclusion that ‘The experience of persecution was, at the very bottom, that of extreme 
loneliness’ (Améry, 1999:70). 
    Améry, though, had been forced to confront one   very significant existential consequence 
of survival which Freedman did not have to face, which was the loss not only of his homeland, 
                                                            
47 In Kertész, 2011: 57-78.  Originally an essay written in Hungarian and entitled A Holocaust mint kultúra, 
delivered in 1992 as part of the Jean Améry Symposium at the University of Vienna. In a thought-provoking 
aside, Kertesz speculates that living in Communist Hungary after 1945 may have actually saved him from 
committing suicide as a consequence of his wartime experiences, as was to be the fate of Améry, Primo Levi, 
Paul Celan and many other survivors in Western countries, because it allowed him to reclaim his Hungarian 
identity as one of millions of ‘prisoners’ of Soviet communism, rather than remaining an outsider.  Surviving 
one’s survival, he concluded, could thus actually be more difficult in a ‘free’ society, than in a totalitarian one. 
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but also every determinant of what he had previously believed had constituted his personal 
and social identity. Not only had he lost his home, but also his people and his language (the 
regional dialect he had grown up speaking as his mother tongue), and had chosen a life of 
permanent exile, rather than seek to return, or build what he considered to be an inauthentic 
life elsewhere.  Consequentially, the existential and moral chasm between Améry and his  
world was significantly wider than that between Freedman and her world. 
   8.6  Language and Narrativization 
     I briefly introduced the issue of the importance or reading catastrophe testimony in a 
particularist context in Section 8.1 above, including  recognizing the different narrative forms 
in which catastrophe testimony may be produced, and the differences between the works of 
Freedman and Améry are an excellent illustration two very different approaches to presenting 
catastrophe testimony. Freedman’s account is an excellent example of what Améry would 
describe as a ‘documentary’ account : a straightforward, factually informative, yet intimate 
and unflinching, step by step account of what was a clearly a horrific, terrifying, degrading 
and life-threatening encounter with a psychopathic assailant, and its aftermath.  It is set both 
within the context of a chronologically ordered account of her life as a victim and survivor 
from the date of her rape up to the time of writing her account of it, and a wider, academically 
informed, philosophical discussion of trauma and recovery, and the social attitudes towards 
sexual violence towards women. Her declared objective is not only to tell her own trauma 
story, but also to inspire other victims of sexual violence to confront and externalize their own 
experiences, and to radically challenge the social perception of victims of sexual violence  as 
bearers of a shameful ‘dirty secret’ (Freedman, 2014: Prologue, viii-xii). Her language is clear 
and consistent with that of someone on the road, if not to recovery, then at least to 
successfully managing her condition.  
    Améry’s account, on the other hand, is radically different. Apart for those significant 
differences between him and Freedman, and their respective experiences, previously 
examined, Améry was at the time of writing his essays an experienced and stylistically refined 
cultural and political commentator, to whom the reflective, literary, form of the essay was a 
natural medium.  He was also  addressing a very particular audience, and intent on making 
his mark not only as a survivor but also as a writer.  At the same time his essays bear often 
painful witness to a first unaided and unmediated attempt to articulate  and externalize his 
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own trauma story in an era in which psychotherapeutic theory and clinical practices relating 
the treatment of chronic post-traumatic psychological disorders were in a comparatively 
primitive state of development.  As he candidly confessed in his Preface to the first published 
edition of his essays, it was only in the process of writing an account of his experience of 
torture and the other traumas of his life as a victim and survivor of the Third Reich, that he 
actually began to understand his own existential condition.  In his essay on torture, as in his 
later essays, he is continuously grappling with a complex ‘ebb and flow’ presentational 
methodology, interweaving what he called ’personal confession’ with passages of incidental 
philosophical reflection that he referred to in his Preface as ‘meditation’, but which are 
frequently more passionate and emotive than that term implies, wanting to win over his 
audience, yet at the same time keep them at arm’s length and pinned in a moral corner.  And, 
unlike Freedman, he has no story of healing or recovery to offer his audience, whether 
personal or societal.  On the contrary, as the original German title of his book-  ‘Beyond Guilt 
and Atonement’- infers, he is writing against the very possibility of recovery or healing, which 
in his case would mean surrendering to social pressures to forgive and forget past atrocities, 
and ‘move on’.  An essential difference between Freedman and Améry  in this respect is that 
notwithstanding Freedman’s distress and anger concerning social attitudes towards her as a 
rape survivor, it was at least accepted that a serious crime had been committed against her 
by her attacker for which he was criminally tried and punished.  Moreover, despite her sense 
of social disconnection she remained an existential and social insider, and thus able to seek 
to recover her lost personal and social dignity within a generally supportive legal and social  
environment.   Améry, on the other hand, was the victim of a number of crimes which, at the 
time he suffered them, the German people and the wider world were largely reluctant to 
punish, and sometimes even recognize, not least because of their magnitude.  Améry had only 
become legally and socially designated as victim of crime as a consequence of post-war 
multilateral legislative and social initiatives, but as the German title of his book clearly flagged, 
they were not seemingly crimes for which the vast majority of the members of post-war 
German society were prepared to take any personal or even historical responsibility. As he 
said in his essay ‘On the Necessity and Impossibility of Being a Jew’, ‘I was unable to force 
yesterday’s murderers and tomorrow’s potential aggressors to recognize the moral truth of 
their crimes because the world, in its totality, did not help me to do it’,  adding that his 
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individual attempts to persuade contemporary  Germans to  recognize that truth always 
seemed to ‘dissolve in polemics’ (Améry, 1999; 96).      
    The language of  Améry’s essays is thus a reflection of the state of mind in which he found 
himself at that time of writing them; an unapologetic  turbulent,  sometimes angry and 
sometimes despairing  text in which passages of philosophical or socio-political reflection 
seem to serve at least in part as periods of emotional respite both for him and his audience 
from the relentless criticism of himself and them, and in which, at times of the greatest 
emotional pressure he seeks refuge in euphemism and metaphor.  As Sebald points out, the 
engine which powered Améry’s prose was ‘implacable resentment’ concerning the past, and 
resistance to those who sought to concretize it as history: 
   One of the most impressive aspects of Améry’s stance as a writer is that although he 
knew the real limits of the power to resist as few others did, he maintains the validity 
of resistance, even to the point of absurdity. Resistance without any confidence that 
it will be effective, resistance quand même, out of a principle of solidarity with victims, 
and as a deliberate affront to those who simply let the stream of history sweep them 
along, is the essence of Améry’s philosophy (Seebald, 2003: 159-60). 
    8.7   Summary and Observations 
     Freedman’s experience of rape and Améry’s experience of torture both involved deliberate 
and extremely violent assaults against their person which they were helpless to prevent. 
Otherwise the differences between their experiences, and their responses to them, could 
hardly have been greater.  Yet comparing them underlines the fact that, despite these 
differences, the  psychic, emotional and social legacies of their experiences were similar in 
three important respects. The first is the feeling of shame and humiliation at their 
helplessness in the face of the brutal invasion of their minds and bodies - at having 
surrendered, as they saw it, to their assailant. The second is their post-traumatic loss of trust 
in the world, though that loss of trust was differently constituted, and manifested itself in 
different ways.  The third is the existential and moral chasm between them and the post-
traumatic societies they inhabited, caused by their ‘sad privilege’ of knowing the full horror 
of what had happened and might happen again, and the impossibility of  conveying the felt 
experience of their ordeal to those who had not suffered similarly, and thus fully recovering 
their dignity and reclaiming their social status. 
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    A critical element of  Améry’s existential condition as a survivor which differentiates him 
not only from Freedman, but also from his fellow concentration camp survivors Delbo, Levi 
and Kluger, is his decision not only not to return to his former homeland, for quite 
understandable reasons, but also not to seek to emigrate to a new homeland and rebuild his 
life.  He chose, instead, unusually, to remain living in permanent exile in Belgium, which had 
been the site both of his arrest, torture, and deportation to Auschwitz, and also where his 
wife had died whilst in hiding, during his time in Auschwitz.48  Thus his narrative ‘existence’ 
as a writer seems in this sense to have followed his existence in real life. Consequently, when 
Heidelberger-Leonard succinctly observes of his essays that Améry ‘unerringly follows his own 
idiosyncratic path through every individual question raised, a path where only what he has 
experienced and his introspection have the last word, with a subjectivity that is never 
satisfied’, she might equally have been describing his attitude to survival more generally 
(Heidelberger-Leonard, 2010:169). Freedman, was therefore able to contemplate, and seek 
to recover from, her post-catastrophic struggle for survival at a  distance from the scene of 
the crime, and as a self-identified existential insider.  Améry, on the other hand, was still  
thinking through, and living his struggle, even as he wrote about it from his place of self-
imposed exile.  Brussels  was both the site of a crucial part of his traumatic journey and a daily 
reminder of his status as an existential outsider, and the distance which lay between him and 
the identity he was longing to reclaim: that of  a German intellectual and writer.  And that, 
presumably, is how he wanted it. 
  One consolation that Freedman and Améry might, however, have been able to share, if they 
had ever been in a position to exchange accounts of their experiences, is that by assaulting 
them  in an intensely personal way, their assailants had at least been required to acknowledge 
their individuality, even if the objective of their actions had been to degrade, objectify,  and 
dehumanize them.  Victims of  intended collective atrocities such as those held prisoner in 
internment or concentration camps, on the other hand (including of course Améry himself),   
received minimal, or no, individual recognition from their assailants, beyond that of being 
identified by a badge, a star, or a number, as someone to be particularly abused or degraded, 
                                                            
48 Améry ‘s wife Regina had died during his time in Auschwitz, whilst in hiding in Brussels, as the result of a heart 
attack.  He began a relationship with his eventual second wife, Maria, after his liberation, and lived with her for 
the remainder of his life. A detailed account of his post-war existence as a person and a writer can be found in 
Heidelberger-Leonard (2010). 
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or more easily murdered.  The apogee of such experiences of depersonalisation and 
dehumanization must surely be those which occurred in the Auschwitz ‘work’ camps, like 
Monowitz, where the extermination of the inmates, literally by working them to death, was 
not only the consequence of the camp’s regime, but its raison d’être.   How this might have 
affected the nature of the psychological trauma prisoners experienced, their suffering as 


















 CHAPTER 9.  HOW SURVIVORS SEE THEMSELVES AND THE WORLD: AUSCHWITZ AND OTHER 
CAMPS 
  9.1  Introduction 
    There are many places of communal suffering in the world. Even if one narrows them down 
to places of captivity, the choice remains depressingly large: prisons, detention centres,  
internment camps, including concentration camps, and less formal situations in which victims 
are held in collective captivity -  as hostages for ransom, as political bargaining chips, or as sex 
slaves, for example. Those whose testimonies are featured in this chapter survived one of the 
most horrific experiences of collective captivity in recorded history - imprisonment in 
Auschwitz as well as other Nazi concentration or work camps - and thus in testifying to their 
own experiences and those of others,  they were discharging a very heavy historical and moral 
responsibility.  Primo Levi , for example, doubted his moral authority as a survivor to speak of 
the fate of the so-called Müsselmanner -those of his fellow prisoners whose physical and 
spiritual strength declined to the point that they lost the will to survive and let death ‘drown’ 
them.  Yet if he had not given the world his testimony, how much would have been known 
about them or about the fate of the relatively tiny number of Italian prisoners in Auschwitz?  
Levi records that of the convoy of 650 people, including himself, which left the Fossoli 
detention camp for Auschwitz, only 125 people (96 men and 29 women) were sent to work 
in Monowitz and other satellite work camps, the remainder being gassed on arrival, and of 
those 125 people only three, including himself, survived. Who would have spoken for the 
dead Italians if Levi had not done so?  How would we have known,  but for his testimony, that 
the it was the inability of most Italians in Monowitz to speak or understand German, and thus 
swiftly comply with the orders of the SS, that led to them being treated more harshly, and 
being less able to equip themselves with essential survival skills, than other prisoners, and 
thus to survive for shorter periods (Levi, 1989: 72)? 
    Choosing which survivor testimonies to feature in this dissertation has therefore not been 
an easy task.  They are the testimonies of just four people, selected from many extraordinary 
accounts of suffering and survival, all written by truly exceptional human beings.   I have 
chosen them partly because they  have had a particular impact on my own thinking in relation 
to the issues I discuss, and partly because I have tried to present as  broad a picture of the 
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experience of Auschwitz and other camps  as possible.  To this end, I have selected authors 
who arrived there from different places, at different ages, from different backgrounds, and 
who offer different perspectives on their experience of victimhood and survival.  Their  
testimonies were also written at different times during the testifier’s existence as a survivor, 
from the immediate aftermath of liberation to fifty years after the event.  What links them as 
testifiers, beyond their status as former prisoners in Auschwitz and other camps, is what I 
perceive to be a common desire  to  offer their readers, beyond an autobiographical account 
of their own existence,  intellectual and moral insights concerning the existential condition of 
being a victim and survivor of one of the most extreme, if not the most extreme, catastrophic 
experiences of the modern era.  
    I begin with the poignant, lyrical and emotive, yet brutally honest and unsparing, testimony 
of Charlotte Delbo, born 1913, a French, non-Jewish, resistance worker who was arrested in 
Paris in March 1942, together with her husband and fellow resistance worker Georges 
Dudach.  Following her husband’s execution by firing squad, and after spending several 
further months in prison, Delbo was deported in January 1943 to Auschwitz, as one of a group 
of non-Jewish women arrested for anti-German political activities.  She remained in the 
Auschwitz satellite camp  Raisko until January 1944, when she was sent to Ravensbrück, 
where she remained until the end of the war.  The second author is one of the best known  
Auschwitz survivors, Primo Levi, an Italian Jew captured by the Fascist militia as a member of 
a partisan group in December 1943.  Levi was  deported to Auschwitz-Monowitz in February 
1944  and remained there  until liberated by the Russians in January 1945, the camp having 
been been abandoned by the SS some days earlier, and Levi and other  prisoners who were 
too ill to join the ‘death march’ towards Germany  left to die. Levi’s account of his experience 
of Auschwitz is contained in his widely acclaimed  book Se questo un uomo, translated into 
English under the title If This is A Man ,( or,  in the American edition, Survival in Auschwitz),  
written shortly after his liberation and originally published in 1947, but republished to far 
greater acclaim in 1958, and thereafter translated into several languages, including German.  
Levi’s other work examined in this chapter is his essayistic  work  I Sommersi e i salvati, written 
in 1986 and   translated into English under the title The Drowned and the Saved.  The third 
survivor featured in this chapter is  Jean Améry whose story has already been briefly 
recounted.  The last author featured is  Ruth Kluger,  whose memoir Landscapes of Memory, 
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was not written until more than fifty years after her survival.  Kluger was a Jewish- Austrian 
poet, writer and academic, born in 1931, who was deported from Vienna to Theresienstadt 
in 1942 with her mother.  She was eventually sent from Theresienstadt to the Theresienstadt 
Family Camp in Auschwitz-Birkenau in May 1944, before being sent to the Christianstadt 
forced labour camp,  in Lower Silesia, six weeks later.  She eventually escaped with her mother 
in February 1945 during  a forced march westwards from the abandoned labour camp, and 
surreptitiously joined the procession of  members of the former German population of Lower 
Silesia fleeing from the advancing Russian army.  Her story of victimhood and survival is 
especially extraordinary in the light of her age at the time.  All of the works cited above reveal 
some aspects of the epistemological, existential and moral chasm between their authors and 
the world, but, as will be seen, very different responses to their situation.   
       9.2  Charlotte Delbo: A Sisterhood of Pain, Loss and Comradeship 
Charlotte Delbo’s best known work in English translation, Auschwitz and After (1995) 
comprises a trilogy of works: None of Us Will Return (Aucune de nous ne reviendra), written 
in 1946, but not  published until 1965, Useless Knowledge (Une connaissance inutile), written 
in 1946/7 but not published until 1970, and The Measure of our Days (Mesure de nos jours),  
published in 1970. In addition, I will draw on her  last work, Days and Memory (La mémoire et 
les jours), published in 1985, the year of her death, in which Delbo  retrospectively addresses 
her experience of surviving Auschwitz, and particularly the issue of remembering a traumatic 
past. 
   In his valuable Introduction to Auschwitz and After, Lawrence Langer notes that one of 
Delbo’s favourite expressions was ‘Il faut donner à voir’, which he translates as ‘they must be 
made to see’49.  As Langer points out her objective is to reveal to her readers ‘the way it really 
was’ - to ‘explain the inexplicable’.  She neither eschews physical descriptions of her 
experiences, as Améry does, nor attempts to treat them in a measured, or objective way, like 
Levi, but confronts the reader with the full horror of them.  
                                                            
49Jennifer Geddes alternatively suggests ‘I want to make it seen’, or ‘I want to make them see’ (Geddes, 2003: 
114, fn.2). 
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   Delbo’s concept of traumatic memory, and the divided self, is particularly pertinent to this 
dissertation.  In Days and Memory, she  uses the analogy of a snake shedding its skin to 
describe how her Auschwitz self and her survivor self  have come to be separately represented 
in her mind during her life as a survivor.  As a survivor, she recalls, she  managed after a few 
years to shed her Auschwitz ‘skin’, as a snake would shed its old skin,  after growing what she 
hoped would be an impermeable  new existential  skin in which she could  present herself as 
a survivor to the world. Her new skin enclosed a ‘common memory’ of Auschwitz- an episodic 
and semantic memory through which her experience of Auschwitz could be re- presented to 
those who had never experienced it as part of her past life. Unlike in the case of a snake, 
however, Delbo found that her old skin remained alive ‘next to her’ and continued to  enclose 
her internalized ‘deep memory’ of her Auschwitz experiences, rather than shrivelling and 
dying.  For as long as the old skin remained intact, its deep memory contents would not spill 
out and disturb her life as a survivor, and she knew she would be able to continue  recollecting 
her experience of Auschwitz exclusively via her common memory.  But she found that, though 
the old skin was tough, it sometimes gave way, revealing the contents of her deep memory, 
usually in nightmarish dreams over which her consciousness had no power, and in which the 
past recurred not in words but in the form of  sensory imprints of her original pain and 
suffering, which lasted until she cried out and woke herself back into consciousness.  And 
after each such episode, Delbo says, she found that she needed to  wait  some days,  until the 
skin around her deep memory, and thus her Auschwitz self, hardened and became 
impermeable once more, so that she was once again  able to speak of Auschwitz without 
exhibiting any anxiety or emotion, in language provided by her common memory,  as opposed 
to reliving them.  Delbo’s attempt to circumvent the existential and moral chasm between 
her Auschwitz self and the world by creating a new  survivor self, and linking that self to the 
world instead, though successful to an extent, had failed to seal off the unconscious memorial  
bridge from her present self  to her Auschwitz  self. The negative forces of trauma, in other 
words, had proved more powerful than the generativist powers of memory.      
    The capacity for such self-reflective analysis, however, only comes after many years of 
experience, and in 1946/7, when Delbo wrote None of Us Will Return, and Useless Knowledge, 
her mood was far from reflective – her only imperative was to make others understand  the 
reality of what she and her comrades had endured. The form and language of these works is 
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very different from that of Améry or Levi -   Langer describes it as a ‘unique blend of poetry 
and prose, resulting in a lyrical rendering of atrocity that is alarmingly beautiful, an aesthetics 
of agitation.’ (Delbo,1995: xvi).  In None of Us Will Return, in particular, which comprises a 
series of anecdotal and poetic portrayals of the daily horrors of existence in Auschwitz, Delbo,  
Langer notes, ‘shuns the narrative impulse, with its dependence on reflection, and forges 
instead a remarkable style of direct confrontation that lures us into the maelstrom of atrocity 
whilst simultaneously drowning all intellectual defences’ (ibid. : xiv). The following is an 
extract from a piece entitled ‘Thirst’, for example in which, Delbo  describes the perennial 
thirst she felt upon wakening in her barracks: 
Upon wakening in the morning, lips move but no sound comes out.  Anguish fills your 
whole being, an anguish as gripping as that of dreams. Is this what it means to be 
dead?  Lips try to speak but the mouth is paralyzed.  A mouth cannot form words when 
it is dry, with no saliva.  And the gaze drifts off, it is an insane gaze.  The others say, 
“She’s mad.  She’s gone mad during the night”.  They summon words capable of 
recalling reason.  An explanation is owed them, but lips decline to move.  The muscles 
of the mouth want to attempt articulation and do not articulate.  Such is the despair 
of the powerlessness that grips me, the full awareness of the state of being dead (ibid. 
:70).   
   This is what Delbo means when she says she wants to ‘make her readers see’ - to draw them 
immediately and   unreflectively into the brutal and dehumanizing reality of her victimhood. 
In this, her narrative impulses are quite distinct  from those of Améry and Levi, which is 
especially noteworthy in the case of the  latter, whose  book If This Is a Man was being written  
around the same time as the material published in Delbo’s None of Us Will Return, and Useless 
Knowledge.  Levi, too, I feel, wanted to ‘make them see’, but in his own quite different way.  
Regrettably, there is insufficient space in this dissertation to fully explore Delbo’s  
idiosyncratic narrativization of her experience, and since I would categorize everything in 
these two works either as poetry or prose poetry , trying to paraphrase them would be both 
difficult and questionable, but hopefully a few further illustrations can convey at least some 
sense of her witnessing style. 
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  The first is taken from the first of her ‘vignettes’ of Auschwitz  (the term is apposite, even if 
its delicacy grates upon one’s senses, in the light of the subject matter), which are found in 
None of Us Will Return, which is entitled  ‘Arrivals, Departures’.  It describes the arrival of 
deportees at the infamous Auschwitz ramp ‘where those who arrive are those who are 
leaving’ (ibid. 3).  Her account illustrates her ability to convey the unimaginably horrific nature 
of the camp’s ‘logic of destruction’, to borrow Améry’s phrase, in a few selected images.   She 
describes  some of the arrivals in terms which emphasise their unpreparedness for the horror 
which is about to engulf them:  a rabbi who ‘holds himself straight, heading the line. He has 
always been a model for the rest’ (ibid. :6), two sisters who ‘went out for a stroll and never 
got back for dinner’ (Ibid. :7), and a group of boarding school girls in identical uniforms 
‘holding hands, unaware, as though on a regular Thursday school outing’ (ibid.).  In a short 
time, all, or virtually all of them will be gassed and their bodies burned.  The matching pleated 
skirts of the boarding school girls will be worn again, but this time as the ‘uniform’ of members 
of the Auschwitz orchestra playing the Viennese waltzes which the camp Commandant likes 
so much. The orchestra also plays the marches which accompany the prisoners as they leave 
for work in  the fields where they will be screamed at, kicked, beaten  and brutalised all day, 
and greets those who have survived the day and returned to the camp in the evening. 
     Another vignette, ‘One Day’, is a  shocking, yet poetic, account of the murder of a Jewish 
female prisoner on one of Delbo’s work gangs, and an illustration of what Delbo means by her 
insistence that readers must be made to see the reality of Auschwitz. The woman, driven 
crazy by thirst, abandons her labour and madly descends a snowy embankment to eat the 
cleaner snow at the bottom, thus breaking the rule imposed by the SS, before eventually 
dragging herself back up the bank, with the help of another prisoner, to where an SS guard, 
with a dog is waiting for her.  Delbo continues: 
The woman moves forward.  She seems to be obeying an order….The SS has his dog 
on a leash.  Did he give an order, make a sign?  The dog pounces on the woman-   
without panting, growling, barking.  All is silent as in a dream.  The dog leaps on the 
woman, sinks its fangs into her neck.  And we do not stir, stuck in some kind of viscous 
substance which keeps us from making the slightest gesture -  as in a dream.  The 
woman lets out a cry.  A wrenched-out scream.  A single scream tearing through the 
immobility of the plain.  We do not know if the scream has been uttered by her or by 
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us, whether it issued from her punctured throat, or from ours.  I feel the dog’s fangs 
in my throat.  I scream.  I howl.  Not a sound comes out of me.  The silence of a dream. 
The plain.  The snow.  The plain. 
The woman collapses.  One last palpitation and that’s all.  Something snaps.  The head 
in muddy snow is nothing but a stump.  The eyes dirty wounds….. 
The SS pulls on his leash.  The dog lets go.  There is some blood on his muzzle.  The SS 
whistles softly under his breath as he leaves.   (ibid: 28-9). 
      This is just one traumatic experience among many she describes.  Another is the ‘selection’ 
run,  in which the women of her block are forced to participate after an exhausting day of 
forced labour, and following which the fourteen women who ‘fail’ the test are taken away 
and murdered. Many of these stories concern events in Block 25 of the camp barracks, which 
was the block to which prisoners whom the SS determined, for whatever reason, were no 
longer fit to live were taken, and from which they were sent to  the gas chambers.  In one 
account, Farewell, Delbo describes the departure of one such vehicle.  The prisoners , who 
have been howling to the heavens, have been thrown into the trucks and fall silent.  One of 
them looks at the female SS guard, Drexler with hate and a ‘scorn that should kill’.   Drexler 
watches them depart: ‘she waves a farewell and laughs.  She is laughing.  And for a long time 
she keeps on waving goodbye’ (ibid. :51).  In another vignette entitled, ‘Sunday’, the women 
are lined up and forced to run some distance, under the  whips and lashes of the guards, with 
their aprons filled with earth, empty the earth, then repeat the process.  Ostensibly it is to 
make a garden at the camp entrance, but it is also another selection, and Delbo recalls feeling 
sorry  for the Jewish women who are handicapped by their more cumbersome clothing, and 
try to hide themselves among the other prisoners to avoid being singled out for beatings and 
lashings by the guards. Some prisoners who fall are dragged into Block 25, and one Jewish 
woman, her will to live finally extinguished, actually asks to go inside.  The torture continues 
until the SS are satisfied with the level of the soil in the new garden.   
  Finally, here is a short untitled post-liberation poem, in which, it seems to me, Delbo is 
already sensing, at a very early stage in France’s post-war re-imagining of itself, both the 
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stubborn survival of the old, Catholic France and an indifference to the stories of those who 
have returned, and the fate of those who did not: 
You who have wept two thousand years 
for one who agonized for three days and three nights 
 
what tears have you left 
for those who agonized  
for more than three hundred nights and far more than three hundred days 
how hard 
shall you weep for those who agonized through so many agonies and they were 
countless 
They did not believe in the resurrection to eternal life 
And knew you would not weep 
           (ibid. :10)  
   None of Us Will Return, though, reveals at least one aspect of the experience of Auschwitz 
in a more positive light than Levi or Améry, and that is in Delbo’s account of the solidarity, 
and mutual help and support she found among the female prisoners in her barracks.  In her 
vignette ‘Morning’, she recalls how her physical and mental condition deteriorated at one 
stage to the point when her friends believed, probably correctly, that she was sinking into 
madness, and she was becoming increasingly attracted to the prospect of death. Though she 
could remember nothing of that period herself, Delbo  found out later that her companions, 
and especially her comrade Viva, had saved her from herself by constantly ‘slapping her into 
life’. She also recalled how, on one occasion, though exhausted after the day’s labour, the 
women had insisted on carrying the body of two dead comrades back from the fields to the 
camp , and thus giving them a modicum of dignity in death.  Delbo  also speaks movingly of a 
communal spirit of defiance among the members of her group; though constantly tempted 
to give in to death, they not only struggled against it, but helped others to do so, in part so as 
not to give the guards the satisfaction of seeing them die.  One important tool for survival, 
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Delbo reveals in her vignette entitled ‘Lulu’, was talking to one’s comrades about one’s plans 
for going home, since those who stopped believing they were going home were ‘as good as 
dead’:  ‘One had to lend to this possible return home certainty, reality and color by preparing 
for it, conjuring up each and every detail’ she recalls (ibid. :102)  There is no dwelling in Delbo’s 
account, on the other hand, on the female equivalent of the figure of the Müsselmann, 
though there  must have been many women in the camp who were similarly diminished. To 
a great extent this ethos of camaraderie and mutual help is attributable to the strength of the 
‘sisterhood’ of Delbo’s particular group, who, like most of those who had been deported to 
Auschwitz in her convoy, were Communists and thus political prisoners, rather than members 
of Jewish or other ethnic groups, and bound together by their shared history and ethic of 
resistance. Being political prisoners also materially enhanced their prospects of survival, 
compared to those of ‘common’ prisoners from a range of different national, cultural, political 
and religious backgrounds who found themselves with nothing in common other than a 
shared  racial or ethnic fate.  
    The second part of Delbo’s trilogy, Useless Knowledge, mainly concerns the period leading 
up to her liberation, but is notable for two poems at the end.  The first untitled poem is about 
the uselessness of self-knowledge in Auschwitz.  Useless, and also incompatible with survival: 
I know myself through and through 
a knowledge 
born from the depths of despair 
You find out soon enough 
you should not speak with death 
for it is useless knowledge…. 
it is far better to know nothing 
              if you wish to go on living  (ibid. :225). 
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The last poem is entitled ‘Prayer to the Living to Forgive Them for Being Alive’, in which Delbo  
tells those who are once more free to live and love that those who died for their freedom will 
not forgive them if they waste the remainder of their lives.  Do something, she urges them, 
something to justify your existence and your right to carry on enjoying life, and thus their 
sacrifice.  At the same time, she repeats her earlier injunction to herself to unlearn what she 
has learned in the world beyond knowledge ‘for otherwise I clearly see/I can no longer live’ 
(ibid. :230). 
 The final part of Delbo’s trilogy,  The Measure of our Days, published 25 years after her return, 
is about her experience, and that of her former comrades, of  survival.  Delbo  writes of the 
ways in which she and the other survivors among her former comrades have  managed, or 
failed to manage,  the task of post-traumatic existence. The vignettes in this part seem to be 
based on actual conversations or other exchanges, though whether, and how far, these have 
been narrativized by Delbo is unclear.  Her own story of survival is given in another untitled 
poem, in which  she describes herself as facing life ‘as though facing a dress/ I can no longer 
wear’.  She ends that poem by recalling the time when a child spontaneously gave her a flower 
in Sicily and asked her for a kiss: 
There is no wound that will not heal 
I told myself that day 
And still repeat it from time to time 
But not enough to believe it 
          (ibid. :241). 
   There is no doubt that Delbo struggled, like so many others, with the problem of surviving 
survival.  She confesses to being unable to prevent herself from scrutinizing the faces of 
everyone she encounters in her daily life, wondering whether or not they would have helped 
her to survive in Auschwitz, and usually deciding that they wouldn’t, though she knows it is a 
stupid game.  It marks the distance between her and them, and also her distrust of the world.  
As a former political, rather than Jewish prisoner, who has returned to Paris and become a 
respected writer, one might perhaps have expected this sense of disconnection to have been 
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much less , say, than that of Améry, or even Levi, but that does not appear to be the case for 
her, or for her fellow survivors.  Reading their stories, one realises that it is the experience of 
the concentration camp, and especially a death camp, which both creates the 
epistemological, existential and moral chasm and ensures its unbridgeability, whatever the 
background of the survivor.  Jorge Semprun,  the renowned Spanish author, screenwriter and 
politician, lived most of his life in France, and was, like Delbo, a resistance fighter and 
Communist, arrested by the Gestapo and deported to Buchenwald in 1943, and like her, 
survived and  returned to France.  He said of his experience: 
You don’t need a concentration camp to know Evil.  But here, the experience will turn 
out to have been crucial, and massive, invading everywhere, devouring 
everything….the essential thing about the experience of Evil is that it will turn out to 
have been lived as the experience of death….and I do mean experience…..We lived 
it…..We are not survivors, but ghosts, revenants. (Semprun,1997: 88-9).    
  This sense of living a spectral existence is similarly present in the  stories of survival Delbo 
records. One of Delbo’s fellow survivors with whom she communicated is Mado.  Mado finds 
that though she always wanted a chance to survive in order to ‘say what she had to say’, there 
is nothing  she can say, because the very fact she is alive seems to deny what she has to say:  
‘Nothing can fill the abyss between other people and myself, between myself and myself.  
Nothing can bridge this gulf, nor narrow it’ (ibid. :259). She tries to explain to others what it 
was like in Auschwitz, largely out of a sense of duty to those who died there , feeling that her 
return must assume some meaning so that their death shall not have been in vain, but  cannot 
make her listeners understand.  ‘Isn’t it terrible’, she says of her dead comrades, ‘they died 
believing that they were dying just before the birth of a dazzling truth?’ (ibid. :261).  She feels 
guilty, despite knowing it is not her fault, feels that she has cheated the dead and betrayed 
herself- ‘It is within us that nothing is the same’.  The people around her, including her son, 
seem peripheral to her life.  They want her to forget the past, but cannot understand it is 
impossible: ‘ Our loyalty to our comrades we left back there is all we have.  In any event 
forgetting is out of the question….time will not pass’.  Memories will always return ‘borne by 
a taste, a color, the sound of the wind, the rain’ (ibid. :266).  Her husband is tactful, because 
he thinks he knows how she feels, but she has never tried to make him understand how she 
really feels because it would make him realize that all his caring had failed to alleviate her 
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pain.  What she really feels is that even having a husband and a son is abnormal, that the 
passage of time cannot undo anything.  And so she goes on not living: ‘I died in Auschwitz’, 
she declares, ‘but no one knows it’ (ibid. :267).  
    Delbo’s other portraits of her former comrades record similar failed attempts to reintegrate 
into ‘normal life’, exacerbated by the inability of friends and family to understand the 
existence, or nature, of  their post-traumatic psychic disorder.  Ida, who was sent to Auschwitz 
at the age of fourteen returns and marries Charles, who was not sent to a camp, has a baby 
girl, and seems to be rebuilding her life, before breaking down, and having a panic attack 
during which she jumps out of a window, and is seriously injured.  The doctors treat this as a 
suicide attempt,  the cause of which they and she believe they have ‘cured’, but despite living 
mainly happily thereafter, she continues to suffers periodic anxiety attacks when the 
Auschwitz ‘ghost’ returns, and then she has to go back to the clinic. Another former comrade, 
Poupette, found those around her insensitive to the way in which  her physical resources and 
health have been diminished by her time in Auschwitz, and unable to take into account how 
much willpower and courage it had required just to start living again afterwards.  Her marriage 
soured, and her husband tried to take their children away from her, claiming she was 
abnormal and mad. Marceline’s husband, on the other hand, is a ‘go-getter’ who believes one 
should not be obsessed by the past, or imprisoned by bad memories.  He cannot understand, 
and nor can the doctors she sees, her anxiety attacks which sometimes last for days. 
   The story which particularly impacted my own thinking about the disordered psychic legacy 
of survival, though, is that of her former comrade Marie-Louise, whom Delbo visits in her 
home.  Marie-Louise married Pierre, her former employer, and had a daughter, before her 
deportation, and  returned to them after her liberation.  On the surface she is  happy and 
comfortably domesticated -  she confesses, tellingly, that she never moves far from  her home. 
She spends much of her time reading and writing about deportation, out of the need to 
remember, and ‘for enjoyment’(though she says there aren’t many books about Auschwitz) 
and also for Pierre, who likes to read whatever she writes.  So far, so seemingly atypical of  
the survivor’s post-traumatic life, but Delbo has seen through the artificiality of Marie-
Louise’s portrayal.   ‘She spoke’, notes Delbo, ‘in a low, soft voice, in perfect harmony with 
the soft hues of her draperies, the pale color of her dress, the gentle light streaming through 
the shirred tulle of her curtains, and, beyond, the leafy boughs of a  tree covering the window.’ 
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(ibid. :280).  The story Marie-Louise tells is one of recovery from the suffering she endured 
following her return, from the post-traumatic stress, tiredness, weakness, trembling and 
sweating in the presence of other people, and fear even of her own daughter, who was 
thirteen when she came back from Auschwitz, and seemed at first to be unable to talk to her, 
and to be scared of her.  She credits Pierre with having ‘put me back in this life without me 
even noticing it’.  They are happy together, she says, never bored and spend the evenings 
together talking.  And then: ‘We never stop talking about Auschwitz.  My memories have 
become his own.  So much so I have the distinct impression he was there with me’ (ibid. :281).  
    Pierre arrives home at this point, and the couple talk to Charlotte frankly and openly- almost 
light-heartedly- about how he gradually helped her back to physical and mental health.  
Clearly, though, he has no real conception of what she went through in Auschwitz.  His 
memory for the detail he has assimilated concerning Marie-Louise’s time in the camp, and  
names and personal histories of their former comrades is remarkable-  better than that of 
Marie-Louise, from whom he has obviously learned it,  or Charlotte.  He talks of the return 
visit Marie-Louise and he made to Birkenau, a few years earlier, as if of a return to some 
former home, and of horrific incidents like the selection run, or the carrying of soil for the 
new garden, in the manner one might recount memories of one’s travels, though he is clearly 
aware of their context. He is even pleased that they were able to see more of the camp than 
Marie- Louise had known during her time there, including the gas chambers and crematoria!  
He tells Charlotte that he attends all the reunions of former comrades with Marie-Louise, and 
talks of them as if they were reunions of old schoolmates.  The conversation then returns to 
the present, and Charlotte, who has been invited to stay the night, eventually makes her 
excuses and leaves.  She promises to return, but it is clearly a promise she does not intend to 
keep. 
    Delbo leaves it to the reader to interpret  the relationship between Marie-Louise and Pierre, 
but it seems to me that it is one which, more than any of her other stories of survival, 
illustrates the unbridgeable epistemological and existential chasm between survivors and  
those to whom they return.  There are no evident behavioural issues on Marie-Louise’s side, 
or indifference to her psychic condition on Pierre’s side, which might ultimately threaten their 
relationship, as it has in the case of other survivors mentioned above.  In some ways, however, 
their relationship nevertheless feels toxic, and slightly sinister, though Marie-Louise insists, 
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and Pierre seems to feel, that he is a model husband.    Has Pierre colonised and sanitized 
Marie-Louise’s common memory of Auschwitz  out of his feelings for her, so as to ameliorate 
her day to day life as a survivor, and thus protect her, or is it an attempt to psychologically 
and emotionally neuter her experience in his own  interest of preserving their comfortable if 
inauthentic, present life together?  Or is he simply unaware of what he has done -  an 
insensitive fool who seems to know everything but understands nothing?  Is his absurd 
banalisation of Marie-Louise’s experience of Auschwitz something which he has conceived for 
her benefit, as some form of perceived therapy, or for his own benefit, to assuage his guilt as 
someone who survived the war in evident comfort and safety, while she suffered intolerably? 
Is it, on the other hand, Marie-Louise who is the real architect of this fantasy life together? 
Has she manipulated Pierre by feeding him every detail concerning her time in Auschwitz, and 
its aftermath, knowing that he  would want to assimilate it and take on the role of her 
psychological and emotional spokesperson, and thus shield her from the attention of others 
and give her the seclusion  she seeks?  Has Pierre remade her, or has she remade herself, and 
him?  And what of her deep memory, which neither Pierre nor anyone other than herself, can 
access?  Was the real purpose of this charade of an existence to repress it?  If so, how far has 
she succeeded, and if not, how and when did her ‘Auschwitz self’ re-emerge?  Is her deep 
memory if not extinguished, at least under control, or a psychic time bomb which in all 
probability will one day be detonated?  Whatever the answers, it seems to me that this story 
is more than a description of a sad state of affairs; it is a warning to all the other Pierres, and 
Marie-Louises who might read it. 
As can be seen from the passages from Auschwitz and After cited above, Delbo does not share 
Améry’s aversion to describing her physical and sensory experiences for her readers; on the 
contrary, it is an essential part of what she has to say.  On the other hand she is fully aware 
that her words  cannot possibly convey the sensory reality of what she felt in Auschwitz  to 
those who have never felt such experiences in their own lives.  In fact one of her untitled 
prose poems is dedicated to precisely that subject (ibid. :275-278).  We cannot answer the 
questions you ask about hunger fear and death in terms of your words, she tells her readers, 
and if we answer you in our words, you will not understand what we say, and thus whatever 
‘knowledge’ those words seem to convey will be useless knowledge.  Survivors would be 
better advised, she says, simply to get on with the business of living. 
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    Delbo’s writing is dominated by three themes; the need to try to make people see the 
experience of Auschwitz as the horrific experience it really was, the need to illuminate the 
seemingly unbridgeable existential gulf between survivors and those to whom they return,  
and the need to make others understand that,  as Jennifer Geddes puts it, ‘the knowledge 
one acquires from extreme suffering is not useful for life’ (Geddes, 2003; 111).  It is both a 
warning to survivors  about the dangers of ‘speaking with death’, if they wish to go on living, 
and also to their listeners or readers, about the futility of instrumentalizing the testimony of 
survivors -  as a message of redemption, or triumph of the human spirit, for example. It is 
telling us that, as Geddes notes: ‘The knowledge gained from suffering is part of the suffering 
itself, not a good that can be extracted from it’( Ibid. :112).  Delbo’s testimony, as revealed in 
the three works which comprise Auschwitz and After, says Geddes, thus ‘offers a 
phenomenology of suffering that questions the outsider’s ability to know or comprehend that 
suffering’ (ibid. :110).    And that of course, as Delbo must have been aware, represents an 
acutely difficult balancing act – how can one both insist on the inaccessibility of the reality or 
truth of one’s experience, and yet retain the reader’s intellectual and moral interest in one’s 
story? 
   9.3  Primo Levi: The Reasonable Man in Extremis 
    Primo Levi is perhaps the world’s best known author of Holocaust related testimony.  The 
two books of his on which I mainly focus, If This is a Man, and The Drowned and the Saved, 
are very different, the former being an anecdotal account of Levi’s experience of Auschwitz, 
written in the aftermath of his liberation and return home, and the latter a collection of essays 
on Holocaust-related subjects written forty years later.  Levi started to write If This is a Man 
in February 1946, four months after returning to his family home in Turin following his 
liberation and circuitous journey back to Italy (the story of which he recounts in his book The 
Truce, first published in 1963), and finished it at the end of that year. It was published in 
October 194750  Only 1,500 copies of the book were sold, but in 1958 it was republished by 
the leading Italian publisher Einaudi, and sold over 500,000 copies in Italy, before being 
                                                            
50 For a detailed account of the process see Thomson, 2003.  Thomson notes that although Levi ‘constructed a 
sort of legend’ that the book had been written ‘in furious haste’, on his return, it was in fact begun 16 weeks 
after his return and written over a period of 10 months, working in the evenings after he had finished work at 
the DUCO paint factory, where he was employed. 
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published in translation in numerous languages, including English and German, as well as 
being adapted for radio, theatre, and other media. Not only was Levi  one of only three Italians 
to have survived from among those in the convoy in which he was deported from Fossoli, but 
he was able to return to  his family and his home. He married, in September 1947, but he and 
his wife Lucia continued to live in the family flat with Levi’s mother. In 1948 Levi resumed his 
career as a chemist.  
    Considering its subject, If this is a Man is a very readable and accessible account, which 
provides a considerable amount of factual information, as well as a measured, frank, and 
insightful portrayal of the  experience of being a prisoner in the Auschwitz satellite work camp 
of Monowitz-Buna.  Writing it, from the account of his biographer, Ian Thomson, seems to 
have been a cathartic process for Levi.  The Drowned and the Saved, on the other hand, in 
keeping with its essayistic form, is a more reflective, but also impassioned work, which to my 
mind has some definite and possibly conscious echoes  of Améry’s essays. It is notable also 
for its inclusion of an essay on Améry himself, which ostensibly concerns the latter’s essay At 
the Mind’s Limits, about the experience of an intellectual in Auschwitz, but  in fact represents 
a much broader posthumous philosophical ‘argument’ with Améry, and with himself, which I 
examine later in this Chapter.  The Drowned and the Saved was published in 1986, shortly 
before Levi committed suicide in April 1987, at the family home in which he had continued to 
reside ever since his return.  Unlike Améry, who carefully planned his suicide, Levi’s suicide 
appears to have been impulsive and, since no suicide note was found, has provoked 
considerable subsequent speculation regarding Levi’s motivation for killing himself  in such a 
sudden and violent manner (allegedly by throwing himself down the stairwell outside his third 
floor flat). 
    The underlying theme of If this is a Man is Levi’s struggle to survive physically and 
psychologically in Auschwitz, whilst retaining some  vestige of humanity, in the face of a 
system which was specifically purposed to degrade and dehumanize, and ultimately destroy  
its victims. The need to engage in that struggle is made clear to Levi on the morning after his 
arrival at Monowitz, when he surveys the appearance of his fellow prisoners, already 
transformed by their shaved heads and prison uniforms: 
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It is not possible to sink lower than this; no human condition is more miserable than 
this, nor could it conceivably be so.  Nothing belongs to us any more; they have taken 
away our clothes, our shoes, even our hair; if we speak, they will not listen to us, and 
if they listen they will not understand.  They will even take away our name: and if we 
want to keep it, we will have to find ourselves the strength to do so, to manage 
somehow so that behind the name something of us, of us as we were, still remains 
(Levi, 1987; 32-3). 
    One way to achieve this goal, Levi finds, is through his friendship with another Italian 
prisoner, Alberto.  He also gets strength from the signs of residual humanity he finds in other 
prisoners, such as Resnyk, a young Pole  with whom he shares a bunk.  Resnyk volunteers to 
make up their sleeping place for the morning inspection, which is a difficult and dangerous 
operation, because in the mad régime of the Lager (Camp), being deemed to have made it up 
wrongly incurs brutal punishment.  Resnyk also accepts Levi as his workmate, carrying heavy 
railway sleepers, despite the fact that Levi is weaker than him, which means that Resnyk will 
end up bearing a greater part of the sleeper’s weight.  The most important material key to 
physical survival, on the other hand is to obtain extra food over and above the meagre daily 
ration of soup and bread, and this means for Levi and Alberto, as for others desperate enough 
to take the risk of being caught, stealing whatever goods they can from the Germans which 
can be bartered for food on the camp’s illicit ‘Exchange Market’, run mainly by the Greek Jews 
of Salonika. 
  Levi, though not callous or insensitive by nature, is nevertheless driven by necessity to 
become  ruthlessly rational and pragmatic when it comes to surviving. He learns that in the 
Lager  there must be no respite in the struggle for survival ‘because everyone is ferociously 
and desperately alone’.  It is a pitiless process of natural selection, in which the strong, the 
adaptable and the astute are to be befriended, and those who are weak of body or mind, like 
the Müsselmanner shunned and left to die. Thomson observes that ‘Levi hated these husks of 
men: association with them was dangerous because they carried disease and their nihilism 
was contagious’ (Thomson, 2003: 174). Thomson also notes that the general condition of all 
the Jewish prisoners appeared pitiful, even to the other inmates of the Auschwitz IV labour 
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camp, such as one of the British military POWs, Alfred Battams51, who passed the Judenlager 
daily on his way back from work: 
They didn’t look human.  It was unbelievable, some of them had these rags on their 
feet, where their clogs’d worn through---walking skeletons.  I saw kiddies only so high 
being horsewhipped by the SS. They had these long bull- whips, and they lashed at the 
children, and they had these Alsatian dogs.  I don’t want to talk about it[crying].  It was 
unbelievable that people could’ve sunk so low (ibid). 
    Levi is apparently not only assiduous  in his efforts to survive, but  also lucky, because as a 
chemist he is eventually deemed to have special skills relevant to the work of Buna as a rubber 
production plant (though in the event no rubber will ever be actually produced there).  He is 
transferred to Kommando 98- the ‘Chemical Kommando’- with his friend Alberto, and, having 
passed an ‘examination’ in chemistry in the form of an interrogation by the humourless Dr 
Pannwitz can once again see himself, however briefly, as a person: Primo Levi, B.Sc., of Turin.  
Despite his newly acquired status, though, he remains a Jewish prisoner, and thus on the 
lowest rung of the hierarchy of prisoners- the slave of slaves – for whom survival was a  battle 
without respite.  One needed ‘to resist enemies, to have no pity for rivals, to sharpen one’s 
wits, build up one’s patience, strengthen one’s will power’. Only those few ‘made of the stuff 
of martyrs and saints’, Levi declared, could survive without renouncing some part of their 
moral world (Levi,1989: 98). Levi is neither; when he surprisingly survives ‘the great selection’ 
for the gas chamber, for example, he and Alberto decide that it may have been due to his 
identity being confused  with that of the much younger man next to him who is bizarrely 
selected when he clearly should not have been, but they say nothing.  
    Levi’s luck also continues to hold. When the allied bombardment of the Works begins to 
threaten the prisoners’ vital food supplies, he becomes the object of a  gratuitous act of 
kindness by an Italian civilian worker, Lorenzo, who for several months gives him part of his 
bread ration, and an old vest to wear, as well as writing a postcard on his behalf to his family 
in Italy, and bringing a reply, without seeking or accepting any reward.  It was due to Lorenzo, 
he says, that he continued to stay alive, not because of his material help so much as reminding 
                                                            
51 Thomson records that the camp’s inmates included about 30,000 foreign non -Jews, including 3-4,000 British 
POWs, in addition to 10-12,000 Jews. 
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him that there existed a just world outside the camp for which it was worth surviving, and 
also that he remained a human being in the eyes of others.  Subsequently, as Levi and the 
other prisoners are fearfully awaiting the onset of winter, which they calculate will bring 
death to seven out of every ten of them, Levi is chosen, from among the members of the 
Chemical Kommando, to be a ‘specialized worker’, in the camp laboratory with the right to a 
new shirt and pair of underpants, and a weekly shave, but more importantly to work in a place 
in which the temperature is maintained at 65 degrees Fahrenheit, rather than labouring in 
the bitter cold. 
   Levi, though, despite his good fortune, still experiences the shame and humiliation of a 
Jewish prisoner. He recalls one particularly shameful incident, when one of the survivors of 
the October 1944 Sonderkommando uprising is publicly hanged before the assembled 
inmates of the camp.  Before he dies, the man cries out; ‘Comrades, I am the last one!’, but 
rather than responding with some defiant word or gesture, Levi and the other prisoners 
remain standing in silence with lowered heads, out of fear of reprisal: ‘slaves, worn out, 
worthy of the unarmed death which awaited us’ (ibid. :156).  He and Alberto later confess to 
each other to feeling ‘oppressed by shame’. 
   Levi’s final stroke of ‘luck’ was to be taken seriously ill with scarlet fever in January 1945. 
and as a result he was in  the Lager hospital when the Russian army began closing in on Buna.  
The SS abandoned the camp , and  20,000 prisoners, including Alberto, were forced to set out 
on one of the notorious death marches westwards, but Levi and the other 800 patients in 
camp hospital were  left behind.  As a result, Levi and the other surviving patients were 
liberated by the Russians, whilst Alberto is never seen again and probably died from 
exhaustion, as did most other prisoners, during the march.  
  In the Afterword to the edition of If This is a Man first  published together with The Truce, in 
1979 (the edition referenced herein),  Levi records his ‘Answers to his Readers’ Questions’ - 
those most frequently asked by readers of If This is a Man- which serves as a valuable 
perspectival bridge between that book and  The Drowned and the Saved. 
    In answer to the question: ‘Did Germans know what was happening?’, Levi replies that 
Germans generally knew of the existence of the camps, though very little of what was 
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happening specifically to the Jews in them.  All Germans however, he declared, knew about 
the ‘multiform anti-Semitic barbarity’ of the persecution of the Jews: ‘Millions of them had 
been present- with indifference or with curiosity, with contempt or with downright malign 
joy- at the burning of synagogues, or humiliation of Jews and Jewesses forced to kneel in the 
street mud’ (ibid.:385).  Many would have also learned something about the camps from 
listening  to foreign radio broadcasts, or seeing lines of Jewish deportees in the streets or at 
railway stations.  Some would have learned much more  as civilian workers in or around  the 
concentration camps.  So if any Germans didn’t know about the camps, it was probably 
because they didn’t want to know - indeed they wanted not to know -  and for this, he says, 
he holds the German people ‘fully culpable’.  
     In answer to the question why ‘there are no expressions of hate for Germans, no desire for 
revenge [in If This is a Man and The Truce].  Have you forgiven them?’, Levi states that he is 
not temperamentally inclined to hatred or a desire for revenge, but also consciously 
repressed such feelings of hatred or violence as he harboured towards his Auschwitz 
persecutors. In his writing, he added, he ‘deliberately assumed the calm, sober language of 
the witness, neither the lamenting tones of the victim nor the irate voice of someone who 
seeks revenge’ (ibid.: 382)to ensure that his testimony would be accepted as credible.  He saw 
his role as a witness whose task was ‘prepare the ground for the judge’(ibid.). As for 
forgiveness, he added,  he would not forgive anyone unless that person can be shown to have 
become conscious of past errors, condemned them, and ‘uprooted them from his conscience’ 
(ibid).  This seems a curiously ambivalent answer, given that Levi had previously reacted 
angrily in 1967 to a remark made by Améry that ‘Unlike Levi, I am not a man to forgive’ 
(Heidelberger-Leonard, 2010: 66).    
     In response to the question ‘How can the Nazis’ fanatical hatred of the Jews be explained?’, 
Levi warns that ‘Perhaps one cannot, what is more one must not, understand what happened, 
because to understand is almost to justify’(ibid.: 395).  No normal human being, he continues, 
can or should want to  identify with Hitler or the other Nazi leaders, or to seek to explain a 
phenomenon so devoid of rationality as Auschwitz.  Nazi hatred of Jews, he concludes, ‘is not 
in us; it is outside man, it is a poison fruit sprung from the deadly trunk of Fascism, but it is 
outside and beyond Fascism itself’ (ibid. :395-6).  There are distinct echoes in this description 
of Améry’s Preface to the Reissue of Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne written in 1977.  There 
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was really nothing, Améry had said, which provides enlightenment on the eruption of ‘radical 
Evil’  in Germany: ‘It issued so to speak, through spontaneous generation, from a womb that 
bore it as a perversion’ (Améry, 1999: viii). Levi adds, though, that whilst we cannot 
understand this hatred, we can and must understand from where it springs, since ‘what 
happened could happen again’. We must  understand in particular the power of charismatic 
leaders like Hitler to transform their own madness into collective madness, and that they only 
become truly dangerous when ordinary people are swept up in that madness, and become 
unquestioning functionaries, or blindly  faithful followers.  There is no simple formula for 
resisting charismatic leaders, he concluded, but the memory of what happened in the past 
might at least serve to support those who wish to find the strength to resist. 
    If, as Levi declared, his intention in writing If This is a Man was to play the role of a witness, 
and leave others to play the role of judge, it is clear that when, forty years later, he wrote the 
essays which comprise The Drowned and the Saved, he was both better equipped and far 
more willing to assume the role of judge.  This realignment in his position had in fact  been 
signalled much earlier, in a letter sent by Levi in May 1960 to Heinz Riedt, who had just 
finished translating If This is a Man into German -  a letter which Levi and his German 
publishers decided would become the Preface of the German edition of the book.  In that 
letter, Levi thanked Riedt for enabling him to ‘speak to the German people and to remind 
them of what they had done, and say to them: “I am alive, and I would like to understand you 
in order to judge you”’ (Thomson, 2003:290-1).   He did not, he said, or at least did not any 
longer, hate the German people, but could not pretend to understand them, and hoped that 
their response to his book might help him to understand them a little better. More than 
twenty years later, in his Preface to The Drowned and the Saved Levi offers a distinctly more 
direct challenge to his readers.  He reminds them how many people had been involved in 
organisations dealing directly with the Nazi apparatus -  major industrial enterprises, like I. G. 
Farben,  which operated the Buna works, and other users of slave labour, but also those 
indirectly involved, such as suppliers of cloth for prison uniforms, or Zyklon B poison in 
unprecedentedly large quantities, who must have known, or at least been able to accurately 
surmise, something, and often a great deal, about the atrocities being committed in the 
camps, but ‘chose the more prudent path of keeping their eyes and ears (and above all their 
mouths) well shut’ (Levi, 1989: 4).  He points out the continuing indifference of many such 
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industrial concerns to their past actions, noting that Topf of Wiesbaden, which designed and 
built the Auschwitz crematoria , was still in operation under its old name in 1975.  The general 
cowardice of Germans in the face of Nazi terror, he declares, was one of the major collective 
crimes of the German people.  
   The Drowned and the Saved, declared Levi in his Preface, had been written in order  to clarify 
‘some aspects of the Lager phenomenon which still appear obscure’, but also, more 
ambitiously, to answer ‘the most urgent question’: ‘How much of the concentration camp 
world is dead and will not return?  How much is back, or is coming back?  What can each of 
us do, so that in this world pregnant with threats, at least this threat will be nullified?’                           
(ibid: 9).  In tackling these questions he does not shrink from describing the true horror of the 
victim experience, nor, on the other hand, does he sanctify the victims.  He acknowledges 
that solidarity among prisoners was the exception rather than the rule in the camps, and 
indeed that sowing the seeds of division and hostility between different categories of 
prisoners was an objective largely  successfully pursued by the SS.  Prisoners granted 
privileged status, he said, were incited  to exercise their  power to ‘tame’ other prisoners, and 
especially new arrivals who might still retain some semblance of resistance or human dignity, 
through verbal and physical aggression, including beatings which sometimes resulted in 
death.  On the other hand, Levi acknowledges the courage of some privileged prisoners in 
seeking out SS officers to corrupt and bribe, or towards the War’s end, frighten with the 
prospect of reprisal, into reversing some of their crueller decisions, and the exceptional 
contribution of those political prisoners who became members of secret resistance groups, 
as in the case of Herman Langbein in Auschwitz. Levi also acknowledges exceptional cases of 
collective resistance by groups of prisoners which demonstrated the capacity both for 
solidarity, and for making courageous, though ultimately fatal, moral choices in the camps.  
He cites in particular the Auschwitz Sonderkommando uprising in October 1944, all the 
participants in which were killed, and the refusal of 400 Corfu Jews, in July 1944,  to work as 
Sonderkommandos in Auschwitz, as a consequence of which they were immediately gassed 
(ibid: 41-2). 
        In another chapter of the book, Levi  addresses of the question of shame or guilt in 
relation both to imprisonment in and survival of the camps.  It is clear from his account that 
this is really a different question from that raised in relation to rape or torture in the preceding 
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chapter of this dissertation, in which the victim’s sense of shame, humiliation, or guilt was 
focused on the experience of  the specific act of bodily violation and the victim’s 
defencelessness on the face of it.  The experience of Auschwitz, by contrast, is that of daily 
suffering over a prolonged period of  time  involving innumerable acts of physical and 
psychological brutality, degradation and inhumanity against prisoners, but also some 
shameful acts by prisoners themselves, born out of their desperation to survive. Feelings of 
shame or guilt might therefore be experienced by prisoners in Auschwitz during their 
imprisonment as a result of particular incidents, such as Levi’s  witnessing of the hanging of 
the Sonderkommando uprising ‘last man’, but also, as Levi points out, as a more general sense 
of shame  at having been reduced to existing on an animal level -  for example having been 
driven by hunger to steal food destined for others.  Nevertheless, he notes, incidences of 
prisoners  committing suicide were relatively uncommon in the Lager; less common, in fact 
than amongst survivors.  This, he suggests is partly because of the lack of opportunity in the 
Lager, or prisoners being ‘too busy dying’ to think about killing themselves, but also because  
prisoners either did not actually experience feelings of guilt, or felt that ‘one was in effect 
expiating it by one’s daily suffering’ (ibid. :51).  For some, as Delbo also noted in her case and 
that of her comrades, survival also became to be seen an act of resistance to one’s intended 
fate, though equally suicide could be seen by other prisoners as the ultimate act of self-
determination, and thus of resistance.   For survivors, on the other hand, feeling of shame or 
guilt, Levi suggested, were more common, particularly where acts not arousing a sense of 
shame or guilt at the time of their commital were sometimes later judged by them in hindsight 
through the prism of a ‘civilian moral code’, as having been  shameful. Some survivors, said 
Levi, became no longer able to live with the shame or guilt invoked by the memory of such 
acts, and took their own lives, whilst others had looked to testimony as a means of expiating 
their shame or guilt, though he could not say to what extent they did so   out of a sense of 
moral obligation to those who did not survive, or simply to ‘free ourselves of the memory’. 
Psychologists he adds are ‘not competent’ to explain the impulse to testify (ibid. :64).  The 
reader is left to ponder into which of these categories, if any, Levi might have placed himself, 
though it is of course tempting to read his comments in the light of his own subsequent 
suicide. 
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    The shame of the world, though, declares Levi, should always be seen as a vaster shame 
than that of survivors.   Shame such as that of those Germans under the Third Reich, who, 
faced with their own crimes and those of others, turned their backs so as not to see or feel 
touched by it, ‘deluding themselves that not seeing was a way of not knowing, and that not 
knowing relieved them of their share of complicity or connivance’ (ibid. :65).  
      In the chapter of The Drowned and the Saved entitled ‘Useless Violence’, Levi touches on  
the relationship between acts of seemingly useless cruelty by Nazi perpetrators, and the 
nature of National Socialism which, once again echoes a theme of Améry’s earlier essays -  in 
this case his essay on torture.  The ‘Hitlerian years’, Levi argues, were characterised by 
widespread ‘useless violence’ -  violence ‘as an end in itself, with the sole purpose of creating 
pain, occasionally having a purpose, yet always redundant, always disproportionate to the 
purpose itself.’ (ibid. :83).  Deportees, for example, were transported to the concentration 
camps in sealed and deliberately tightly packed cattle wagons -   far more tightly packed in 
the case of Jews transported from Eastern Europe than Western Europe -  which intentionally 
lacked straw, sanitary facilities, food and water, even for journeys of up to two weeks.  Levi 
recalls an incident when deportees in his own convoy to Auschwitz were forced to descend 
from their wagons at a railroad station in Austria, where they were compelled out of necessity 
to relieve themselves in the open, in full view of others in the station, who naturally regarded 
them as behaving like animals rather than human beings.  Useless cruelty, and especially that 
designed to violate individual modesty and dignity, also conditioned the existence of all 
Lagers, Levi notes -   the women of Birkenau, for example, tell how their soup bowls also had 
to be used for evacuating themselves at night, and washing themselves.  Similarly, prisoners 
in the camps were constantly being forced to strip naked, ostensibly for showers or medical 
examinations, or even more cruelly for selections.  Roll calls lasting typically one to three 
hours but on occasion up to twenty-four hours, usually after an escape, were another form 
of useless cruelty, especially in the winter rain and snow, often leading to individuals breaking 
down or dying.  Useless cruelty was equally evident in the enforcement of absurd camp rules, 
such as the need for prisoners to show at all times five buttons on their filthy  and lice- infested 
jackets, or the absurdly strict bedmaking rules.  And of course it was useless cruelty which 
primarily motivated  the use of prisoners as ‘beasts of burden’, carrying or pulling heavy loads, 
or digging useless holes, such as the women of Ravensbrück being made to shovel sand in 
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sand dunes; activities which had no purpose other than to break the will, and ultimately the 
body, of the prisoner. It was the ‘ Nazi logic’, said Levi, that ‘ the “enemy” should not only die, 
but die in torment’ (ibid. :96).  Violence, said Levi, ‘ran in the veins’ of the SS guards; most of 
them were not psychopaths nor sadists, but had simply been saturated by indoctrination with 
the ‘morality’ of the totalitarian Nazi regime, and  given unlimited powers to exercise their 
violent natures.  When the former commandant of Treblinka, Franz Stangl, was interviewed 
the writer Gitta Sereny, Levi recalled, she asked him what the point was of the cruelties and 
humiliations inflicted on prisoners, considering they were to be killed anyway. He  replied that 
it was ‘To condition those who were to be the material executors of the operations.  To make 
it possible for them to do what they were doing’ (ibid. :100-101).  As Améry said, the logic of 
depravity.  It brought to mind  a passage from a speech Imre Kertesz made to the Academy of 
Arts in Berlin in 2007.  Kertesz noted  that Eichmann’s remark, during his trial, that he was 
never an anti-Semite was not absurd (though it was false), since the murder of millions of 
Jews required ’good organizers’ rather than anti-Semites52  
    In another chapter of his book, Levi addresses the  question he says he is invariably asked 
by audiences he addresses, namely why the prisoners in Auschwitz and other camps did not 
try more often to escape, or rebel against their captors -  a question which, he said, had 
become formulated with increasing persistence over the years, and with ‘an ever less hidden 
accent of accusation’ (ibid. :122).  It is perhaps this chapter which most directly addresses the 
existential and moral chasm between survivors and the world, because, as Levi says, it is 
raised by those who live in a free society, to whom escape from an illegitimate and abnormal 
imprisonment appears both possible and something of a moral obligation, to expiate the 
shame of capture and imprisonment.  It is, he adds, a notion constantly reinforced by popular 
literature and other media, for example concerning the exploits of Allied prisoners of war in 
German camps, but one which bears little resemblance to the situation of Jews, gypsies, or 
Soviet  prisoners in a concentration camp in Poland or Germany. For them, not only was 
escape an almost impossibly difficult and dangerous physical challenge, and one which could 
lead to terrible reprisals against those who remained, but also futile, since the local 
population outside the camp was hostile to them, and thus more likely to give them up to the 
                                                            
52 A speech made on 19th June 2007 entitled ‘Europe’s Oppressive Legacy’ at a conference entitled ’Perspective 
Europe’ accessed on 21st April, 2011 on the website http://www.sightandsound.com/features/1382.html. 
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Germans, or kill them, than shelter them. Moreover, in the very rare cases where escapes 
were successful, and escapees were subsequently able to tell those to whom they returned 
the truth about the camps, they were almost never listened to or believed.  Nevertheless, Levi 
notes, the popular myth of revolt and uprising by the oppressed majority against the powerful 
few is a story as old as humanity, although the historical truth is that the minority of such 
actions which succeed are not typically led  by the radically oppressed, or those whose 
physical and moral strength has been depleted to the point of exhaustion.  
   The final chapter of The Drowned and the Saved concerns the reception of the German 
edition of If This Is a Man, as revealed in correspondence received by Levi from some of its 
German readers. He had pictured the German edition at the time of its publication53, he said, 
as being like a loaded gun pointed at German heads, especially given that, in 1961, most of its 
readers were likely to be members of the war generation: 
Before they were oppressors or indifferent spectators, now they would be readers: I 
would corner them, tie them before a mirror.  The hour had come to settle accounts, 
to put the cards on the table.  Above all the hour of conversation.  I was not interested 
in revenge-----My task was to understand them.  Not that handful of high-ranking 
culprits, but them, the people I had seen from close up, those from among whom the 
SS militia were recruited, and also those others who had believed, who not believing 
kept silent, who did not have the frail courage to look into our eyes, throw us a piece 
of bread, whisper a human word (ibid. :138) 
   Levi ‘s hope, he said, was that the book would ‘have some echo’ in Germany, and that  the 
nature of that echo would enable him to understand the Germans people better. In fact , 
however, he received only about forty letters from German readers he considered worthy of 
attention between 1961 and 1964, (about one letter for every thousand people who had 
bought the book), almost all of which were written by people who either said they were, or 
appeared to be young, and thus not members of the war generation. 
                                                            
53The German version was published in early 1961 with an initial print run of 50,000 copies, of which 20,000 sold 
immediately (Thomson, 2003: 292-3). 
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   Dr. T.H. of Hamburg, who wrote to Levi in 1962, though, was  clearly a member of the war 
generation, and offered a range of excuses for the conduct of Germans during the Nazi period.  
Hitler, he said, had in 1933 seemed the lesser evil than Communism, and the people had been 
taken in by his ‘beautiful words’, lied to and betrayed by him. Moreover, he declared, Hitler’s 
hatred for the Jews was ‘never popular’ - on the contrary Germany ‘deservedly counted as 
the country most friendly to the Jews in the entire world’.  He had personally never heard of 
any case of spontaneous outrage or aggression against Jews -  ‘only (very dangerous) attempts 
to help them’.   Also, it had been impossible for people to rebel against the totalitarian state, 
and those who tried in July 1944 had been executed ‘in thousands and thousands’. ‘Dear Dr 
Levi’, Dr. T.H. concluded, ‘I have no excuses.  I have no explanations.  The guilt weighs heavily 
on my poor betrayed and misguided people’. (ibid. :145-6).  Levi’s response, he said, was 
‘perhaps the only irate [letter] I ever wrote’.  Dr. T.H., he opined, was a typical specimen of 
the German upper-middle class: ‘a not fanatical but opportunistic Nazi who repented when it 
was opportune to repent, stupid enough to believe that he can make me believe his simplified 
version of recent history’. (ibid. ;147).  Levi responded. that ‘no Church offers indulgencies to 
those who follow the Devil or accepts as justification the attribution of one’s sins to the Devil.’  
He reminded him that in the last freely held elections to the Reichstag, in November 1932, 
whilst it was true Hitler’s ‘beautiful words’ had secured 196 seats for the Nazis, the 
Communists had won 100 seats, and the Social Democrats 120 seats.  He pointed out that 
Hitler had not betrayed the German people - he was a ‘coherent fanatic’ who had made his 
ideas crystal clear years previously in his book Mein Kampf, including his portrayal of Jews as 
the eternal enemy, and never thereafter changed or concealed them, and also revealed in 
that book his plan to conquer and dominate other countries. Anti-Semitism had been the 
foundation of Nazi policy, reiterated by Hitler ‘to the point of obsession’, so no one who voted 
for him could have been ‘friendly’ towards the Jews.  As for resistance, it had been too little, 
too  late.  Finally, nothing had obliged German industrialists to use Jews as slave labour, or 
the Topf company to design and build crematoria, save the desire for profit, or obliged 
Germans to join the SS, or take clothes or shoes from dead Jews, including children, for their 
own use (ibid. :147-8). 
   Other letters Levi received, he said, were very different in seeming to demonstrate their 
authors had read Levi’s book attentively, and to have loved and understood it, but they could 
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not be considered a representative sample of the views of the tens of thousands  who read 
the German edition of his book.  In fact, one of these ‘good’ readers, the student H.L., tells 
him that that although all her teachers were put through a ‘De-Nazification’ programme, it 
was conducted in ‘an amateurish, dilettantesque manner, and widely sabotaged’.  She also 
tells him that young people are resistant to the idea of German collective guilt, and many 
state they have had enough of the mea culpa of the press, and their teachers.  
    Hety Schmitt-Maas- ‘Hety S’-  who worked for the Ministry of Culture of the Land Hessen, 
seems to have been the only member of the war generation with whom Levi maintained a 
lengthy correspondence, and developed a ‘long and fruitful, often cheerful’ friendship 
between October 1966 and November 1982 (she died in 1983).  Her vocation, said Levi, was 
to put ‘men with a destiny’ in touch with each other, in return for being given copies of the 
letters they exchanged, and it is she who puts Levi in touch with Jean Améry. She was also, 
Levi notes,  the only one of his war generation correspondents with ‘clean credentials’- a 
Social Democrat who had refused as a girl to join the Hitler Youth and whose father had been 
briefly imprisoned in Dachau as an opponent of the Nazi regime.   
     Levi’s Conclusion to The Drowned and the Saved is as bleak, in its way, as Améry’s Preface 
to the Reissue of Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne. He writes that the experiences of survivors 
of the Nazi Lagers ‘are extraneous to the new Western generation, and become ever more 
extraneous as the years pass’ (ibid.:166).  Nevertheless, he argues, the voices of survivors 
must be listened to because what happened was neither foreseen nor predicted, and, 
incredibly, had happened  ‘to an entire civilized people’ who had ‘followed a buffoon whose 
figure today inspires laughter, and yet Adolf Hitler was obeyed and his praises were sung right 
up to the catastrophe’(ibid.: 167). ‘It happened’, he says, ‘therefore it can happen again: this 
is the core of what we have to say’. (ibid.: 166-7).  The SS who served in them were directly 
responsible for what happened in the camps but they had not been, save for exceptions, 
‘mind twisted individuals, ill-born, sadists, afflicted by an original flaw’ but average human 
beings who had been ‘reared badly’.  Others among those responsible for the Holocaust and 
other atrocities had been a mixture of ‘diligent followers and functionaries’, some of whom 
were fanatical Nazis, but many others of whom were  just indifferent to the consequences of 
their actions, fearful of punishment for disobeying, ambitious careerists, or just naturally ‘too 
obedient’.   But behind them stood the great majority of the German people: 
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 who accepted in the beginning, out of mental laziness, myopic calculation, stupidity, 
and national pride, the ‘beautiful words’ of Corporal Hitler, followed him as long as 
luck and the lack of scruples favoured him, were swept away by his ruin, afflicted by 
deaths, misery and remorse, and rehabilitated a few years later as a result of an 
unprincipled political game. (ibid. :170).  
   Levi’s verdict is in essence very similar to that of Améry in his 1964-6 essays, though Améry 
had issued his message from inside the lion’s den, when any general responsibility for the 
past was still being hotly denied, or at best shrugged off, and, as Sebald pointed out, he had 
done so in the face of direct hostility.   The Drowned and the Saved is certainly, as Ian Thomson 
notes, ‘a more argumentative, tortured and sceptical book’ than If This is a Man, but the 
difference is, as Thomson points out, not difficult to understand.  The latter book was written 
by a twenty-eight year old who had recently completed a journey from ‘pain to consolation’, 
and emerged on the winning side, whilst the former was written by a man in his mid-sixties, 
who had been living with Auschwitz for forty-two years, and had seen  much  evidence in that 
time of man’s continuing  brutality to man (Thomson, 2003: 504-5).  Levi, like Améry before 
him, had been defeated by the forces of history, and the politics of the present, but in truth, 
unlike Améry, he had not tried  very hard to oppose them when it really mattered.  In essence, 
as I explain in more detail below, in relation to Levi’s ‘posthumous argument’ with Améry  I 
see The Drowned and the Saved as at least in part an argument between Levi and himself, and 
largely as one concerning the ethics of survival, to which some believe his suicide was the 
outcome. I turn next to the very different story of Ruth Kluger’s experience as a Holocaust 
victim and survivor. 
   9.4  Ruth Kluger’s Holocaust Childhood 
Ruth Kluger was born  in Vienna, in 1931, to Jewish parents, and lived in that city until 1942.  
In her memoir Landscapes of Memory (first published under the title Still Alive, in 2001), she 
tells how, following the German occupation of Austria in March 1938, Vienna became her 
‘first prison’.  Her father, a gynaecologist and paediatrician, was arrested in 1940 by the SS for 
performing an illegal abortion and interned, and on his release was compelled to leave  
Austria for Italy, leaving Ruth and her mother trapped in Vienna. Her father was eventually 
arrested in France, in 1944, and deported from Drancy to Auschwitz, where he was presumed 
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to have been gassed shortly after his arrival.  Ruth, her mother and grandmother were among 
the last Jews to be deported from Vienna to Theresienstadt, in September 1942.  The Nazis, 
she said, called Theresienstadt a ghetto, but in reality it was a prison, and was extremely 
overcrowded, housing 40-50,000 people in a barracks designed for 3,500 soldiers and civilians 
at most.  Though she felt safe there, in the sense of her life not being threatened by others, 
Theresienstadt was a ‘hotbed of epidemics’, her grandmother being one of those who died 
there.   
     In May 1944, Ruth and her mother were deported to Auschwitz in a cattle truck. Her 
strongest recollection of the journey is of the overcrowding, and of the air inside the truck 
which smelled of sweat, urine, excrement and ‘a whiff of panic’, and her own sense of being 
abandoned.  Her reaction on arrival at Auschwitz was one of terror, but ‘I knew immediately 
that this was no place for crying, that the last thing I needed to do was to attract attention’ 
(Kluger, 2004: 108).  Considering, she said, that for virtually the whole of  her existence as a 
conscious person, her human rights had been taken away from her piece by piece, it seemed 
to her that   Auschwitz, where prisoners were hated and disrespected to the point of denying 
their very existence as human beings, had ‘a kind of logic to it’.  Ruth and her mother were 
put into the ‘Theresienstadt Family Camp’ in Birkenau, which was exceptional in that it housed 
men, women, children and even babies.  Her mother immediately suggested that she and 
Ruth both run to the camp’s electrified fence together, to kill themselves, but Ruth refused, 
and her mother (who went on to live to the age of 97) accepted her refusal, though Kluger 
believes her suggestion had been serious, and one she too might have made in her place.  Life 
for her in Auschwitz, she said, was about nothing more than roll calls, thirst, and the fear of 
dying.  Kluger has little time for those who talk of having experienced signs of life or hope in 
Auschwitz, or for the pronouncements of psychologists like Bruno Bettelheim, who claimed 
that a person who was not ‘spoiled by a disabling bourgeois education’ should be able to 
adjust to new social conditions , even in a concentration camp.  She is equally dismissive of 
Bettelheim’s claim that the saner the person, the better her chance of survival; on the 
contrary, she says, one might argue that those who suffer from compulsive disorders like 
paranoia would have a better chance of survival, because the reality of the Auschwitz most 
closely resembled their delusional world!  (ibid. :121).  
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   In June 1944 Ruth was selected with her mother for transfer to a forced labour camp called 
Christianstadt, a sub-camp of the Gross-Rosen concentration camp in Lower Silesia, with 
other women from the Theresienstadt Family Camp.  The transfer saved their lives; on 7th 
July 1944,  the Theresienstadt Family Camp was closed down and its remaining inmates all 
gassed.  Conditions in Christianstadt, she recalls, were better than in Birkenau, and the guards, 
though arbitrary and partial in their treatment of prisoners, not ‘egregiously cruel’.  The 
winter of 1944-5 was very cold, though, and the women, having been assigned to do work 
more suitable for men, such as forest clearing or working in a quarry, or having been lent out 
as slave labourers to local villagers, were the least productive and cheapest part of the work 
force, and were thus given the smallest food rations.  In February 1945 Christianstadt was 
closed, and  Ruth and her mother escaped from a forced march to another camp, near the 
border of what is now Poland, and the former German Democratic Republic, and joined the 
procession of homeless German civilians fleeing the advancing Russian army , posing as fellow 
refugees, until they encountered  a group of American soldiers, and were given sanctuary.  
Ruth’s mother subsequently obtained work as an assistant and interpreter to a Jewish-
American officer in the old ducal town of Straubing, in Lower Bavaria, helping with mainly 
young Jewish displaced persons, whilst Ruth tried to catch up on her lost years of schooling. 
They eventually  emigrated to New York , in 1947, by which time Ruth was 16 years old. 
   Ruth Kluger subsequently became a Professor of German literature and taught at a number 
of American universities, and finally at the University of California, Irvine,  and returned to 
Germany as director of the university’s Education Abroad Program in Göttingen, aged 57.  A 
few months later she was knocked down by a bicycle and suffered a brain haemorrhage.  She 
recovered, but said she felt compelled by the incident to write her life story, originally in 
German.  In 2000 she wrote a ‘parallel book’ (neither a translation nor a new book, she said) 
in English.  She continued to work in Irvine and Göttingen until her retirement, and died in 
October 2020, aged 88. 
     Landscapes of Memory is a forthright, frank and unsentimental account of Kluger’s life as 
a child victim of the Holocaust and her existence as a survivor of that experience in a largely 
uncomprehending and indifferent world.  Her experience of victimhood benefits from the fact 
that it was the adolescent experience  of someone whose mind was uncluttered by psychic, 
existential, or moral ambiguities or ambivalences, though there is no doubt that her 
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experiences were profoundly traumatic, and in fact resulted in her subsequently receiving 
(unsuccessful) psychotherapy.  Her perspective on her survival has also clearly gained from  
her exposure to societal responses both in the United States and Germany (about both of 
which she is unashamedly sceptical). I will focus, though, on Part Two of her book, entitled 
‘The Camps’.  In it one finds no sense of  shame or humiliation, or loss of trust in the world 
(which she never had the opportunity to acquire in the first place) as a consequence of her 
experiences as a victim or a survivor.  Certainly she experienced the same sense of  
disconnection from post-traumatic the world as a result of her experiences as the other 
survivors whose accounts appear in this dissertation, and her book bears witness to a similar 
epistemological, existential and moral chasm between her and the world,   but she seems to 
have simply accepted  it as a fact of life, and  got on with the business of living.  Of course she 
only spent a few weeks in Auschwitz , though in such a place even a few weeks of terror, 
starvation and  fear of imminent death, especially as a thirteen year old girl, is surely a lifetime 
of suffering.  However, I think the key to her resilience might be the fact that, as she said, she 
had experienced a continual deprivation of her rights as a human being throughout her 
previous conscious life, and had thus acquired no illusions about the world, or her place in it, 
which might be destroyed by her experience.   
   Kluger precedes her account of the camps, with a critique of what she calls the ‘museum 
culture’ prevalent in the presentation  of former concentration camps  such as  Auschwitz, 
which, she claims, have become  places where the visitor ‘monitors his reactions, examines 
his emotions, admires his own sensibility, or in other words turns sentimental’(ibid.:71). ‘For 
sentimentality’, she continues, ‘involves turning away from the ostensible object and towards 
the subjective observer, that is, towards oneself.  It means looking into a mirror instead of 
reality’ (ibid.).  Having spent a long day at Auschwitz-Birkenau myself, I can  understand her 
point  of view- in fact from my own observations I think she may  be too generous in assuming 
that all visitors react emotionally, however self-absorbedly, to what they see.  Most do, I’m 
sure, but I also recall groups of seemingly unperturbed, if baffled, children dutifully following 
their guides past a selection of gruesome mementoes, on what I assume they might have 
regarded as a rather bizarre school outing, and others whose ‘sightseeing’ enthusiasm 
reminds me of Delbo’s Marie-Louise story.  Despite the stubborn sincerity and considerable 
presentational efforts of my guide, and my own desire to be affected by it, to weep and cry, I 
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confess that I found it, save for a few moments of emotion at seeing one of the preserved 
prisoner barracks,   a largely surreal and disorienting experience. Thus, I rather agree with  
Kluger, who never returned to Auschwitz, that  ‘it is no place for pilgrimage’.  ‘The place which 
I saw, smelled and feared, and which has now been turned into a museum, has nothing to do 
with the woman I am’, she added (ibid. :131).  She did however visit another ‘museum’ site, 
Dachau: 
It was a clean and proper place, and it would have taken more imagination 
than your average John or Jane Doe possesses to visualize the camp as it was 
forty years earlier.  Today a fresh wind blows across the central square where 
the infamous roll calls took place, and the simple barracks of stone and wood 
suggest a youth hostel more easily than a setting for tortured lives.  Surely 
some visitors secretly figure they can remember times when they have been 
worse off than the prisoners of this orderly German camp.  The missing 
ingredients are the odor of fear emanating from human bodies, the 
concentrated aggression, the reduced minds.  I didn’t see the ghosts of the so-
called Musselmänner (Muslims) who dragged themselves  zombielike through 
the long, evil hours, having lost the energy and the will to live (ibid.: 72-3). 
 Kluger even wonders whether the sanitized, disorienting, presentation of the past ‘is the 
hidden purpose of these peculiar museums’ though this runs counter to their proclaimed 
purpose. I think this applies specifically in relation to  camps which are situated, like Dachau, 
in the territory of the perpetrators, or perhaps, like Auschwitz, those who actively 
collaborated with them.  Perhaps the gruesome mementoes of the past one often sees on 
display in such places, or the dark cells, and the places of torture and death in which one 
stands around in awkward ignorance, reading their sombre ‘information’ plaques, are there 
to say ‘this is how it was,’ whilst the neatly and attractively preserved sites are there to say 
‘this is how it is, and how we are, now – decent, respectful people’.  It would be harsh to 
blame those responsible, though, if that were the case. 
   Reading Kluger’s remarks also called to mind my own visit to Oradour-sur-Glane, near 
Limoges, which was the site of the murder of 642 French men, women and children by soldiers 
of the 2nd SS-Panzer Division on 10th June 1944, and the burning down of the village.  This 
184 
sudden and violent attack   is now thought to have been intended as a reprisal  for  resistance 
activities which the Germans had been wrongly informed had occurred there. The village, 
which is now a memorial site, has been left more or less untouched as a monument to the 
massacre- one can still see in the ruins of burned-out houses, and charred remains of some 
personal effects of their owners, such as vehicles, bicycles, and sewing machines.  It is, just by 
its presence, an intentionally authentic, unequivocal, and very affecting monument to the 
brutal, murderous, criminality of the perpetrators, and the martyrdom of the  victims, which 
appears to require no further explanation.  Thinking about why it had seemed right and 
proper to those responsible for the site to present it in this way, in contrast to those 
responsible for Dachau -  why it should seem appropriate to make  the  massacre of Oradour  
imaginable , unlike the atrocities in the Nazi camps -  I concluded that it was because Oradour 
is situated in the land of the victims, who were not only deemed wholly innocent but whose  
fate was  consistent with the nation’s post-war  narrative of Résistance (or, less kindly, 
Résistancialisme54).   
    Kluger, like Améry, Levi and Delbo,  encountered incomprehension, and sometimes 
resistance on the part of those to whom she tried to explain the reality of her experiences.  
The German wife of a Princeton colleague, for example, whom she calls Gisela, ‘felt smug 
about belonging to a younger generation of Germans who couldn’t be blamed for anything’, 
declaring that ‘Theresienstadt wasn’t all that bad’ (bid.: 80).   ‘Gisela’s remarks’, recalls Kluger, 
‘were a provocation and unmistakeably aggressive.  I’m sure she resented that in warm 
weather I didn’t wear long sleeves to cover up the Auschwitz number tattooed on my arm, or 
try to hide it with bracelets or cosmetics, to mention two of the suggestions I received in the 
course of fifty years.  “Theresienstadt was a ghetto for old people and Jewish veterans”, she 
says, reciting a bit of German folklore’ (ibid.: 80-1).   Auschwitz, Gisela admitted, was another 
matter, but compared to her own mother, who lost her husband on the Russian front and 
could not remarry due to the shortage of available German men after the war, she suggested 
that Kluger’s mother, whose father and son were murdered, was comparatively lucky, as she 
found two more husbands in America. (ibid.: 88).  
                                                            
54  The term coined by the French historian Henry Rousso in 1987 to describe the post-war exaggeration of the 
importance and extent of French resistance activities during the  German occupation, especially  by Gaullist and 
Communist politicians.  
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   More generally, though, it was just the case that talking of experiences such as the journey 
from Theresienstadt to Auschwitz, she didn’t fit the ‘framework of social discourse’. Like the 
other survivors Kluger feared that her description for example, of the feeling of  
claustrophobia she experienced in the cattle truck to Auschwitz might invoke in the minds of 
her listeners the feeling they might have experienced of being stuck in a lift, in the Channel 
Tunnel between England and France, or, for those who experienced it, in an air-raid shelter.  
She sums up her experience as a testifier in terms which echo those of Delbo and her 
comrades: 
I used to think after the war I would have something of interest and significance to 
tell.  A contribution.  But people didn’t want to hear about it, or if they did listen, it 
was in a certain pose, an attitude assumed for this special occasion….as if I had 
imposed upon them, and they were graciously indulging me.  The current craze for 
oral history and interviewing harbors a related flaw of one-sidedness, even though the 
interviewer is doing the imposing: he or she contributes nothing except an implied 
superiority to suffering.  Beware the kind of awe which easily turns to its opposite, 
disgust.  For we like to keep the objects of both emotions at arms-length, in instinctive 
revulsion (ibid.: 107). 
Perhaps Kluger overstates her case, and is too harsh in relation to the oral history ‘industry’, 
but she does raise a very pertinent question. The European Holocaust Research Institute, 
according to a tweet I accessed on 1st June 2021, enables you to browse 2,200 archival 
institutions in 59 countries.  One of these is the Institute for Visual History and Education, in 
the USC Shoah Foundation, at the University of Southern California (originally founded by 
Steven Spielberg), which, according to its website (sfi.usc.edu) contains over 54,000 
audiovisual testimonies from Jewish and other survivors of the Third Reich, mainly recorded 
between 1994 and 2001. Hugely impressive , of course, but what exactly are these 
testimonies for?  If it is academic research, why does one need to create 54,000 testimonies, 
and thus invoke 54,0000 sets of traumatic memories? Is it a necessary act of scholarship,  a 
bulwark against Holocaust denial, or for some other reason?  And  at what psychic and 
emotional cost on the part of testifiers were they obtained, relative to the benefit to 
historians and other academic consumers they undoubtedly provide?  
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Kluger is also unsparing in her critique of  German public and private memory of their own 
actions in the past. She speaks, for example, of the many ‘well-meaning’ Germans who used 
forced labourers as unpaid servants during the War, and who talk of them  being well off, well 
fed, content, and grateful, without apparently having seen any signs of  anxiety, suspicion, or 
enmity towards them, in their faces, and who recoil when Kluger refers to them as slave 
labour.  In the aftermath of the War, she recalls from personal experience, German hatred 
and contempt for Jews didn’t cease, but merely became subliminal.  The  Jews were hated by 
all generations of Germans, even if they disagreed about who or what was to blame for what 
happened in the past, because Jews reminded them just by their presence of what they had 
done.  Survivors, on the other hand, either ‘outdid one another with stories of their suffering 
or they wanted to leave all that behind in order to focus on the future’ (ibid.: 191).  Kluger 
remembers that her German neighbours treated the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials ‘with 
distaste’.  They didn’t want to know about the crimes committed in their own name, as if 
turning away from the facts was proof of their own innocence, and found it easier instead to 
accuse investigators and observers of engaging in a deliberate humiliation of the German 
people.  This attitude, she claims, prevailed right up to the time of the Frankfurt Auschwitz 
trial.  As in the case of the other survivors, Kluger found the existential and moral chasm 
between her and Germans fundamentally unbridgeable. It was not the case, however, that 
she hated or could no longer identify with the country or its people; on the contrary when  
she left Germany in 1947, she said, she felt that ‘part of me was irreversibly German, albeit in 
an offbeat way’ (ibid. :194). 
   9.5  Jean Améry: The Intellectual’s Experience of Auschwitz 
       Jean Améry, unlike Kluger, felt that he could no longer self-identify even partly as a 
German, but nevertheless he too found that part of him was irreversibly German, and it was 
the part of which mattered to him above all else: his intellectual and cultural being.  This is 
directly reflected in the title of the first of the essays he wrote for South German Radio, on 
his experience of Auschwitz, written in early 1964 and broadcast by Améry to its listeners in 
October of that year- At the Mind’s Limits.  Essay on the Intellectual’s Experience of Auschwitz. 
His essay, Améry declared, would be about ‘the confrontation of Auschwitz and intellect’ 
rather than a ‘documentary report’ (an indirect reference to Levi’s book, notes Heidelberger-
Leonard) about the horrors of the camp, about which ‘people have already heard far too 
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much’ (Améry,1999: 15), This seemingly esoteric choice, though, was in reality a profoundly 
serious cultural as well as a personal one.  Améry hoped that his essays would help him to 
rediscover himself, and be rediscovered by others, as a German intellectual and writer—
writing, as he was later to say, for Germans rather than merely in German, as he had been 
doing as a journalist, writing ‘feuilletonistic’ articles for German-Swiss journals, for the 
previous twenty years. His essay was thus intended  both to offer  a new perspective on the 
question of the victim’s existence in Auschwitz and a means of  introducing Améry as a serious 
thinker and writer to fellow left-wing German intellectuals like the programme’s producer, 
the poet and writer Helmut Heisenbüttel.  As a result, as Améry himself confirms in his 
Preface, the earlier part of his essay is self-consciously ‘essayistic’ and ‘contemplative’, before 
becoming gradually more subjective and ‘confessional’, and finally a frank and unsparing 
account of his own intellectual and spiritual submission to the reality of the camp.  
Nevertheless, the tone of the essay remains throughout distinctly more essayistic and  
reflective than that of his later essays, and particular his essay Resentments.    
   The essay begins  with a portrait of the ‘intellectual or cultivated man’- someone not just 
defined  by their training or occupation, such as a lawyer, doctor, engineer or scholar, but 
also: 
 ‘a person who lives within a spiritual frame of reference in the widest sense.  His realm 
of thought is an essentially humanistic one, that of the liberal arts.  He has a well-
developed esthetic consciousness.  By inclination and ability he tends towards abstract 
trains of thought’ (ibid.: 2). 
Améry is of course describing himself, and his self-portrait is deliberately ironic in the context 
of the experience he is about to describe.  The personal attributes of this cultural paragon he 
details -  the  ability to ‘recite great poetry by the stanza’, to know ‘famous paintings  of the 
Renaissance as well as those of Surrealism’, and the possession of a keen  knowledge of 
history and philosophy -  are  not merely useless, but also hazardous, and even life-
threatening,  in the dis-ordered, brutalised, ‘social’ world of Auschwitz.  In Monowitz, the 
treatment, and ultimately the fate, of prisoners, was determined not by their intellect but by 
their utility and their skills as tradespeople. Machinists, electricians, plumbers, cabinet 
makers, carpenters, tailors, shoemakers, bricklayers, cooks and mechanics could earn 
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themselves vital privileges, such as an extra bowl of watery soup, and have a slightly improved 
chance of survival.  Those from the ‘higher professions’, on the other hand, are counted in 
Auschwitz as an  underclass, fit only for unskilled labouring work, with a few lucky exceptions,  
such as ‘my barracks mate Primo Levi from Turin, who wrote the Auschwitz book, If That Be 
a Man’ (ibid.:3) and indeed Améry himself, whose orthographical skills secured him a clerical 
position in the Buna offices. The prudent intellectual thus sought to conceal his true 
background, and if he had any manual skills, however rudimentary, to claim to be a craftsman, 
or he would end up spending his days carrying rails, pipes or construction beams, and soon 
be ‘eliminated from the labor process’ (ibid.:3-4).  Camp life generally, Améry noted, also 
required physical agility and courage ‘that necessarily bordered on brutality’.  Moral courage, 
on the other hand ‘was not worth a trifle’(ibid.:4).  Members of the higher professions  
typically lacked such necessary skills for daily existence as the ability to ‘deliver an uppercut’ 
to a would-be thief, or make their beds in the prescribed way, or respond briskly enough to 
the ‘Caps off’ command, and so were disrespected by the kapos and other prisoners.  They 
could find themselves friendless, unless they made the effort to  communicate on the level of 
ordinary prisoners, in camp slang, and what would be considered in their former cultivated 
circles as rude or  ill-mannered language. 
   Moreover, notes Améry, unlike in camps such as Dachau or Buchenwald, in which the 
prisoners were predominantly political, and books and even a Camp Library were available to 
provide inmates with some interior intellectual life and help them function socially, in 
Auschwitz the great majority of prisoners were unpolitical Jews and Poles, and the most 
privileged and influential prisoners were the German professional criminals.  As a result, the 
intellectual was isolated, having little opportunity to socialise with others like himself.  Nor 
did Améry find solace in memory, unlike Levi, who recalled the spiritually uplifting effect of 
being able to recite in rudimentary French translation some partly remembered lines of the 
Canto of Ulysses from Dante’s Inferno to his comrade Jean Samuel. Améry recalled that when 
he recollected a previously much repeated stanza from a poem of Friedrich Hölderlin, it 
evoked no emotional or mental response , as it always had done in former times.  ‘The poem 
no longer transcended reality’, he recalls (ibid.:7).  A special problem, he added, afflicted 
intellectuals like himself who possessed a German educational and cultural background, for 
the ‘language’ of Auschwitz, which he described as ‘camp slang’,  demonstrated to them that 
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German culture no longer belonged to them, but to their captors, and that in this, as in every 
other way, even the lowest ranking SS man was superior to them. 
       But as spiritually and socially handicapped as Améry may have been , one might expect 
that the ‘rational-analytic’ mind of a neo-positivist thinker like himself would at least have 
offered some kind of bulwark against the irrational ‘logic of destruction’ of Auschwitz.  Not 
so, says Améry; on the contrary, ‘it led straight into a tragic dialectic of self-destruction’ (ibid. 
:10).  It was certainly true, he said, that in the beginning his rational-analytic mind prevented 
him from simply accepting and adjusting to the realities of the camp’s logic of destruction, 
since it was contrary to everything he had previously considered humanly acceptable, and so 
what others accepted as their fate he  felt obliged to oppose.  But as time wore on, and that 
logic became an immovable and permanent reality, he said, the innate respect for the 
authority of power which is a characteristic of the German intellectual, began to undermine 
his resistance.  His knowledge of the many previous historical instances of subjugation and 
slavery, for example, made him wonder whether his situation was not, in historical context, 
simply the way it was, and had always been.   And so eventually his mind turned inward, 
against itself: 
The power structure of the SS state towered up before the [intellectual] prisoner 
monstrously and indomitably, a reality that could not be escaped and therefore finally 
seemed reasonable.’ (ibid.).    
  Militant Marxists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, pious Christians, and Orthodox Jews, whether highly 
educated professionals or workers and peasants, on the other hand he said, had  a spiritual  
foothold in the world  which enabled them to detach themselves from the ‘SS state’.  As a 
result they ’survived better or died with more dignity than their irreligious or unpolitical 
intellectual comrades, who often were infinitely better educated and more practised in exact 
thinking’ (ibid. :13). Améry could not bring himself to believe what they believed, but sincerely 
wished he could be like them -  ‘part of a spiritual continuity that is interrupted nowhere, not 
even in Auschwitz’ (ibid. :14).  For Améry and other non-believers, on the other hand, the 
’cruel sharpness of an intellect honed and hardened by camp reality’ dismissed all 
metaphysical explanations for their situation as meaningless. Nowhere was reality as real as 
it was in Auschwitz, and in no other place was any attempt to transcend it ‘so hopeless and 
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so shoddy’(ibid.:9).  Améry declared that no spiritual good could be salvaged from the  
experience of the camp - he did not become wiser ‘if by wisdom one understands positive 
knowledge of the world’, nor ‘deeper’, nor ‘better, more human, more humane and more 
mature ethically’, though he undoubtedly became ‘smarter’(ibid.:20).  Far from finding the 
camp a ‘university for life’, as Levi claimed he had done, Améry summarised the existential 
legacy of the non-believing intellectual55 in the following terms: 
 You do not observe dehumanized man committing his deeds and misdeeds without 
having all your notions of inherent human dignity placed in doubt.  We emerged from 
the camp stripped, robbed, emptied out, disorientated—and it was a long time before 
we were even able to learn the ordinary language of freedom.  Still today, incidentally, 
we speak it with discomfort and without real trust in its validity. (ibid.) 
The one valuable intellectual legacy of Auschwitz, he added, was the unshakeable belief that 
‘for the greatest part the intellect is a ludus [game] and that we are nothing more- or, better 
said, before we entered the camp we were nothing more- than homines ludentes’ [players] 
(ibid.)  It made the intellectual lose  his ’metaphysical conceit’, his ‘naïve joy in the intellect’ 
and ’what we falsely imagined was the sense of life’.  Sartre, he noted ironically, said that it 
had taken him thirty years to rid himself of traditional philosophical idealism, but a few weeks 
in the camp had been sufficient for Améry to complete that process. The Austrian writer Karl 
Kraus, he noted, said of the Third Reich that ‘The word56 fell into a sleep when that world 
awoke’.  The intellectual survivor, though, said Améry, felt rather that it had died: 
The word always dies where the claim of some reality is total.  It died for us a long 
time ago.  And we were not even left with the feeling that we must regret its departure 
(ibid.). 
  The starker reality of being a  prisoner in Auschwitz for Jewish prisoners like Améry, however, 
was the fact of their being Jews, and this, as Améry admits in his Preface to the first edition 
                                                            
55 Améry often refers to himself in the third person, or uses the collective ‘we’, but I found no evidence that he 
was in fact a part of any self-defining group of non-believing Jewish-German intellectuals , and indeed his 
emphasis on his isolation implies that this was not the case, so I read this as more of a stylistic device than a 
reflection of  his real experience- possibly a means of facilitating the engagement of his audience. 
56 Meaning the mind, or intellectual life 
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of Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne  is something he had not seen clearly enough in 1964, when 
writing his essay.  It was however  frankly revealed by Améry in his 1977 essay Mein Judentum: 
  In the abyss, all the “aryan” prisoners were on a level so far above us, the Jews, that 
it can be measured only in light years.  They beat us when it pleased them; especially 
the Poles distinguished themselves at this, in a way that is unforgettable, and should 
not be concealed.  They had internalized the Führer’s values -  because tradition had 
trained them for it.  They may have been destined to be slaves of the master race; but 
we were signed over for death.  It reached the point where we Jews allowed ourselves 
to be beaten without resistance. (Améry, 1984: 18). 
    Améry’s essay on the intellectual in Auschwitz therefore needs to be understood in the 
context of the basis on which it was commissioned; that is as a  carefully crafted portrayal of 
his experience as an intellectual of Auschwitz, designed for an audience of fellow intellectuals. 
To judge Améry by any other criterion risks ascribing to him a lack of self-awareness and 
insensitivity  which is quite contrary to what we know of him.  In this context, Améry’s essay 
seems to me to constitute a brutally honest, deeply moving, and original introspective 
account of a mind at its absolute limits – in fact, on the point of self-destruction.   But it is  
also about the total failure of German culture and education (including his own) to withstand 
the reality of National Socialism, written not for the benefit of the war generation of Germans 
but to inform and educate an emerging post-war generation of leftist intellectuals concerning 
his and their past. Améry knew that a much fuller picture of the reality of Auschwitz had 
already emerged, inter alia, in Levi’s book, but he also knew that it had been published at a 
time when the vast majority of Germans of the war generation were still clinging to the myths 
concerning the Third Reich which Dr. T.H. had regurgitated to Levi.  Young Germans, on the 
other hand, had been intentionally kept ignorant of such matters, as Améry had already made 
clear in his chapter on Germany in his 1961 book Preface to the Future, and the Frankfurt trial 
had been proceeding for too little time to have permeated their consciousness.  
Consequently, I think the subject matter of his Auschwitz essay was rather well judged and 
well timed from a didactic perspective, though it was destined, like Levi’s book, to bear little 
practical fruit, as far as its impact on its listeners and readers was concerned. 
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  9.6  Améry and the Germans  
   Améry did not directly address the question of his attitude towards contemporary West  
German society until he wrote his  fourth essay, ‘Resentments’, (which he had originally 
wanted to call ‘The Germans’) at the end of 1965.  Heidelberger-Leonard records that Améry 
warned Heissenbüttel, his radio producer, of the potentially controversial nature of the essay, 
telling him: ‘It is “strong stuff”.  I hope not too strong for your listeners.  But it is like this: such 
an essay can either be written with complete honesty or not written at all.’ (Heidelberger-
Leonard, 2010: 161). But as Heidelberger-Leonard points out, it was far from the ‘tirade of 
hatred’ that many of its German readers took it to be.  As Améry says towards the end of the 
essay: ‘If you wish, I bear my grudge for reasons of personal salvation. Certainly.  On the other 
hand, however, it is also for the good of the German people’. (Améry, 1999: 80).  On the one 
hand he wanted his listeners, and later his readers, to acknowledge the righteousness of his 
resentments against German society past and present, but on the other hand, it was his 
‘absurd’ dream, he said, that their response to his resentments might, as Heidelberger-
Leonard puts it, ‘redeem’ him - bring about an end to the loneliness he felt as a result, as he 
saw it, of having been abandoned by German society.  Heidelberger-Leonard  describes this 
as a longing for ‘requited love’ (Heidelberger-Leonard, 2010: 162).  I am not sure about that, 
but there is no doubt that Améry’s emotional investment in his quest was considerable. 
      Améry’s essay was not the first time he had written about the German people, though, 
reveals Heidelberger-Leonard.  In June 1945, barely three months after his liberation, in what 
she calls an ‘astonishingly objective’ but unpublished, essay entitled Zur Psychologie des 
deutsches Volken (‘On the Psychology of the German People’), he had advocated the ‘integral 
physical extermination of all the leading personalities in the [Nazi] Party (….) and the entire 
staff of the State Secret Police’ (ibid.: 81).  However, she says, he had judged the German 
people as a whole  with surprising leniency in that essay, which was  written at a time when, 
as Améry himself recalled in 1965, he was enjoying  ‘a totally unprecedented social and moral 
status’, both as a survivor and a former resistance fighter, which ‘elated me to the 
extreme’(Améry, 1999: 64). In any event, in 1945 he had deemed the German people to be 
not actively guilty collectively of the crimes suffered in the concentration camps but guilty 
without exception of not publicly opposing them. For this, he said, they should not be 
punished but ‘re-educated’, though it seems that he was not specific about how this could be 
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achieved in practice (Heidelberger-Leonard, 2010: 84). Améry had  also  favoured at that time 
the implementation of the Morgenthau Plan, proposed by the U.S. Senator Henry 
Morgenthau, for the de-industrialization of Germany and its conversion into a primarily 
agrarian economy, to counter the danger of a resurgent  Germany once more threatening the 
world.   
   If Améry’s essay ‘On the Psychology of the German People’ might be characterized as 
‘optimistic’, albeit in a rather radically militant way, that optimism had dissipated by 1965. 
The Cold War between the Soviet bloc and the West had already refashioned Germany as a 
‘democratic’ bulwark against Communism, and far from being de-industrialized, the country 
had been politically rehabilitated and economically reconstructed, without being required to 
atone for, or even admit to, any collective responsibility for the evils of National Socialism. 
Moreover, the German people had neither been compulsorily re-educated, as Améry had 
suggested, nor  demonstrated any serious disposition  to re-educate themselves.  Améry’s 
assessment of this process is subtly ironic: 
Under these circumstances – circumstances of unprecedented economic, industrial 
and military rise – one cannot reasonably demand of someone that he go on tearing 
his hair and beating his breast.  The Germans saw themselves absolutely as victims, 
since, after all, they had been compelled to survive not only the winter battles of 
Leningrad and Stalingrad, not only the bombardment of their cities, but also the 
dismemberment of their country.  Thus, as can all too easily be understood, they were 
not inclined to do more than to take the past of the Third Reich and in their own way 
to “overcome” it, as one said back then.  In those days, at the same time as the 
Germans were conquering the world markets for their industrial products and were 
busy at home – not without a certain equanimity – with overcoming, our resentments 
increased; or perhaps I must restrain myself and say only that my resentments 
increased (Améry, 1999: 66). 
  Améry became one of the ‘disapproving minority with its hard feelings’.  ‘I attracted the 
disapproving attention,’ he recalled,  ‘no less of my former fellows in battle and suffering, 
who were now gushing over about reconciliation, than of my enemies who had been 
converted to tolerance.  I preserved my resentments’ (ibid.: 67).   By the beginning of the 
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1960s, though, Améry was beginning to have ‘something to do’ with German intellectuals of 
his own generation,  whom he found had ‘rediscovered’ themselves as ‘refined, modest and 
tolerant’, and also ‘thoroughly modern’, earnestly discussing Theodor Adorno, Saul Bellow, 
or Natalie Sarraute57 with the same enthusiasm he envisaged that during the Nazi period, 
they had probably extolled the works of  authors of the popular ‘Blood and Soil’ school of 
writers (ibid.: 62). 
  Améry’s resentments were probably not allayed by the outcome of the Frankfurt Auschwitz 
trial, which ended shortly before his essay was broadcast, though he does not  refer to it in 
his essay.  There being no death penalty under German municipal law, the prosecution in the 
trial had requested a maximum sentence for murder of life imprisonment in relation to 16 of 
the 20 remaining defendants, but of the 17 actually found guilty, only 7 were found guilty of 
murder, and received the maximum sentence, whilst the remaining 10 defendants, including 
the most senior ranking defendant, Mulka, were found guilty only of accessory to murder, 
and, with the exception of Mulka, sentenced to imprisonment for periods of less than 10 
years.  One of the medical staff, Dr Lucas, for example, who participated in four selections of 
1,000 prisoners for the gas chambers, received a sentence of just three and a half years 
(Pendas, 2006: 100- 102).  Améry would certainly have read  reports of the trial in the German 
and foreign press, and been aware not only of the leniency of these sentences, but also of 
some questionable aspects of the trial process. Among these were the hostile and 
intimidating manner in which survivor witnesses, and particularly those from the Communist 
countries, notably Poland and Ukraine, had been cross-examined by defence counsel, the 
requirement for survivors giving evidence in the presence of their former torturers, and the 
Court’s repeated insistence on a high level of detail and precision in witness testimony (ibid.: 
162-4).  He might also have been aware of what Pendas refers to as the dialectical relationship 
between media fascination with the trial and the public reaction to it - the more strident the  
former became the more indifferent or opposed to the trial the public  seemed to be (ibid.: 
258).  Though undoubtedly significant in its effect on public perceptions of Nazism and the 
Holocaust,  Pendas records that public opinion polls revealed that only 53% of those who 
actually attended the trial approved of it, that many Germans, even after the trial, still 
                                                            
57 The part- Jewish, Russian born, French novelist and essayist, who survived the War living on false papers and  
subsequently became a leading theorist and practitioner of the ‘nouveau roman’ school of fiction. 
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opposed extending the Statute of Limitation periods for Nazi crimes, including the then 
Federal Justice Minister, Edwald Bucher, and that 44% of Germans polled in 1966 continued 
to oppose the holding of such trials.   
    In any event, Améry made it crystal clear that in examining his resentments  for the purpose 
of his essay, he would be tactless, for tact, he said, ‘is not suited for the radical analysis that 
together we are striving for here’ (ibid.: 63).  His task, he said, was not just to explain his 
resentments, but to justify them.  Whatever his awareness of  the feelings of ordinary 
Germans towards the Frankfurt trial, he was certainly more attuned to the zeitgeist of 
contemporary Germany than Levi had been in 1961 (and had in fact analysed it in detail in 
that same year in his book Preface to the Future). Consequently, Améry’s case for his 
resentments was firmly based on the state of  contemporary German society as well as its 
past failings, and especially the fact that ‘personalities who were allied with the torturers’ 
continued  to play important public roles in German society, and that ‘the criminals have a 
good chance to attain a venerable old age and triumphantly outlive us’  (ibid.: 63-4). The 
Germany of 1965 thus still reminds him of the German Reich: 
Fateful land, where some stand eternally in the light and others eternally in the 
darkness.  I travelled the length and breadth of it in the evacuation trains that, under 
the pressure of the final Soviet offensive, carried us from Auschwitz westward and 
later from Buchenwald to Bergen-Belsen.  When the tracks led us through the snow 
across a corner of the Bohemian countryside, the peasant women came running to 
the death train with bread and apples and had to be chased off through shots into the 
air by the escort party.  But in the Reich: faces of stone. A proud people still.  The pride 
has grown a bit stout, I’ll admit.  It no longer squeezes out between grinding jaws but 
gleams in the contentment of good conscience and the understandable joy of having 
made it once again.  It no longer cites heroism on the battlefield but the productivity 
that has no like in the entire world.  Still the old pride, and on our side the old 
helplessness.  Woe to the conquered (ibid. :80-1). 
  It is not difficult to see how this might seem like hatred, but what Améry really  wanted his 
audience to understand was that his resentments were not only historically justified, but also 
that they were not of the morally condemnable kind depicted by Nietzsche in his book The 
196 
Genealogy of Morals - not manifestations of what Nietzsche conceived as ‘slave morality’.58  
Rather, they were, as Thomas Brudholm puts it, ‘a legitimate and valuable form of anger 
responding to perceived moral wrongs’ (Brudholm, 2008: 9).  Améry opposed Nietzsche’s 
conceptual notion of ressentiment with the concrete reality of personal experience.  Equally, 
he opposed the notion that his resentments were simply the manifestation of some post-
traumatic psychological disorder, as he had read them described, or at least if they were, he 
declared, the ‘warped’ state of survivors constituted ‘a form of the human condition that 
morally as well as historically is of a higher order than that of healthy straightness’ (ibid. :68). 
 What, then, did Améry actually want his listeners and readers to do in order to alleviate his 
resentments, assuming they accepted that they were justified?  His ‘moral daydream’ he said, 
was that young Germans - those  who bore no direct or indirect responsibility for the crimes 
of that period -  could join with him in wanting to fulfil his ‘dis-ordered’ desire for two 
impossible things: ‘regression into the past and nullification of what had happened’. How they 
did this, he said, was for them to determine, but he suggested they to reject everything that 
was done during the period 1933-45, including even beneficial products of the period such as 
the Autobahns.  In his ‘ moral daydream’, he envisaged  turning back time itself, because 
whilst time had helped to heal the wounds of German society, by allowing the perpetrators 
to reintegrate into it and ‘dissolve in its consensus’, it had left the victim’s wounds unhealed.  
His ‘absurd’ demand to turn back time thus represents a moral protest against temporal 
reality and the perception of time as a natural healer.  This is why any re-engagement 
between Germans and victims like Améry  cannot take the form of reconciliation, but rather 
of them joining him in refusing to be reconciled to what happened in the past ( Brudholm, 
2008:116).   
   In the meantime, Améry argues, it is upon the survivors such as himself, rather than the 
German people, that the burden of collective guilt falls, because they alone are burdened by 
the knowledge that the German people, with some exceptions (which he celebrates but finds 
statistically insignificant) are guilty of the crimes and atrocities of the Third Reich, not in the 
sense of having all committed them, but in the sense that the term embraces ‘guilt of deed, 
                                                            
58 A useful summary of Nietzsche’s notion of ‘ressentiment’ in the specific context of Améry’s essay can be found 
in Vetlesen, 2006, pp. 27-9. 
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guilt of omission, guilt of utterance, and guilt of silence’ (ibid.: 73). Yet if he ventures to  voice 
his resentments to  young Germans who have grown up ‘in the calm climate of a new German 
democracy’, and know little of their past, he fears they will just sound  like ‘stagnant, Old 
Testament, barbaric hate’(ibid.: 75).   In a German weekly, for example, Améry reads a letter 
from an obviously young man from Kassel, who is ‘sick and tired of hearing again and again 
that our fathers killed six million  Jews’, and equates that crime with American ‘bombings’, or 
British murders in the Boer War (ibid.; 75-6).  Améry wants the young people like the 
correspondent from Kassel to be free  of  collective guilt for the past, but only if they earn 
that freedom by accepting that Hitler and his deeds are  and will continue to be part of 
German history and German tradition. 
   But, as he himself predicted, Améry would fail to ‘goad ‘ young Germans into redeeming 
their past, whether in concrete or spiritual terms.  He was both too early, because they did 
yet not know enough about that past, and too late, because they had already grown up, 
largely contentedly, in a modern, tolerant and democratic society which had  successfully 
buried it.  The future turned out in fact to be was worse than he had predicted,  because when 
left-wing  German youth finally revolted against Fascism, it was in the form of a sometimes 
violent revolt against what they perceived as the  Fascism of their own democracy, rather 
than a spiritual revolt against the real fascism of the Nazi period.  Worse still, in Améry’s view,  
one consequence of that perceived struggle was to give birth to a new, leftist anti-Semitism, 
in the ‘respectable’ guise of anti-Zionism.  In his Preface to the 1977 Reissue of Jenseits von 
Schuld und Sühne Améry recalled learning that at a ‘rally for the Palestinians’ in a large 
German city the ‘young agitated antifascists’ had been heard to cry ”Death to the Jewish 
people”. He continued: 
I would never have dreamed it when the first edition of my book appeared in 1966 
and I had no other enemies except my natural ones: the Nazis, old and new, the 
irrationalists and fascists, the reactionary pack that had brought death to the world. 
That today I must stand up against my natural friends, the young men and women of 
the Left, is more than overtaxed “dialectics”.  It is one of those bad farces of world 
history that make one doubt the sense of all historical occurrence and in the end 
despair (ibid.: x). 
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   At the end of his Preface  Améry concluded: ‘Nothing has healed, and what perhaps was 
already on the point of healing in 1964 is bursting open again as an infected wound’. (ibid.:  
xi).  But if this verdict, and much of Améry’s writing more generally, seems unremittingly 
bleak, it must be borne in mind that it was the verdict of an idealist, who had persisted in 
holding on to his moral daydreams, and resisting the tide of history, to the point of absurdity 



















  CHAPTER 10.  DEALING WITH THE PAST 
 10.1  Introduction 
   Améry’s analysis of his tortured relationship with the German people illustrates that 
catastrophe testimony is concerned not only with conveying information concerning the past, 
but also with dealing with the past.  Naturally, this is less evident in the case of testimonial 
accounts written shortly after the occurrence of the catastrophic experience in question, such 
as Levi’s If This Is a Man, or Delbo’s None of Us Will Return and Useless Knowledge, when the 
cognitive and existential distance between the testifier and the event is at its shortest, and 
the main preoccupation of testifiers is to get others to listen to their stories.  We see that, for 
example, in Levi’s nightmare of telling his story to an indifferent audience, or the urgency of 
Delbo’s  insistence that others must be made to see the reality of her suffering and that of her 
comrades.  The need to deal with the past, rather than just revealing it, on the other hand, is 
evident in those works featured in the preceding two chapters which were produced many 
years after the occurrence of the catastrophic experiences to which they relate, notably 
Freedman’s One Hour in Paris, Améry’s  At the Mind’s Limits, and Levi’s The Drowned and the 
Saved. Moreover the past which has to be dealt with in such works  encompasses not only 
the catastrophic event, but also the experience of surviving it. 
    As the testimonies examined in the preceding two chapters reveal, the issue of dealing with 
the past is in fact two issues: the introspective issue of dealing with one’s own past, and the 
political, social, cultural and moral issue of dealing with the experience of being a victim and 
survivor in the   world, and it is this latter issue upon which I focus in this chapter.  Freedman 
seems to me to present the most straightforward assessment task in this respect, not only 
because of her apparent success, after a very difficult beginning, in managing her post-
traumatic condition, but also because her catastrophic experience was one which is universal 
and continuing in most societies and thus familiar, even where it is not understood or fully 
acknowledged, and has also become increasingly sympathetically viewed in recent years. She 
is thus able to offer both a frank and unflinching account of her experience and its legacy, and 
a positive and forward-looking account of her present situation. Levi’s book, on the other 
hand, is the least straightforward to assess, because although it deals with a wide range of  
issues relevant to the experience of concentration camps, and surviving them, it deals largely 
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with other people’s experience of persecution, in relation to which Levi  assumes his preferred 
role of witness rather than protagonist. There are, though two chapters of his book in which 
Levi takes a distinctly personal stance. The first of these is his chapter on the reception of If 
This Is a Man by its German readers which I have already discussed, though his stated 
objective there is to try to understand how his readers dealt with their past.  The second is a 
chapter I have not previously discussed, which is the chapter of The Drowned and the Saved 
Levi devoted to Améry entitled ‘The Intellectual in Auschwitz’.  Ostensibly it is a critique of 
Améry’s Auschwitz essay ‘At the Mind’s Limits’ but in essence it is a broader critique of 
Améry’s world view as a survivor which in turn leads to Levi examining his existence as a 
survivor. Having already delivered my interpretation of Améry’s views in the preceding two 
chapters, I want to focus in this chapter on the issue of how Levi perceived, or at least 
purported to perceive, Améry, and what that says about Levi  and his attitude to dealing with 
the past.  This, in turn, leads to a discussion of the general issue of how the past can or should 
be dealt with by survivors of catastrophic experiences, and also the recipients of their 
accounts. 
10.2  Levi vs. Améry 
     There were many differences between Levi and Améry on a personal, existential and social 
level, and also  one much-discussed difficulty in their relationship (which seems to have been 
entirely conducted through hearsay and correspondence) which is not central to the issues 
raised herein, but is excellently summarised and more widely contextualized in Heidelberger-
Leonard, 2010 (pp.65-71), and also discussed, inter alia, in Stille (1990), Thomson (2003), 
Vetlesen (2006), and Cheyette (2013). In brief, Améry was transferred to the Buna Works in 
June 1944, and  recalled having  encountered Levi there, though  Levi claimed to have no 
recollection of him.  The two men never met in person after their liberation but  both became 
correspondents of Hety Schmitt-Maas. In the course of his correspondance with Schmitt-
Maas, in response to her probably unintentionally provocative praise of Levi as a man who 
seemed ‘entirely free of resentment’ Améry apparently commented  that, ‘Unlike Levi, I am 
not a man to forgive’, a suggestion which stung Levi, and which he apparently vigorously 
refuted (Heidelberger-Leonard, 2010 :66-7). It therefore seems plausible to suggest that this 
unfortunate exchange was at least in part responsible for Levi’s subsequent critique of 
Améry’s book. However, to devote an entire chapter of The Saved and the Drowned to a 
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posthumous critique of what Levi described as an ‘icy and bitter’ work, with which one 
assumes the vast majority of his readers were unfamiliar, seems to be a rather 
disproportionate and belated form of retaliation, as well as supremely ironic in its implied 
characterisation of Levi as a man of resentment!       
    In any event, the passage of Levi’s critique upon which I want to focus in this Section 
relates to an  episode recounted not in Améry’s Auschwitz essay but in his final Jenseits von 
Schuld und Sühne essay:  ‘On the Necessity and Impossibility of Being a Jew’. In this passage,  
Améry is recalling being hit in the face by an Auschwitz Kapo called Juszek -  a ’Polish 
professional criminal of horrifying vigour’-  for some trifling offence, as was Juszek’s usual 
practice, whereupon Améry returned the blow, striking Juszek in his face. ‘My human 
dignity lay in this punch to his jaw’, recalled Améry, though as a result he was ‘woefully 
thrashed’ by the stronger man.  He continues: 
Painfully beaten, I was satisfied with myself.  But not, as one might think, for 
reasons of courage and honor, but only because I had grasped well that there are 
situations in life in which our body is our entire self and our entire fate.  I was my 
body and nothing else: in hunger, in the blow that I suffered, in the blow that I dealt.  
My body, debilitated and crusted with filth, was my calamity.  My body, when it 
tensed to strike, was my physical and metaphysical dignity.  In situations like mine, 
physical violence is the sole means for restoring a disjointed personality. (Améry, 
1999: 90-1). 
   Returning the blow in a wider spiritual and social sense, became, Améry declares, the 
foundation of  his  attitude towards the world as a survivor, the blow in question being the 
world’s failure to restore  his dignity as a  human being deemed worthy of life.  He had been 
particularly affected in the years following his return from captivity by news of continued  
anti-Semitic disturbances in Poland, including the murder of Jews who had returned to 
reclaim their former properties, the unwelcoming attitude to returning Jewish survivors 
among the ‘ever sickly petty bourgeoisie’ in France, and the talk of a ‘Jewish Problem’ in 
Holland, as well as the British government’s efforts to prevent Jewish survivors of the camps 
entering Palestine.  He decided at that time that whilst he had to accept as a reality the 
continuing ‘world verdict’ on Jews, including himself, as being not worthy of life, rather than 
202 
seeking introspective consolation in the form of burnishing his sense of self-worth,  he 
would adopt a public stance of protest  against that verdict : ‘I became a person not by 
subjectively appealing to my abstract humanity but by discovering myself within the given 
social reality as a rebelling Jew and by realizing myself as one’ (ibid.: 91). 
  Levi offers a meta-narrative on  Améry’s description of the incident between Juszek and 
himself, in ‘The Intellectual in Auschwitz’, though, without giving  its wider political and 
philosophical context,  contrasting Améry’s action with his own ’intrinsic incapacity’ to 
‘return the blow’: ‘ ”Trading punches” is an experience I do not have, as far back as I can go 
in memory; nor can I say I regret not having it’ he observes (Levi, 1987: 109).  He confesses 
his ‘absolute inferiority’ in this respect, and his admiration for Améry’s choice to’ leave the 
ivory tower and go down into the battlefield’, both as a prisoner and a survivor, but 
comments that it ‘led him to positions of such severity and intransigence as to make him 
incapable of finding joy in life, indeed of living’.  ‘Trading blows’ with the world, Levi 
concluded, could only end in defeat for the individual, and this, he suggested, provided one 
explanation for Améry’s eventual suicide. (ibid. : 110).  Rather cleverly,  Levi follows this 
assessment with a repudiation of Améry’s description of himself as a ‘forgiver’, whilst 
conceding that if he had suffered everything Améry had suffered, he too might have 
become a more resentful survivor.  
    Leaving aside the question of whether and to what extent Levi’s critique might have 
contained an element of personal animus, it raises a fundamental question for survivors of 
collective catastrophic experiences, which is whether there is any morally ‘right’ way to re-
engage specifically with perpetrator societies, insofar as they feel the need to do so.   
Améry’s response to that challenge had been intensely subjective and also cultural, not only 
because he was a survivor, but also because he was, or had been, a German. Levi, on the 
other hand, had in 1961 chosen to remain above that particular battlefield, which he no 
doubt felt perfectly entitled to do as an Italian, declaring only that his personal mission was 
to ‘understand’ Germans.  Vetlesen (2006), notes that Levi is generally regarded, in taking  
this stance, as someone whose evident humanism commands great respect, in the light of 
his experiences. However, he asks whether, as Tzvetan Todorov (1997: 269) suggested, this 
might have led to Levi ignoring his own warning that ‘to understand is almost to justify’ and 
thus a task not best undertaken by the victim. Vetlesen further suggests that when Levi  said 
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he wanted to ‘understand’ Germans, he was in reality  attempting to fight his own feelings 
of resentment against them by  portraying the ability to rise above such feelings as a virtue. 
Consequently he suggests that Levi’s ‘posthumous argument’ with Améry should be seen 
not primarily as ‘an intellectual dispute or a discourse on morality’ but essentially as Levi’s 
struggle against himself -  as Levi’s  way of  justifying to himself  a suppression of his own 
resentments towards Germans, in other words -  ‘thus confirming’, opines Vetlesen, ‘ the 
received psychological wisdom that  what we cannot tolerate in ourselves we attack and 
reject when encountering it in others’ (Vetlesen, 2006; 41).  Vetlesen’s analysis broadly fits 
my own reading of Levi’s essay, but  I would also suggest, more generally, that resentment is 
the natural, if rarer, condition of the survivor of a catastrophic experience  whereas 
‘understanding’ is the unnatural, if more common (because undertaken in the belief that it 
is  more morally praiseworthy and more socially acceptable) suppression of it.  Further, 
resentment, especially where it represents a reaction against immoral social pressure to 
forgive or be reconciled, is, as Améry maintained, a distinctly morally unambiguous reaction, 
whereas ‘understanding’ is a distinctly  morally ambiguous one.  As Vetlesen observes, 
‘What Améry helps provide is a factor that society needs in order to be a decent society’ 
(ibid. :44), though of course society does not always appreciate such help.  In short, I would 
argue that the natural existential and moral  role of the survivor of an atrocity committed 
against him relative to the former perpetrators is that of a plaintiff, not a judge.  
    In arguing against Levi in this specific context, however, I have no wish to accuse him of 
moral cowardice.  The difference between Améry and himself was, as Levi suggests, both a 
matter of temperament, and also the fact that Améry, unlike Levi, had lost too much -  his 
country, his wife, his culture, and his identity -  to be ‘understanding’ in his  dealings with 
German society.  Levi in fact exhibited great moral courage in  The Drowned and the Saved 
in endeavouring to some extent to speak on behalf  the ‘Drowned’, such as the Auschwitz 
Sonderkommando.  This may have led to feelings, if not of survivor guilt then at least of 
what Bryan Cheyette calls ‘ethical uncertainty’- a desire to avoid Manichaean distinctions 
between good and evil.  It also, suggests Cheyette, made Levi aware of ‘the provisional 
nature of all forms of story-telling in relation to the Holocaust’ (Cheyette, 2013:272).  No 
such uncertainty, on the other hand, is apparent in If This is a Man, written forty years 
earlier, which seems to me to be  notable for Levi’s realism and unambiguous frankness, for 
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example concerning his attitude towards his own survival. It does not shirk from revealing 
the ruthlessness, and self- serving mental and physical toughness and ‘strange callousness’ 
as he calls it, that he, and all survivors, had required to see them through the experience of 
Auschwitz.  This  implies that his attitude in Auschwitz might have always been closer to that 
of Améry than he later cared to admit. In fact, I concur with the assessment of Alexander 
Stille  that: 
Underneath the measured tones of Levi’s prose, there is a tough-minded, unflinching 
realism, and beneath the harsh, bitter surface of Améry’s writing is a desperate 
belief in sweet reason and dialogue (Stille, 1990:366). 
   Nevertheless Améry, despite his desire for some kind of mutually redemptive re-
engagement with young German intellectuals, was also a realist, for example in seeing, as Levi 
failed to do, the pointlessness of addressing his resentments to Germans of his own 
generation.  Do survivors of catastrophic experiences, then, have any kind of moral duty to 
try to understand their persecutors, or do they necessarily derive any benefit from their 
efforts to do so?    Levi’s suggestion in 1961 that he wished to understand Germans in order 
to ‘judge’ them seems too nebulous to me to suggest he really believed that to be the case, 
and by the time he wrote The Drowned and the Saved, it seems to me that he might have 
abandoned that project altogether. 
  10.3  A German Perspective 
    For a more complete picture of the situation in the Germany of the 1960s and subsequently, 
though, we should also consider it from a German perspective. The well-known writer and 
former Judge, Bernard Schlink, who was born in 1944 and thus would have been in the age 
group targeted in Améry’s ‘Resentments’ essay in 1965, offers a brutally frank insider account 
of post-war German society’s dealings with the past.  Schlink writes that young people like 
himself who tried to confront their parents concerning the past encountered massive 
hostility, so that, especially in the 1960s, even a private discussion about The Third Reich  and 
the Holocaust ‘had to be insisted upon against great resistance’ (Schlink, 2008: 26).  When, 
many years later, that resistance was finally broken, Schlink recalled, there followed a period 
in which the Holocaust was turned into a ‘sort of banality’, with a stream of books, memorials, 
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and conferences against forgetting, or the comparison of every awful contemporary event to 
the Holocaust, until young people simply came to regard the subject as tiresome, like Améry’s  
young man from Kassel, and the schoolmates of the student who wrote to Levi.  This 
banalization, says Schlink, was essentially the successor strategy to the earlier German 
attempt avoid the task of Vergangenheitsbewältigung - ‘overcoming’ or ‘mastering’ the past 
– not, as previously, by denying or burying it, but by earning the right, through exemplary 
commemoration, to draw a line under it.  Hence, the  sub-title of the German edition of 
Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne -   Bewältigungsversuche eines Überwältigten (roughly 
’Attempts to  Overcome by One who was Overcome’) -  is, perhaps intentionally, ironic. Such 
efforts, Schlink observes, unless they arouse genuine emotions concerning the past, simply 
devalue its moral legacy (which was perhaps for some at least the objective).  Perhaps, then, 
one should salute the efforts of some young Germans to seek out the truth concerning the 
past, and also acknowledge that by no means  all of them fell victim to the anti-Zionist Leftist 
phenomenon Améry described in his Preface to the reissue of his book.  
      Schlink also concluded in his book, as had Améry, that collective guilt cannot be passed 
down to successor generations.  He even considered whether, specifically in the case of  the 
crimes of the Third Reich, a ‘new sort of [collective] guilt’ may be required - that of not 
dissociating oneself from the perpetrator through renunciation -  which could attach to 
anyone after 1945 (ibid.:15).  However, he concludes that whilst the moral and legal-historical 
case for imposing such guilt might be strong when applied to   perpetrator generations, since 
it justifiably  infers some kind of communal solidarity with the perpetrators, it is weak when 
applied to successor generations, save in the case of those who positively demonstrate a 
choice to stand in solidarity with past generations. 
   It seems, therefore that what we learn from the example of the Third Reich is that whilst 
collective guilt in respect of the crimes of the perpetrators can attach to those of the same 
generation, the burden of that guilt is highly unlikely to be accepted, or the question of  the 
nature of  the crimes in question or the responsibility for them even discussed openly 
among members of that generation.  Thus Hannah Arendt, who made a number of visits to 
Germany from 1949 onwards, said in 1964, that she had observed two strange phenomena.  
The first was that Germans who had  ‘never done any harm in their lives’ constantly insisted 
on talking about how guilty they felt about the Nazi era, yet genuine ex-Nazis seemed to 
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have the clearest consciences in the world about it.  The second was that despite their  
declared sense of guilt  about the past, ‘people in Germany had grown astonishingly blasé 
about the idea that “there are murderers amongst us”’ (Arendt, 2007:488).  Arendt 
concluded that confessions by the innocent of feeling guilty were ‘phony’ and  served to 
cover up the crimes of the genuinely guilty.  The concept of collective guilt ,she argued, was 
in any event purely metaphorical, since an innocent person cannot be guilty of the crimes in 
which they had not participated. The concept of collective responsibility for crimes 
committed in your name, on the other hand, was a real but political one, and one for which 
the German people as a whole should accept their collective responsibility. 
    The problem of dealing with the past, or at least of dealing with it truthfully, after the end 
of the Second World War, though, was not an exclusively  German phenomenon.  In post-
war France, for example, as previously mentioned,  the story of a collaborationist Vichy past, 
including the deportation and subsequent murder of more than twenty per cent of the 
country’s Jewish population, was reconfigured as one of widespread popular resistance to  
German rule.  Naturally, stories of atrocities committed by French men and women, such as 
members of the notorious Vichy paramilitary organisation known as the Milice  (Militia) 
were inimical to this narrative.  Delbo, for instance, told Langer how she tracked down the 
two men who had arrested her husband and herself following her return, and reported 
them to the authorities with the necessary evidence to prosecute them.  However, the 
authorities told her that about a year after her arrest the two men had switched allegiance 
and joined the resistance, fighting bravely until the end of the war, and thus would not be 
prosecuted for their earlier crimes (Langer, 1995, Introduction: xii). 
  One can see, therefore, why, for the survivor of a collective catastrophic experience, 
dealing with the past may be virtually impossible.  On a private level, as in the case of a 
survivor of rape or torture, it is a traumatic experience from which one never completely 
recovers.  On a public level, however, it is a crime in which whole populations are actively or 
passively implicated, but for which only those who are held directly responsible can be 
charged and punished, and for which collective responsibility is otherwise typically either 
denied, or admitted only after it is no longer legally or socially  harmful to do so.   In the 
meantime, if the survivor wants to be reconciled with the perpetrator collective, she may 
have to be prepared to agree to forgive the unforgivable, and forget the unforgettable, and 
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to accept symbolic admissions of guilt from the innocent and gestures of atonement from 
those who have nothing to atone for, in lieu of true justice and real retribution.  Seen in this 
light, we can understand how testimony can perform a vital personal role for survivors who 
do not wish to be reconciled on such humiliating  terms, but are powerless to obtain true 
justice or real retribution, as well as a vital  didactic and epistemological public role, though 
the effect of performing the latter role may be to widen, rather than narrow, the existential 



















  CHAPTER ELEVEN.  EPILOGUE 
   In the course this dissertation I have examined a number of  testimonies of survivors relating 
to catastrophic experiences which are on the face of it not readily comparable: rape, torture, 
and imprisonment in Auschwitz and other Nazi concentration camps.  Each of these 
testimonies, though, bears witness, in its particular way, to the epistemological, existential   
and moral chasm which such an experience, and the legacy of living with it as a survivor, 
creates, and sustains, between the survivor and the world, and also sometimes between the 
testifier and his or her former self.      
     The epistemological chasm between the survivor of a catastrophic experience and the 
world in a testimonial context equates, roughly speaking, to the  difference between 
everything which is  known, felt, or remembered by the testifier concerning the catastrophic 
experience or the experience of surviving it, and that part of such content which can become 
known to the recipient of his or her testimony in the form of propositional information.  The 
existence of this chasm is a common feature of all the testimonies examined in this 
dissertation, largely due to the inability of the testifier to  communicate his or her subjectively 
felt experience of being a victim or a survivor to those who have not shared that experience. 
One important manifestation of this inability is the insufficiency of language to convey  
feelings, for example that of the testifier’s pain, or hunger.  This is not to say, however, that 
nothing worthwhile can be conveyed through descriptive language, beyond propositional 
information, or that no intellectual, moral or spiritual value can be extracted by recipients 
from phenomenological descriptions by survivors of their experiences.  In fact this is surely 
necessary, if the testifier is to achieve the goal of intellectual and spiritual engagement with 
his audience as Améry, for example, claimed he wished to do. Delbo, too, though she declared 
that her sensory experience of Auschwitz could not be understood simply by reading her 
prose or poetry, nevertheless insisted that she had written it so that her readers could be 
‘made to see’ what she had experienced.  In fact conveying something of the sense of her 
experiences through her self-proclaimed ‘inadequate’ language seems to me to have been 
her most remarkable artistic achievement.  
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   The existential chasm between the testifier and the world, of which the moral chasm is a 
part, is determined both by the nature and circumstances of the catastrophic experience, and 
the testifier’s experience of existing as a survivor in the world. The relative importance of the 
latter experience may well vary considerably depending on a number of factors. One such 
factor might be the period of time which may have elapsed between the occurrence of the 
catastrophic experience and the testifier’s account of it.   Another might be the life choices 
made by the testifier as a survivor – for example whether he or she  has returned to her 
former home, or emigrated and created a new life with a new  identity. Yet another might be 
the state of mind of the testifier at the time of testifying, or the objective of the testifier in 
testifying, and no doubt there are other factors to be considered.  What is noticeable, though, 
is that even where there are no signs of a significant existential chasm  between the survivor 
and the world, there is still evidence of an existential loneliness – a sense of the testifier 
feeling cut off from, and perhaps abandoned by, society.  There is also a sense, for example 
in the writing of Delbo and Kluger, both of whom seem to have integrated or reintegrated 
into post-catastrophic society reasonably successfully, that if one wants to get on with the 
business of living ‘normally’ as a survivor, one has to cut oneself off from one’s past, and one’s 
former self – to create, in other words, an internalized existential chasm.  Levi, on the other 
hand seems to have managed to reintegrate into society without needing to perform this 
psychological surgery, by producing his testimony shortly after his return.  In his case, 
catastrophe testimony may thus have acted as a sort of cathartic release valve, as Levi 
suggested it could, but its effect can equally be psychologically hazardous, as he admitted. 
One important aspect of the existential chasm between the survivor and the world which is 
illuminated by Schlink’s book is the particularly complex nature of the dynamic between 
survivors of collective catastrophic experiences and perpetrator societies.  He shows how 
difficult it can be for survivors to engage with members of such societies on any existentially 
or morally truthful level , or elicit any  recognition of the wrongs done to them The three-
stage ‘self-rehabilitation’ process Schlink describes occurring in post-war German society -  
aggressive defensiveness and denial, followed by exemplary, but morally dubious, 
commemoration, and finally compassion fatigue and symbolism -  seemed to me to fit  
Levi’s account of his letters from his German readers, and also brought to mind a comment 
Améry made in an essay broadcast in the mid 1970s entitled ‘After Five Thousand 
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Newspaper Articles’ , about how he became a writer.  In that article, Améry said of the 
‘succès d’estime’ (critical success) of his book Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne, of which he 
estimated only 7,000 copies were sold: 
 I have the suspicion that I merely struck a chord that began to vibrate just at that 
time when it was still fashionable to occupy oneself with the fate of the Nazi victims 
and that today…..I couldn’t tempt a soul with this book (Améry, 1984: 4) 
Perhaps, though, it is only thinking about this societal failure in relation  to the enormity of a 
crime such as the Holocaust which makes it seem so shocking. The fact that crimes which 
implicate directly or indirectly substantially the whole of societies cannot subsequently be 
admitted or atoned for by those involved, or that  successor generations are unwilling to 
inherit the responsibility for them, is perhaps simply how it is, how it always was, and in all 
probability how it will be in the future. The Holocaust is often cited as the most egregious 
historical example of this phenomenon, in part because the Nazi régime came to power as a 
result of the exercise of the democratic will of the German people, and, as Levi and Améry 
both pointed out,  remained in power with the general support of the population, including 
active or passive complicity in, or indifference to, their persecutions of Jews and others.  Yet 
it is far from being the only example of such a phenomenon. Crimes involving individuals, or 
particular elements of society, on the other hand are obviously easier for society as a whole 
to recognize, and deal with, though even in such cases it may be necessary to overturn, or at 
least modify, established societal narratives or myths; for instance that the  society in 
question is one in which  women can safely move about on their own, or one which is 
protective of those who are subjected to sexual abuse or violence. Even more significant 
obstacles are encountered, though, in  cases of violence  committed or sanctioned by 
governments or other state actors, such as the torture of political opponents.  Recognition 
of such crimes normally requires régime change, in order that  the  perpetrators can be 
recharacterized as enemies of the state, or at least anti-societal elements within it, and thus 
more easily denounced and punished.  
    Is there, then, some other means by which societies can  detoxify their past otherwise 
than at the expense of individual survivors?  Some commentators believe that a model for 
such a process might be found, notwithstanding the imperfections of its implementation, in 
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the proceedings of tribunals such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  
Critics of the proceedings of the Commission, on the other hand, like Brudholm (2008) 
regard it as a utilitarian process, in which individual victims of the former apartheid regime 
were instrumentalized in the interests of social cohesion and the country’s future. The 
Commission invited victims of crimes and atrocities committed against them by servants of 
the apartheid regime between 1960 and 1994  to give evidence of those crimes or atrocities 
without cross examination or harassment by defence counsel, in response to applications 
from the perpetrators for amnesty- immunity from criminal prosecution and civil actions for 
damages.  Alleged perpetrators were not required to show remorse or apologise to victims, 
nor victims to show forgiveness to perpetrators, the objective being to achieve some kind of 
catharsis or closure concerning the past, rather than justice in a formal legal sense, for the 
victims. In practice, however, says Brudholm, leading political actors, such as Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu, regularly praised those victims who expressed a willingness to forgive as 
great role models for the country, whilst the Commission’s Final Report on its proceedings 
presented  victim responses in terms of a dichotomy between forgiveness or vengeance, 
leaving no room for intermediate positions which might encourage reconciliation yet also 
allow victims more opportunity to retain their dignity59  In essence, Brudholm contends, 
rather than recognising the victim’s right to refuse forgiveness, and to feel anger and 
resentment towards perpetrators, and harbour desires for retribution against them,  the 
Commission, and leading figures such as Tutu, portrayed these feelings as psychological 
disorders or spiritual failings which victims should try to overcome.  Such ‘forgiveness 
boosterism’, argues Brudholm, constitutes an ethical wrong, by reinforcing the harm and 
disrespect originally suffered by the testifier, and ‘compounding’ her resentment as a victim 
with further resentment arising from: (1) the offer of  amnesty to perpetrators which 
deprives victims of their right to seek legal redress  and justice for  past crimes; and (2) the 
public celebration of forgiveness and restorative justice which denies  and condemns  
legitimate and righteous resentment (Brudholm, 2008: 57). 
   The cynic might conclude therefore that the only truly successful means which has been 
found by societies for meeting the existential and moral challenge of survivor testimony in 
the case of serious collective crimes committed by them or their predecessors is to  avoid 
                                                            
59 See Brudholm, 2008: 37-8 for concrete examples in support of his argument. 
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confronting them for as long as possible, and preferably until such time as they can be 
consigned to what Améry referred to as  the ‘cold storage of history’.  Indeed, in relation to 
crimes as egregious, and in which so many were actively or passively implicated, as the 
Holocaust, or other genocides, it may be considered the only solution from a utilitarian 
perspective.  Améry predicted in 1966 that this is what would happen in relation to the 
crimes of the Third Reich, and though he believed his prophesy had been fulfilled in 1977, it 
is to the great credit of the German people that this turned out not to be the case. 
     If, then, I had to characterise in a few words how catastrophe testimony most clearly 
evidences the epistemological, existential and moral chasm between survivors and the 
world, it would be in terms of two asymmetries.  The first is that between the subjectively 
felt and understood experience of the testifier as a victim and a survivor, on the one hand, 
and what can be known or understood of that experience by others through the medium of 
her testimony, on the other.  The second  asymmetry is that between the hopes and 
objectives of testifiers in testifying  and the capacity or desire of recipients of their 
testimony to help fulfil them.  It is these asymmetries also which mostly account for  the 
distinctions between catastrophe testimony and other kinds of testimony whose principal 
task is the conveyance of propositional information.   Catastrophe testimony certainly 
typically performs this function, but, beyond this, it is a vehicle for introspection, for the 
cathartic release, articulation or externalization of traumatic memories, for social, political, 
cultural or moral education and engagement with the world, and for challenging  prevailing 
public memories, social attitudes, and moral responses, towards victims and survivors, and 
the past more generally .  When Jean Améry said at the end of his Preface to the First Edition 
of At the Mind’s Limits, that the aim of his study was that it should  be of concern to all 
those who ‘wish to live together as fellow human beings’, he encapsulated in a few words 
an affective intent which is for me the mark of true catastrophe testimony. 
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